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ABSTRACT

The increase in the number of racial and ethnic minority judges in the federal
courtroom has led several scholars to examine the merits of descriptive representation.
Advocates of descriptive representation argue that it is important, not only because it can
translate into positive attitudes towards government, but also because it can lead to more
substantive policy outcomes that can benefit under-represented groups in society.
Research focusing on the latter of the two merits of descriptive representation, however,
has a tendency to treat racial and ethnic minority judges as monolithic groups. It contends
that racial and ethnic minority judges, based on their experiences with discrimination,
will be more likely than their white colleagues to vote in favor of the claimant across
policy issues considered salient to other racial and ethnic minorities. It also argues that
these same differences in individual voting behavior will give racial and ethnic minority
judges a distinct advantage, as they can crystallize issues of race, enhance perceptions of
policy specialization, and threaten panel unanimity to influence panel outcomes. This
research is far from conclusive, however. While research focusing on the behavior of
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African American judges demonstrates mixed results with regards to both individual
voting behavior and panel outcomes (Scherer, 2004-2005; Boyd et al., 2010), others find
that Latino judges tend to be more conservative than their white colleagues (Manning,
2004).
This dissertation attempts to reconcile some of these mixed results and
unexpected findings by providing one of the first comprehensive examinations of African
American and Latino judicial behavior in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. More specifically,
it extends the above arguments by focusing on those conditions that can mediate the
individual voting behavior of African American and Latino judges and their ability to
influence panel outcomes, which includes both panel rulings and majority opinion
writing. While the presence of salient policy issues, such as discrimination cases,
provides one condition for understanding African American and Latino judicial behavior,
this dissertation contends that “claimant effects” or the presence of co-racial and coethnic claimants can enhance perceptions of commonality that motivate African
American and Latino judges to vote in favor of the claimant as well as influence panel
outcomes. By controlling for these judge-claimant relationships, it is possible to not only
test whether previous results are due to the exclusion of “claimant effects,” but also
examine whether theory is applicable to both African American and Latino judges across
the same set of data.
To test my argument, this dissertation focuses exclusively on Title VII
employment discrimination cases based on race and ethnicity between 2001 and 2009.
The data is unique in that it records both the race and ethnicity of the judge and the
claimant. The results from this dissertation show that African American and Latino
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judges are not monolithic in their individual voting behavior. Although African American
judges are more likely than non-Black judges to vote in favor of other co-racial
claimants, Latino judges are less likely than non-Latino judges to rule in favor of Latino
and non-Latino claimants alike. The results also show that African American and Latino
judges are not marginalized in the courtroom, as they can influence both individual
voting behavior and panel outcomes. While the presence of an African American judge
on a panel increases the probability that a panel will rule in favor of a Black claimant, the
presence of a Latino judge has the opposite effect by decreasing the likelihood that both
Latino and non-Latino claimants will win their appeal. Finally, the results demonstrate
that African American and Latino judges are more likely than their white colleagues to
write the majority opinion across Title VII employment discrimination cases.
Interestingly, though, the likelihood of writing the majority opinion is not conditioned by
the formal role of the presiding position.
Overall, the results from this dissertation have important implications for the
relationship between descriptive representation and substantive outcomes. In the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, it has been well documented that Title VII employment discrimination
claims are difficult to win on appeal. Minority judges, at least African American judges,
can help alleviate some of this difficulty by bringing a different voice to the bench.
Different from Latino judges, African American judges can influence their panel
colleagues and, at the very minimum, moderate the policy preferences of their panel
colleagues. By having more opportunities to write the majority opinion, moreover,
African American judges can also set the policy agenda as well as change, strike down,
or even create new legal guidelines that may lead to more winnable claims in the future.
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This dissertation also provides an added dimension to the study of descriptive
representation by focusing on the more direct effects that African American and Latino
judges can have on the claimants who wish to appeal or defend their case in the
intermediary courts.

By coming to the bench with a different perspective, African

American judges can level the playing field by being directly responsive to other Blacks
claimants. This is especially important given that Blacks are over-represented in Title VII
employment discrimination claims. Finally, this dissertation concludes by arguing that
diversity in the courtroom is a normative good.

Even though Latino and African

American judges come to the bench with different voices, efforts to make the bench look
more like the United States’ diverse population remains important for achieving greater
inclusion in the political system.

ix

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................... xiii
List of Tables .................................................................................................................. xiv
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................1
The Federal Courts as a Counter-Majoritarian Institution? .............................................3
Debating the Merits of Descriptive Representation .........................................................8
Scope and Purpose of Dissertation ................................................................................12
African American and Latino Judicial Behavior ..........................................................14
Descriptive Representation ..........................................................................................15
Small Group Theory ...................................................................................................17
Claimant Effects ..........................................................................................................21
Outline of Dissertation ...................................................................................................23
Chapter 2 CLAMANT CUES AND THE INDIVIDUAL VOTING BEHAVIOR OF
AFRICAN AMERICAN AND LATINO JUDGES ......................................................26
Background ....................................................................................................................28
Descriptive Representation in the Courts ......................................................................31
Diversity on the Bench and Influence Over Voting Behavior .......................................35
The Role of Claimant Effects ........................................................................................37
Hypotheses .....................................................................................................................39
Data and Methods ..........................................................................................................40
Dependent Variable .......................................................................................................45
Independent Variables ...................................................................................................46

x

Control Variables ...........................................................................................................52
Results ............................................................................................................................58
Conclusion .....................................................................................................................80
Chapter 3 African American and Latino Influence Over Panel Outcomes ...............84
Attitudes and Strategic Interaction.................................................................................87
Panel Effects and Small Group Theory .........................................................................91
Racial and Ethnic Diversity, Influence, and Panel Outcomes .......................................94
The Role of Claimant Effects ........................................................................................99
Data and Methods ........................................................................................................100
Dependent Variable .....................................................................................................105
Independent Variables .................................................................................................105
Control Variables .........................................................................................................108
Results ..........................................................................................................................112
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................125
Chapter 4 MAJORITY OPINION WRITING AND THE SELECTION OF
AFRICAN AMERICAN AND LATINO JUDGES ....................................................129
Background ..................................................................................................................131
Diversity, Panel Influence, and Majority Opinion Writing .........................................137
Data and Methods ........................................................................................................140
Dependent Variable .....................................................................................................143
Independent Variables .................................................................................................143
Control Variables .........................................................................................................143
Results ..........................................................................................................................148

xi

Conclusion ...................................................................................................................157
Chapter 5 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................160
Summary of Results .....................................................................................................163
Explaining Latino Judicial Behavior ...........................................................................166
Explaining Differences in Behavior between Latino and African American Judges ..169
Implications for Substantive Representation ...............................................................172
Limitations of Dissertation and Future Areas of Research ..........................................178
Final Remarks ..............................................................................................................183
Appendices ......................................................................................................................187
Appendix A: Validity Tests for Individual-Level Analysis .........................................187
Appendix B: Logistic Model of Panel Outcomes (Includes Variables that Account for
the Partisan Composition of Panels) ............................................................................194
Appendix C: Logistic Model of Majority Opinion Writing Model (Clusters
Observations Around Panel) ........................................................................................197
References .......................................................................................................................199

xii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1 The Number of Minority Judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1970-2009 .....9
Figure 2.1 Probability of Ruling in Favor of a Black Claimant.........................................65
Figure 2.2 Probability of Ruling in Favor of a Latino Claimant .......................................66
Figure 2.3 Probability of Ruling in Favor of a Latino Claimant .......................................75
Figure 2.4 Probability of Ruling in Favor of a Latino Claimant .......................................76
Figure 3.1 Probability of Winning a Discrimination Claim (2001-2009) .......................119
Figure 3.2 Probability of a Latino Winning a Discrimination Claim (2001-2009) .........121
Figure 3.3 Probability of Winning a Discrimination Claim (2001-2009) .......................123
Figure 4.1 Probability of Writing the Majority Opinion in Discrimination Cases (20012009) ................................................................................................................................153
Figure 4.2 Probability of Writing the Majority Opinion Among Non-Presiding Judges in
Discrimination Cases (2001-2009) ..................................................................................155

xiii

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1 Distribution of Votes by the Race and Ethnicity of the Judge and the Claimant
in Discrimination Claims (2001-2009) ..............................................................................48
Table 2.2 Distribution of Votes by the Race and Ethnicity of the Judge and the Claimant
Across different Panel Compositions in Discrimination Claims ......................................51
Table 2.3. Descriptive Statistics.........................................................................................53
Table 2.4. Proportion of Favorable Votes by White, African American, and Latino judges
Across Employment Discrimination Claims (2001-2009). ...............................................59
Table 2.5. Logistic Model of Individual Voting Behavior in the U.S. Courts of Appeals
(2001-2009)........................................................................................................................61
Table 2.6. The Voting Behavior of Latino Judges towards Latino Claimants by
Partisanship ........................................................................................................................68
Table 2.7. Logistic Model of Individual Voting Behavior Across Different Panel
Compositions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (2001-2009) ................................................71
Table 3.1. Distribution of Panel Rulings by Panel Composition and Race and Ethnicity of
the Claimant in Discrimination Claims (2001-200) ........................................................107
Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics.......................................................................................109
Table 3.3. Favorable Panel Outcomes by the Racial and Ethnic Composition of the Panel
and the Race and Ethnicity of the Claimant.....................................................................113
Table 3.4. Logistic Model of Panel Outcomes in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (20012009) ...................................................................................................................................................... 115

xiv

Table 3.5. The Voting Behavior of Latino Judges Towards Latino Claimants by
Partisanship ......................................................................................................................................... 122
Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics .................................................................................................. 144
Table 4.2 Assigning the Majority Opinion to White, African American, and Latino
Judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (2001-2009) ................................................................ 148
Table 4.3. Logistic Model of Majority Opinion Writing in the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
2001-2009 ............................................................................................................................................ 150
Table A.1 List of Latino and African American Judges who Participated in a Title VII
Employment Discrimination Claim Between 2001 and 2009 .......................................... 187
Table A.2 Logistic Model of Individual Voting Behavior in the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
2001-2009 ............................................................................................................................................ 188
Table A.3 Logistic Model of Individual Voting Behavior in the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
2001-2009 ............................................................................................................................................ 191
Table B.1 Logistic Model of Panel Outcomes in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 2001-2009
................................................................................................................................................................... 194
Table C.1 Logistic Model of Majority Opinion Writing in the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
2001-2009 ............................................................................................................................................ 197

xv

CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Of the three branches of government, the judicial branch serves as a countermajoritarian institution that protects the rights of the minority from an overbearing
majority. In the United States, the institution of majority rule is central to the political
landscape. While those who represent the interests of the majority can use their superior
size to determine the policy agenda and pass public policy, those who represent the
interests of the minority have much less opportunity to determine political outcomes.
James Madison and other delegates at the Constitutional Convention, however, were
especially fearful that dominating interests, also known as “factions” or “groups,” could
potentially take control of government (Hamilton et al., [1788] 1961).1 Assuming that
individuals are motivated by self-interest, the Framers reasoned that factions,
representing common passions or interests, could potentially infringe upon the rights and
liberties of the minority. In this sense, democracy would be replaced by tyranny of the
majority.
Given the potential for dominating interests to emerge, the Framers sought to
place important constitutional and legal restrictions on government (Woll, 2011).
Following the principle of separation of powers, federal judges maintain autonomous
powers where they are called upon to interpret the law and settle disputes. At the same
1

Madison defined a 'faction' as “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the

whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the
rights of other citizens or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community” (Hamilton et al.,
[1788] 1961).
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time, the judicial branch also places important constraints on legislative and executive
power. Although not explicitly stated in Article III of the Constitution, the power of
judicial review allows federal judges to declare actions of the legislative and executive
branches invalid or unconstitutional. As Hamilton noted, “it [the judiciary] not only
serves as “an excellent barrier” against the encroachments and oppression of the
representative body,” but it also serves “as an essential safeguard against the effects of
the occasional ill humors of society” (Hamilton [1788] 1961, 433, 438).
The independence of the court is central to the ability to make decisions and
provide a check on dominating interests. By independence, I refer to the “ability of the
courts to perform their duties free of influence or control of other actors” (Law, 2010:
1369). Assuming that individuals are self-interested, the framers feared that judges would
be susceptible to bias and pursue their own personal agendas (Ferejohn, 1999). The
framers also feared that federal judges would be prone to intimidation from those
representing other government institutions and the public (Ferejohn, 1999). By insulating
judges from internal and external pressures, however, it was assumed that judges could
base their decisions on the facts of the case and legal principles, such as the plain
meaning of statutes, the Constitution, the intent of the Framers, and legal precedent,
rather than other extra-legal influences (Segal and Spaeth, 2002: 26).2 In this context, the
2

Segal and Spaeth (2002), in their discussion of the legal model, define each of these concepts in turn.

Plain meaning “applies not only to the language of statutes and constitutions, but also to the words of
judicially formulated rules” (53). Moreover, “it holds that judges rest their decisions in significant part of
plain meaning of the pertinent language” (53). Legislative and Framer’s’ intent refers to “construing
statutes and the Constitution according to the preferences of those who originally drafted and supported
them” (60). While legislative intent refers to the interpretation of statutes, Framers intent involves the
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Court is distinct from the other branches of government in that political motivations are
not intended to be paramount in decision-making.
To ensure judicial independence, the Framers established a series of institutional
mechanisms. According to Article III of the U.S. Constitution, judges are appointed by
the president and confirmed by the Senate. By appointing judges rather than electing
them, the Framers sought to ensure that the neither the public nor any one branch of
government would have complete control over the decision-making of federal judges.
Article III of the Constitution also stipulates that judges hold tenure on the basis of good
behavior. Over the years, the notion of serving on the basis of good behavior has
translated into lifetime tenure for federal judges. In fact, “the standards of impeachment
are so high that only 14 judges have been impeached in U.S. history and only 7 have ever
been removed from office” (Lowi et al., 2010; Ferejohn, 1999). 3 Finally, Article III
mandates sustainable salaries to promote job security and ensure that judges would not be
susceptible to other external influences, such as bribery (Ferejohn, 1999). By establishing
these institutional mechanisms, the Framers hoped to protect the independence of the
judiciary.
The Federal Courts as Counter-Majoritarian Institutions?
Despite the more normative view that judges merely find law through the facts of
interpretation of constitutional provisions (60). Finally, precedent, or stare decisis, refers to “the adherence
to what has been decided” (76).

3

The difficulty in achieving a two-thirds majority vote in the Senate provides one explanation for these low

numbers. As Ferejohn (1999) notes, “majorities of this seize are hart to put together and sustain over time
(356-357).
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the case and the guidance of legal principles, it has been well established that judges are
also important policy makers (Segal and Spaeth, 1993; Rhode and Spaeth, 1976; Rhode,
1972). Through their ability to interpret law, judges can modify, strike-down, and
completely change existing legal precedent (Carp, Stidham, and Manning, 2004). The
basis for which judges can craft policy is through their ability to select among multiple
interpretations of the law. As Birkby (1983) explains:
Any judge faced with a choice between two or more interpretations and
applications of a legislative act, executive order, or constitutional
provision must choose among them because the controversy must be
decided. And when the judge chooses, his or her interpretation becomes
policy for the specific litigants. If the interpretation is accepted by other
judges, the judge has made policy for all jurisdictions in which that view
prevails (1; see also Carp et al., 2004: 30)
The above conception of the judicial role also focuses on how judges in the
federal courts ought to act. Assuming that the courts are insulated from both internal and
external influences, judges are supposed to make impartial decisions that are based on
guiding legal principles and ensure that laws passed by government do not infringe upon
the rights of the minority. Contrary to this more normative view, however, a wealth of
scholarship from the behaviorist approach demonstrates that judges are motivated by
their policy preferences (Segal and Spaeth, 1993; Rhode, 1972; Schubert, 1965; Pritchett,
1948). They argue against the notion that federal judges completely adhere to legal
principles, such as Framers’ intent, legal precedent, and the Constitution. Instead, federal
judges, given the same set of case facts, can use different legal standards to support
almost any position (Segal and Spaeth, 1993). Otherwise, judges would always reach the
same conclusions, as legal principles would offer a single and correct path.
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The conception of judges as policy makers has led many to pose the question, is
the judiciary a counter-majoritarian institution (Dahl, 1957; Mishler and Sheehan, 1993,
1996; Barnum, 1985; Norpoth and Segal, 1994; Romero, 2000)? Despite the more
normative view that the courts are removed from external influences, a growing body of
research finds that federal-court judges tend to be responsive to the will of the majority
(Dahl, 1957; Mishler and Sheehan, 1993, 1996; Barnum, 1985). Since the judicial branch
lacks enforcement powers, students of the courts contend that federal-court judges must
be able to maintain a sense of institutional legitimacy and garner support from both the
public and other political actors to ensure the execution of their decisions. Although there
are some notable lag effects between public opinion and judicial behavior (Mishler and
Sheehan, 1993; but see Norpoth and Segal, 1994), the Supreme Court has been found to
be directly responsive to public opinion, even after taking into account the more indirect
effects that capture partisan turnover in the Supreme Court (Misher and Sheehan, 1993).
Of these justices, ideologically moderate judges are the most responsive to public opinion
(Mishler and Sheehan, 1996). This is especially crucial since the justice in the ideological
middle can determine the outcome of panel rulings (Martin, Quinn, and Epstein, 2005).
In this light, the role of the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, is much different
than how the Framers originally intended.
These majoritarian tendencies have been especially harmful for specific social
groups in the U.S., including racial and ethnic minorities (Morin, 2005). According to
Soltero (2006), “legal systems generally mirror the societies in which they exist, since
laws are in essence the rules governing societal norms” (5). Historically, the Supreme
Court has sought to selectively incorporate the rights of Blacks and other racial and
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ethnic minorities by making gradual changes to Supreme Court precedent. Under the
Taney Court, for example, the Supreme Court limited the inclusion of African Americans
in the U.S. political system by denying their citizenship, promoting slavery across U.S.
territories (Dredd Scott v. Sandford, 1857), and establishing the state action doctrine,
which held that the 14th Amendment was only applicable to the actions of the federal and
state government and not the private sphere (Civil Rights Cases, 1883). Following this
trend, the Supreme Court also created the principle of “separate but equal,” which
institutionalized the segregation of Blacks and other racial and ethnic minorities (Plessey
v. Ferguson, 1896). Although the Court would later reverse “separate but equal” (Brown
v. Board of Education, 1954; see also Mendez v. Westminster School District of Orange
County, 1946), its ruling was limited to only schools.
The lack of protection has also affected other racial and ethnic minorities. In
comparison to African Americans, Latinos and Asian Americans “were largely
considered an anomaly within the black-white legal and societal structure” (Soltero,
2006: 5). During World War II, for example, the Supreme Court held that the federal
government could place Japanese U. S. citizens in internment camps to protect the U.S.
from the possibility of espionage (Koramatsu v. U.S., 1944). The Supreme Court also
denied the land rights of Mexican Americans that were guaranteed under Article 8 of the
Treaty of Guadalupe, Hidalgo (United States v. Sandoval, 1913; Botiller v. Dominguez,
1889). In the Insular Cases, the Supreme Court also relegated Puerto Ricans to secondclass citizenship by subjecting them to colonial dependency and denying equal
representation in the U.S. Congress (Morin, 2005: 47). Finally, even though defendants
have a right to be tried by a jury of their peers (Hernandez v. Texas, 1954), the Court has
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also ruled that prosecutors can dismiss bilingual jurors who can speak both Spanish and
English (Hernandez v. New York, 1991). Although the ruling would disproportionately
impact Latinos, the Court justified its decision by reasoning that bilingual individuals
could not adhere to the lower courts’ official translation (Morin, 2005: 78-79).
In 1964, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act, which outlawed discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Although it prohibits unequal
treatment

in

housing,

education,

public

accommodations,

and

employment,

discrimination is a problem that continues to affect the lives of racial and ethnic
minorities. In 1992, for example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
reported that code phrases were used by employment agencies to screen out women and
racial and ethnic minority applicants (Whitby, 1997: 62). In Los Angeles, California, one
agency was found to have “discriminated against over thirty-five hundred applicants,
many of whom were black” (Whitby, 1997: 62). Also, in 1994, Texaco settled a suit of
more than 174 million dollars over informal practices that disproportionately promoted
whites over other racial and ethnic minorities. To date, the Texaco suit represents one of
the largest settlements in Title VII history (Whitby, 1997: 62-63).
Despite the continuance of discrimination in the United States, the federal courts
have made it more difficult to prove discrimination (Selmi, 2000-2001; Selmi, 2011).
Since employers do not readily admit to discrimination, employees must, more often than
not, resort to using circumstantial evidence. Recognizing this dilemma, the Supreme
Court established a burden-shifting test to show that an employer’s actions had the effect
of rather than the intent of discrimination (Griggs v. Duke Power, 1971). In Griggs v.
Duke Power (1971), the Court placed the burden of proof on employers where they were
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required to show that their actions were out of “business necessity.” Under the tenure of
Chief Justice Rehnquist, though, the Supreme Court became increasingly conservative
towards employment discrimination claims by making a series of judgments that shifted
the burden of proof back to the employee (Selmi, 2011). In Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio (1989), for example, the Court maintained that employees must prove that racial
imbalances in the workplace have no valid business purpose. In other words, employers
could continue to treat their employees differently so long as they had a legitimate
business reason (see also Price Waterhouse and Hopkins, 1989). Although the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 would ultimately reverse several of the Supreme Court’s decisions by
providing added protections for employees, racial and ethnic minorities have seldom been
successful at proving their discrimination claims (Selmi 2000-2001, 2011).
Debating the Merits of Descriptive Representation
The history of the federal courts as it relates to issues of race and ethnicity
suggests that the judiciary does not sufficiently protect the rights of racial and ethnic
minorities. Consequently, former presidential administrations, including those under
Presidents Carter and Clinton, have sought to diversify the racial and ethnic composition
of the federal courts (Goldman, 1997). Figure 1.1 shows the increase in the number of
African American and Latino judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals between 1970 and
2009. Throughout much of the federal courts’ history, the composition of the U.S. Court
of Appeals consisted of mainly white males (Goldman, 1997). Prior to the Carter
administration, only two African Americans occupied the appellate-court bench without
any Latinos in the intermediary courts. By 1980, this number increased to 4 and 9,
respectively. Finally, in 2009, African American and Latino jurists represented 7.3
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percent (20) and 5.1 percent (14) of all sitting judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals
(Federal Judicial Center, n. d.).4 While the federal courts have yet to achieve levels that
reflect the U.S.’s diverse population, there have been clear improvements in the racial
and ethnic composition of the federal bench.

Figure 1.1: Number of Minority Judges in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 1970-2009

Number of Judges

25
20
15
10
5

1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008

0

Year
African American Judge

Latino Judge

The increase in the number of judges has sparked much debate over the merits of
descriptive representation (Goldman 1978-1979). According to Pitkin (1967), descriptive
representation occurs when office holders in political institutions and their constituents
share similar social and demographic characteristics. Those who argue against

4

Currently, there are 275 seats in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.

9

diversifying the courts for the sake of diversity contend that the appointment process
should be based on merit alone and emphasize qualities, such as integrity and ethics
(Abraham, 1999; Epstein and Segal, 2005).5 Opponents also argue that an exclusive focus
on racial and ethnic characteristics can introduce biases into judicial decision-making,
promote reverse discrimination that negatively impacts the appointment of qualified
whites, and diminish the legitimacy of the judiciary (Goldman, 1978-1979). While having
a color-blind society is certainly ideal, the above arguments are flawed in many respects
(Goldman, 1978-1979). First, they ignore the continuing role of discrimination and the
lack of democratic inclusion in the U.S. political system (Goldman, 1978-1979). Second,
they neglect the main objective of diversification, which is to create a federal bench that
is fairly representative of the U.S. population and not one that is over-represented by any
one particular group (Goldman, 1978-1979). Goldman (1978-1979) also contends that it
is a disservice to assume that minority judges are not qualified for a position on the bench
since presidents are already highly selective when it comes to choosing their judicial
candidates (Goldman, 1978-1979). Finally, it is naïve to think that the selection process is
solely based on merit, as the partisanship and ideology of judicial nominees plays an
inherent role in the appointment of federal judges.
By contrast, proponents of diversity in the courtroom argue that the appointment
of racial and ethnic minorities is a normative good. First, advocates of descriptive
representation suggest that a diverse courtroom may lead to symbolic representation or
“intangible psychological benefits” (e.g. Garcia and Sanchez, 2008), such as trust in
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government, political efficacy, and feelings of inclusion in the U.S. political system
(Mansbridge, 1999; Gay, 2002; Howell and Fagan, 1988; Vanderleeuw and Utter, 1993;
Bobo and Gilliam, 1999; Banduchi, Donovan, and Karp, 2005; Sanchez and Morin, 2011;
but also see Gay, 2002). The ability to create positive attitudes among under-represented
groups is especially important, as African Americans and Latinos are more skeptical of
the notion they receive equal treatment, are less trusting of court authorities, and believe
courtroom decisions are influenced by political considerations (Brooks and JeonSlaughter, 2001; Rottman, 2000: 6). By simply being in positions of power, it is assumed
that racial and ethnic minorities can improve these negative perceptions by acting as role
models and compensating for historical and continued injustices (Phillips, 1998: 228; see
also Mansbridge, 1999).
Second, proponents of diversity in the courtroom can lead to important
substantive policy outcomes. More specifically, they argue that racial and ethnic
minorities can bring different perspectives to the bench, such as sense of fair rule, which
can compensate for past and continued injustices (Goldman, 1978-1979: 494). Indeed,
more recent presidents, including Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush, have been
fairly explicit about the importance of diversity in the federal courtroom (Goldman and
Saronson 1994-1995; Segal 2000; Clinton 1996) and have highlighted the role of judges’
personal experiences as one factor in their decision to nominate judges (Segal 2000; see
also Clinton 1996; Davis 1989: 21). Taken together, the positive merits associated with
racial and ethnic diversity are said to contribute to the perception that the judicial branch
is a legitimate institution (Walker and Barrow, 1985: 597; Mansbridge, 1999: 651;
Scherer and Curry, 2010).

11

Scope and Purpose of Dissertation
This dissertation enters into the above debate by focusing on the latter of the two
merits of descriptive representation: substantive policy outcomes. Focusing on Title VII
employment discrimination claims based on race and ethnicity, it provides one of the first
comprehensive studies of African American and Latino judicial behavior in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals.6 In the lower federal courts, previous work has a tendency to analyze
a single minority group across a set of policy issues, such as African American judges
across search and seizure cases (e.g. Scherer, 2004-2005) and Latino judges across
employment discrimination cases (e.g. Manning, 2004). Although this research is
certainly fruitful for understanding the role of descriptive representation in the courtroom,
the inability to control for both groups across the same data has made it difficult to
examine how racial and ethnic minority judges behave relative to their white colleagues
on the bench and to one another. By controlling for both the race and ethnicity of judges,
therefore, this dissertation is able to test whether theory, which has a tendency to assume
that minority judges are monolithic in their behavior, is applicable to both African
American and Latino judges across the same set of data.
Overall, the appellate courts provide an excellent opportunity to examine the
behavior of African American and Latino judges.

First, appellate-court judges are

considered to be important policy makers where they “are called upon to monitor the
performance of federal district courts and agencies and to supervise their application and
6

According to Baum (1997), judicial behavior is “what judges do as judges, leaving aside other activities

such as speech making and presidential advising” (2). The definition is useful because it focuses on
decision-making on judges across different forms of participation within the courts, such as voting on the
merits, taking positions during conference, and selecting the majority opinion writer just to name a few
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interpretation of national and state laws” (Carp, Stidham, and Manning, 2004: 39-40).
Second, the appellate courts are divided into 12 regional circuits, including the Appeals
Court for the District of Columbia, which allows for greater diversity within racial and
ethnic groups. Finally, the nature of the collegial courts provides opportunities to
examine how racial and ethnic minority judges interact with their panel colleagues.
Random panel assignments, moreover, ensure that racial and ethnic minorities interact
with different colleagues within their circuit.
Given this institutional setting, this dissertation asks a series of questions
regarding the behavior of African American and Latino judges at the individual and panel
level of analysis. It begins by focusing on the individual voting behavior African
American and Latino judges. In particular, it asks whether African Americana and Latino
jurists are more likely than white judges to rule in favor of the claimant? Following a
growing number of studies that account for the social composition of appellate-court
panels (Farhang and Wawro, 2010, 2004; see also Kastellec, forthcoming; Boyd et al.,
2010; Cox and Miles, 2008), it also asks whether African American and Latino jurists
continue to vote differently than their white colleagues when they sit on majority-white
panels? By focusing on individual voting behavior and acknowledging the collegial
nature of the appellate-courts, it is possible to test whether theory is applicable to both
racial and ethnicity minorities across different panel compositions.
Second, and following research that focuses on panel effects and judicial
influence in the collegial courts (Kastellec, forthcoming, 2011; Boyd et al., 2010;
Farhang and Wawro, 2010, 2004; see Cox and Miles, 2008), this dissertation moves
beyond individual voting behavior by asking whether or not African American and
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Latino judges can influence final panel outcomes? In other words, can the presence of an
African American or Latino judge on a panel increase the probability that an employee
will win their claim? Given that appellate-court judges sit on rotating, three-member
panels, the institution of majority rule stipulates that at least two judges must reach a
consensus before filing a panel decision. In this regard, the ability to form majority
coalitions is especially important. While those in the majority can write the majority
opinion and influence policy outcomes, those who disagree with the preferences of the
majority can either choose to file a separate dissenting opinion or do nothing.
Finally, this dissertation is one of the first studies to examine the relationship
between race and ethnicity and majority-opinion writing. More specifically, it asks
whether African American and Latino judges are more likely than their white colleagues
to write the majority opinion? If so, does the assignment of the majority opinion depend
on the formal role of the presiding judge who has the power to assign the majority
opinion? Interestingly, little research has paid attention to those factors that explain the
presiding judge’s decision to assign the majority opinion in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
Still, the majority opinion is at the core of the policy-making process (Segal and Spaeth,
2002). Not only does it represent the ability to shape the policy agenda, but it also offers
judges the opportunity to promote the organization of the court by selecting judges who
specialize in distinct areas of the law (Maltzman and Wahlbeck, 2004; see also Atkins,
1974).
African American and Latino Judicial Behavior
To address these research questions, I rely on two overarching theories:
descriptive representation and small group theory. While the theory of descriptive
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representation is important for understanding the individual voting behavior racial and
ethnic minority judges, small-group theory provides a framework for explaining how
minority judges can influence their panel colleagues on the collegial courts. This
dissertation also contributes to our understanding of African American and Latino
judicial behavior by emphasizing the role of claimant effects or co-racial and co-ethnic
cues that can mediate the behavior of judges. In doing so, it is possible to examine those
factors that condition the behavior of African American and Latino judges. In what
follows, I provide a description of each theory.
Descriptive Representation
To explain the individual voting behavior of African American and Latino judges,
students of the courts have relied on the theory of descriptive representation. The theory
of descriptive representation contends that racial and ethnic minorities and women bring
with them “different points of view” to the bench, such as a sense of fair rule and more
equitable justice (Goldman, 1978-1979: 494; Songer et al., 1994; Walker and Barrow:
1985). However, these “different points of view” are not based on ideology, but rather on
experiences with discrimination (Goldman 1978-1979: 494; Scherer, 2004-2005).7 For
example, research focusing on judges’ career paths suggests that minorities are not
afforded the same opportunities as their white counterparts (Walker and Barrow, 1985),
as they are more likely to graduate from public law schools, hold government positions,
and earn less money throughout their careers (Goldman and Saronson, 1994-1995;
7

In 1993, for example, an African American judge was arrested on suspicion of using a stolen credit card at

an upscale shopping mall in New Jersey. Despite showing his identification and adamantly denying the
charges, the police took him into custody where he was chained to a wall for three and a half hours
(Margolick, 1994).
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Slotnick, 1983-1984). Surveys of racial and ethnic minorities in the law profession also
suggest that African Americans and Latinos are more likely than their white colleagues to
perceive, experience, or even witness discrimination and in the U.S. legal and judicial
systems (Chavez, 2011; Cruz and Molina, 2009; Carter, 1999; Lyles, 1997). Finally,
these attitudes are reinforced by more qualitative evidence that acknowledges the role of
discrimination in judicial decision-making (Davis, 1989; Higginbotham, 1993;
Sotomayor, 2002; Tobias, 1990). Thus, racial and ethnic minority judges will not only
come to the bench with different life experiences, but it is argued that these same life
experiences will also translate into divergence in voting behavior between minority and
white judges.
The theory of descriptive representation also posits that divergence in voting
behavior between minority and non-minority jurists depends on the presence of salient
policy issues, such as civil rights and criminal cases, that are important to racial and
ethnic minorities (Goldman, 1978-1979; Songer et al., 1994; Walker and Barrow, 1985).
Central to this conditional aspect of behavior is the role of discrimination. Thus, racial
and ethnic minority judges will have a tendency to vote in favor of the claimant across
policy issues that either deal directly with discrimination or policy issues that can have a
negative impact on racial and ethnic minorities more broadly. For example, Goldman
(1978-1979) reasons that minorities may be particularly sensitive to issues dealing with
racial and sexual discrimination. Other policy issues may also include criminal or even
immigration policies. Across all other non-salient policy areas, therefore, one would
expect to find no significant differences in voting behavior between minority and white
judges.
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Small Group Theory
While the descriptive representation model provides theoretical expectations with
regards to the direction of individual judge votes, it does not consider the role of panel
effects or “intra-panel dynamics of circuit-court judges who seek to persuade or
otherwise influence their colleagues” (Cross, 2007: 148). At first glance, there is little
reason to expect that minority judges will be able to influence their panel colleagues.
Assuming that judges vote according to their most preferred policy outcome, the
“racialized institutions model” holds that “racially polarized political contexts provide
few potential coalition members since policy preferences are reinforced by racial
cleavages, and not by broader liberal or conservative ideologies” (Preuhs 2006: 587; see
also Hawksworth, 2003). For example, Hawkesworth (2003) describes how women of
color in the U.S. Congress were silenced and prevented from claiming credit for their
efforts, even by members of their own party (537). Thus, racial and ethnic minorities are
forced to work within different institutional constraints and deal with inter-personal
relations that ultimately prevent racial and ethnic minorities from achieving their goals
(Hawkesworth, 2003).
In the U.S. Courts of Appeals, this racialized context is reinforced by the underrepresentation of racial and ethnic minority judges and low probability that two minority
judges will ever sit on the same panel (Farhang and Wawro, 2004). In the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, for example, whites make up the majority of appellate-court judge, followed by
African American and Latino judges, respectively. Among the 275 seats in the appellatecourts, white judges currently represent 83 percent of all sitting judges. African American
and Latino jurists, however, represent less than 10 percent for each group. Random panel
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assignments, coupled with the small number of minority judges per circuit, also limit the
probability of majority-minority panels. For instance, Farhang and Wawro (2004) note
that the probability of having at least two minority judges serving together on the same
panel is less than 3 percent.8 Consequently, minority judges, who represent polarizing
interests, are limited in their ability to influence panel outcomes and write the majority
opinion.
Contrary to this conventional wisdom, however, a bourgeoning line of research
contends that these same differences in behavior can also place African American and
Latino judges at a distinct advantage –not only in terms of panel outcomes, but also in the
context of majority opinion assignments (Kastellec, forthcoming; Boyd et al., 2010; Cox
and Miles, 2008; Farhang and Wawro, 2010, 2004). Following research that concentrates
on the social psychology of judges, small group theory holds that how judges relate to
one another can have a significant influence other judges’ behavior (Ulmer, 1971).
Different from models that focus on strategic bargaining (e.g. Epstein and Knight, 1998),
however, it relaxes the assumption that judges are single-minded seekers of policy by
assuming that judges pursue policy and non-policy goals alike (Baum, 1997). For
example, a designate judge, who works in a temporary capacity, may wish to defer her
judgment to a permanent member of the appellate courts in order to achieve greater
collegial relations (Collins and Martinek, 2011). Similarly, appellate-court judges may

8
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contend that this level of diversity is representative of the distribution of racial and ethnic minorities across
appellate-court circuits.
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also wish to moderate or completely change their vote in order to achieve other nonpolicy goals.
Based on this key assumption, racial and ethnic minorities, who represent
polarizing interests, may not only be able to influence their panel colleagues, but also
increase the likelihood of writing the majority opinion in Title VII employment
discrimination cases. There are three reasons to expect these two outcomes. First, African
American and Latino judges can improve the quality of deliberation by drawing on their
personal experiences with discrimination and crystallizing issues of race and ethnicity
among their panel colleagues (Mansbridge, 1999; see also Carp and Stidham, 1991: 176;
Cross 2007: 154-155; Edwards, 2003: 1656-1661; Sunstein et al., 2006: 73). For
example, research focusing on Congress demonstrates that women of color can persuade
other members of Congress across salient policy issues (Mansbridge, 1999) even though
racial and ethnic minorities must overcome racialized contexts that prevent them from
achieving their goals (Hawkesworth, 2003).
Second, racial and ethnic minority judges can influence their panel colleagues by
their mere presence. Following research that focuses on policy specialization (Atkins,
1974), white judges may perceive African American and Latino jurists to be more
credible or expert across policy issues considered to be salient to racial and ethnic
minorities. For example, research focusing on jury deliberations demonstrates that white
jurors sitting on racially diverse panels tend to be more lenient towards Black defendants,
cite more case facts, make fewer factual errors, and appeal directly to Black jurors in the
group to validate their concerns of racism (Sommers, 2006). Perceptions of policy
specialization may also be reinforced by negative stereotypes. For example, surveys of
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Latinos in the legal profession find that Latino lawyers possess feelings of tokenism and
perceive themselves to be subject to “ethnic oriented roles,” such as translation work and
immigration law (Cruz and Molina, 2009: 42; see also Chavez, 2011: 67-69). In the
context of the collegial courts, therefore, minority judges not only have the potential to
crystallize issues of race and ethnicity, but also cause white-judges to defer their
judgment to minority judges when policy issues are salient to racial and ethnic minorities.
Finally, racial and ethnic minority judges can influence their panel colleagues by
threatening panel unanimity. According to this view, judges prefer panel unanimity to
split-decisions. Not only is panel consensus important for establishing a unified front on
the interpretation of law, but it also provides a sense of institutional legitimacy, which is
necessary for the execution of court orders by other governmental entities (Farhang and
Wawro. 2004). Given the importance of panel consensus, therefore, African American
and Latino judges can improve their own bargaining leverage by threatening to dissent
from the majority panel. Although the rate of dissent is a relatively rare event (Farhang
and Wawro, 2004), research indicates that minority judges have tendency to diverge from
the majority coalition. Not only are they more likely to vote differently than their white
colleagues on the bench (Scherer, 2004-2005; Gottschall, 1982-1983; Collins and Moyer,
2008; Manning, 2004), but research also indicates that they are also more likely to write
separate dissenting opinions apart from the majority (Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek,
2003, 2004ab). Ultimately, this track record may improve upon their ability to bargain
when they are at odds with the panel majority.
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Claimant Effects
Finally, this dissertation contends that both individual voting behavior and the
ability to influence panel outcomes may be conditioned by the presence of co-ethnic and
co-racial claimants. Despite expectations that racial and ethnic minorities will vote
differently than their white colleagues, separate analyses demonstrate mixed results with
regards to African American jurists (Boyd et al., 2010; Scherer, 2004-2005) and even
more conservative behavior among Latino judges (e.g. Manning, 2004). For example,
studies find that African American and Latino judges in the federal courts are no more
likely than white judges to rule in favor of Black policy issues and employment
discrimination cases (Segal, 2000: 174; Walker and Barrow, 1985; Farhang and Wawro,
2004). Still, others find that African American judges are more likely to rule in favor of
the defendant in criminal cases (Gottschall 1983-1984; Scherer, 2004-2005; Collins and
Moyer, 2008). These mixed findings are also supported by research that focuses on panel
effects, which demonstrates that African American judges sitting on majority-white
panels can influence outcomes that favor the claimant across affirmative action claims
but not employment discrimination claims more broadly (e.g. Kastellec, forthcoming;
Farhang and Wawro, 2004. Different from theoretical expectations, however, Latino
judges are less likely to rule in favor of the defendant in criminal cases and civil rights
cases more generally (Manning, 2004). In all, the findings suggest that the theory of
descriptive representation may not necessarily explain more favorable decisions among
under-represented groups in the federal courts.
This dissertation attempts to reconcile these different outcomes by focusing on
“claimant effects” or the conditional role that co-racial and co-ethnic claimants might
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have on the behavior of African American and Latino judges. In comparison to the
different policy issues considered salient to racial and ethnic minorities (e.g. Songer,
1994; Boyd et al., 2010), studies focusing on the voting behavior of African American
and Latino judges in the federal courts have yet to control for the presence of race and
ethnicity of the claimant. By and large this is because the Federal Reporter and Federal
Supplement, which are the primary sources for appellate-court opinions, tend to exclude
the background characteristics of the claimants when they are not pertinent to the facts of
the case. Consequently, our knowledge of these judge-claimant relationships has been
relegated to other levels of the federal government, such as the municipal and state courts
(Steffensmeier and Britt, 2001; Holmes et al., 1993; Spohn, 1990; Welch, Combs, and
Gruhl, 1988; Uhlman, 1978).
The theory of claimant effects is based on the assumption that judges rarely have
complete information about cases (Steffensmeir and Demuth 2001: 147). To reduce
uncertainty, judges rely on a number of different sources for their information, ranging
from the facts of the case and legal precedent to amicus curiae briefs and the use of case
law by the appealing and defending parties. Additionally, judges may also rely on the
appellants’ background characteristics to facilitate their rulings, including the race,
gender, and social class of the appellant (Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2001: 145). Acting
as informational cues, the presence of a claimant with similar characteristics may trigger
feelings of commonality and highlight common experiences with discrimination
(Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2001: 145). Based on these similarities, I expect two
important outcomes. In the context of individual voting behavior, I expect African
American and Latino judges to be more likely to rule in favor of the claimant in Title VII
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employment discrimination cases. In doing so, descriptive representatives can “level the
playing field” and ensure that racial and ethnic minorities do not receive harsher
treatment than they might deserve (Welch, Combs, and Gruhl, 1988: 127). In the context
of panel effects, the presence of co-racial and co-ethnic claimants can also lead to more
favorable outcomes, as the presence of a Black or Latino claimant can serve to motivate
minority judges to improve the quality of deliberation and reinforce cues of policy
specialization.
Outline of Dissertation
This dissertation focuses on the judicial behavior of African American and Latino
judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Chapter Two begins the analysis by examining the
individual voting behavior of Latino and African American judges. Moreover, it adds to
the analysis by taking into account the social composition of panels. Following
theoretical expectations, I contend that racial and ethnic minorities will bring different
points of view to the bench and that individual voting behavior will continue to hold after
taking into consideration the social composition of the panel. This chapter finds that
African American judges are more likely than their non-Black colleagues to rule in favor
of the claimant, especially when co-racial claimants are present. Latino judges, however,
behave much differently. Although they are less likely than non-Latino judges to rule in
favor the claimant, the results also demonstrate that this less-than favorable behavior
applies to both Latino and non-Latino claimants alike. Finally, this chapter finds that the
social composition of the panel plays an important role in behavior. While African
American and Latino judges continue to demonstrate important differences in their
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individual voting behavior, white judges sitting on racially and ethnically diverse panels
are likely to conform to the preferences of their African American and Latino colleagues.
Chapter Three builds on the previous chapter by focusing on panel effects, or the
extent to which African American and Latino judges can influence panel outcomes. As
judges who sit on three-member panels, this chapter tests the argument that African
American and Latino judges will be able to influence their panel colleagues when a coracial and a co-ethnic claimant is present. This chapter finds that the presence of an
African American judge on a panel increases the probability that a Black claimant will
win their claim of discrimination. Different from racially diverse panels, however, the
presence of a Latino judges decreases the likelihood that a panel will rule in favor of both
Latinos and non-Latino claimants
Chapter Four focuses on majority opinion writing. In this chapter, I contend that
minority judges hold a distinct advantage over their panel colleagues, as the presiding
judge may wish to promote non-policy goals, such as unanimity, specialization, and
credibility. This chapter finds support for my argument. Specifically, the presiding judge
is more likely to assign the majority opinion to African American judges, but not for
Latino judges. However, important differences emerge when non-presiding, Latino
judges are compared to non-presiding, non-Latino judges. The results also demonstrate
that the decision to select the majority opinion writer is not conditioned by the formal
role of the presiding judges. In fact, the results demonstrate that when African American
and Latino judges preside over a case, they are no more likely than their white colleagues
to write the majority opinion. In all the findings have important implications for racially
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diverse institutions and the substantive representation of interests for racial and ethnic
communities.
Chapter Five is the concluding chapter and returns to the more normative debate
that focuses on the merits of descriptive representation. It offers a summary of the main
findings as well as explanations for differences between African American and Latino
judicial behavior. Further, it discusses the implications of this research by focusing on
substantive policy outcomes and the more direct impact that decisions can have on
African American and Latino claimants. Although this dissertation provides one of the
first comprehensive studies of African American and Latino judicial behavior, it
maintains that there is room for improvement and offers some suggestions for future
research. Finally, the chapter offers some concluding remarks with respect to both
diversity and future appointments to the federal judiciary.
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CHAPTER 2
Claimant Cues and the Individual Voting Behavior of African American and
Latino Judges
I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her
experiences would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a
white male who hasn’t lived that life ~Justice Sonia Sotomayor

In 2009, President Obama appointed Sonia Sotomayor, the first Latina to the
Supreme Court. Obama’s appointment not only reflected a growing Latino population in
the United States, but his decision to make the Court look more like the United States’
electorate also spoke of a much broader trend to diversify the lower federal courts.1 Prior
to the Carter administration, only seven African Americans and three Latinos occupied
the lower federal courts. By 1980, this number increased to 39 and 19, respectively.
Today, African American and Latino jurists represent 9.4 percent (120) and 6.4 percent
(77) of all sitting judges (Federal Judicial Center, n. d.). While the federal courts have yet
to achieve levels that reflect the U.S.’s diverse population, there have been clear
improvements in the federal benches’ racial and ethnic composition.
The growing number of racial and ethnic minorities in the federal courts has led to
a number of studies that have focused on the voting behavior of African American (e.g.
Gottschall, 1983-1984; Scherer, 2004-2005; Segal, 2000; Songer, Davis, and Haire, 1994;
Walker and Barrow, 1985) and, to a much lesser extent, Latino jurists in the federal
courts (Manning, 2004). 9 Our understanding of African American and Latino judicial
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behavior is far from conclusive, however. Despite expectations that racial and ethnic
minorities will vote differently than their white colleagues, separate analyses have
demonstrated mixed results and, in some cases, more conservative behavior among
minority jurists. Perhaps one reason for these results is that they have failed to account
for “claimant effects” or the conditional role that co-racial and co-ethnic claimants might
have on the behavior of African American and Latino judges. By and large this is because
the Federal Reporter and Federal Supplement, which are the primary sources for
appellate-court opinions, tend to exclude the background characteristics of the claimants.
Consequently, our knowledge of these judge-claimant relationships has been relegated to
other levels of the federal government, such as the municipal and state courts
(Steffensmeier and Britt, 2001; Holmes, Hosch, Daudistel, Perez, and Graves, 1993;
Spohn, 1990; Welch, Combs, and Gruhl, 1988; Uhlman, 1978).
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the individual voting behavior of
African American and Latino jurists in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. In doing so, this
analysis serves as one of the first studies to test whether voting behavior is consistent
across multiple racial and ethnic groups. Since voting behavior in the collegial courts
rarely takes place in a vacuum (Collins and Martinek, 2011), it also extends the analysis
by examining African American and Latino voting behavior across majority-white and
majority-minority panels. Based on previous experiences with discrimination, this
chapter contends that African American and Latino judges will be more likely than their
white colleagues to vote in favor of the claimant across issues considered salient to racial
and ethnic minorities (Goldman, 1978-1979). At the same time, I also expect the presence
of co-racial and co-ethnic claimants to trigger feelings of commonality and condition
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African American and Latino judges to vote in favor of other Black and Latino claimants
(Steffensmeier and Britt, 2001). Focusing on the U.S. Courts of Appeals between 2001
and 2009, I rely on an original dataset to analyze the voting behavior of appellate court
judges across Title VII employment discrimination claims based on race and ethnicity.
This dataset is unique in that it records the race and ethnicity of both judges and
claimants. Subsequently, it is possible to analyze how African Americana and Latino
judges behave towards claimants with similar racial and ethnic backgrounds
This chapter demonstrates that minority judges are not monolithic in their voting
behavior. The results demonstrate that while African American judges are more likely
than non-Black judges to rule in favor of the claimant, this more favorable behavior is
largely conditioned by the presence of co-racial cues. Latinos judges, however,
demonstrate much different behavior relative to their white colleagues, as they are less
likely to vote in favor of claimants more generally. These differences in behavior also
continue to hold once the social composition of the panel is taken into account. In all, the
findings not only have important implications for substantive policy outcomes affecting
Title VII discrimination claims, but they also provide an added dimension to the study of
descriptive representation by focusing on the direct consequences that judges’ decisions
can have on appellants.
Background
It has been well established that federal-court judges are policy makers whose
decisions can have an important impact on the development of law (Rhode and Spaeth,
1976; Segal and Spaeth, 1993, 2002). In the U.S. Courts of Appeals, for example, federal
judges provide an important “error correction” function where they “are called upon to
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monitor the performance of federal district courts and agencies and to supervise their
application and interpretation of national and state laws” (Carp, Stidham, and Manning,
2004: 39-40). The power to monitor the lower courts and federal agencies, moreover, can
be far reaching, as they are organized into 12 regional circuits, including the Appeals
Court for the District of Columbia, that cross both state and territorial lines, such as
Puerto Rico and Guam. According to Cross (2007), when circuit courts disagree, it gives
reason for the Supreme Court to settle disputes and create uniformity. When circuit courts
agree, however, the Courts of Appeals have the power to create national law (Cross,
2007: 2).
Given the importance of federal judges in these policy-making institutions,
scholars have sought to explain their behavior for some time. According to Baum (1997),
judicial behavior is “what judges do as judges, leaving aside other activities such as
speech making and presidential advising” (2). Perhaps the most prominent explanation of
judicial behavior is the attitudinal model. The attitudinal model holds that the “judges
decide disputes in light of facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values
of the justices” (Segal and Spaeth, 2002: 86). Thus, judges behave according to their
most sincere preferences by “supporting the case outcomes and doctrines they most
prefer” (Baum, 1997: 90). In other words, “conservative judges vote the way they do
because they are conservative and liberal judges vote they way they do because they are
liberal” (Segal and Spaeth, 2002: 86). Support for the attitudinal model has been well
documented, especially in its ability to predict the voting behavior of U.S. Courts of
Appeals judges (Segal and Spaeth 1993, 2002). In more recent years, it has also been
utilized to explain Appeals Court decisions to reverse lower court rulings (Hettinger et
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al., 2006) and write separate dissenting opinions, apart from the majority (Hettinger et al.,
2004a).
Scholars have also examined the role of background characteristics. Accordingly,
these studies reason that personal experiences can have an important and influential
impact on judges’ behavior. Proponents of the theory argue, “socializing experiences
stimulate the development of certain attitudes and values or even conceptions of the
judicial role” (Goldman, 1978-1979: 374). The study of background characteristics has
been met with some criticism, however. Specifically, critics argue that background
characteristics are often mediated by ideological attitudes. Since attitudes account for the
culmination of life’s experiences, attitudes serve as more proximate cause of judicial
behavior (see Tate, 1981). According to this perspective, therefore, background
characteristics, such as career and educational experiences, should account for little
variation in judicial behavior.
Nevertheless,

studies

demonstrate

that

background

characteristics

can

significantly influence judges’ behavior, even after controlling for ideological attitudes.
For example, Tate (1981) shows that the prestige of judges’ educational backgrounds can
have an important effect on the behavior of judges towards economic policies. Tate
(1981) also demonstrates that career backgrounds, such as experiences with being a
former prosecutor or judge, can have an important influence on judicial behavior. For
example, Tate (1981) finds that former prosecutors are more likely to rule against the
claimant in civil liberty claims than those involved in private practice. Regional
influences are also important, as judges born in the South tend to be more conservative
than judges from other regions of the U.S. (Songer and Davis, 1990). Finally, judges who
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belong to older age cohorts are more likely to rule in favor of the elderly in age
discrimination cases (Manning, Carol, and Carp, 2004).
Descriptive Representation in the Courts
In more recent years, students of the courts have added to the “background”
literature by examining the judicial behavior of descriptive representatives. According to
Pitkin (1967), descriptive representation occurs when office holders in political
institutions and their constituents share similar social and demographic characteristics.
While the concept of descriptive representation has been previously applied to judges
with particular religious (e.g. Catholic, Jewish, Protestant) and national origin
backgrounds (e.g. Jewish, Italian), a more contemporary view of descriptive
representation focuses on the “representation of historically disadvantaged groups by
members of those groups” (Dovi, 2007: 27). Understood in a more restrictive sense,
therefore, scholars of descriptive representation have focused on racial and ethnic
minorities, including African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, and women.
Advocates of descriptive representation suggest that a diverse courtroom is
important for two reasons. First, it may lead to symbolic representation or “intangible
psychological benefits,” such as perceptions of trust among under-represented groups
(e.g. Garcia and Sanchez, 2008). This is important, as African Americans and Latinos are
more skeptical of the notion they receive equal treatment, are less trusting of court
authorities, and believe courtroom decisions are influenced by political considerations
(Brooks and Jeon-Slaughter, 2001; Rottman, 2000: 6). By simply being in positions of
power, it is assumed that racial and ethnic minorities can improve these negative
perceptions by acting as role models and compensating for historical and continued
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injustices (Phillips, 1998: 228; see also Mansbridge, 1999). These expectations,
moreover, are shared among judges themselves, as African American judges believe
descriptive representation to be important for building a sense of trust towards the
judiciary (Smith, 1983). In turn, the presence of a diverse judiciary that “looks like
America” is said to contribute to the perception that the judicial branch is a legitimate
institution (Walker and Barrow, 1985: 597).
Second, descriptive representation may translate into important substantive or
policy-oriented outcomes. According to this view, racial and ethnic minorities and
women bring with them “different points of view” or “certain qualities of the heart and
mind” to the bench, such as a sense of fair rule and more equitable justice (Goldman,
1978-1979: 494; Songer et al., 1994; Walker and Barrow, 1985). 10 However, these

10

Surveys of African American and Latinos in the law profession provide further evidence to support the

contention that behavior is motivated by perceptions of discrimination. For example, over 90 percent of
African American lawyers believe that racial bias exists in the justice system and that racism in the justice
system is the same or greater than other segments of society (Carter, 1999). These attitudes are also shared
among African American judges. In comparison to 83 percent of white judges, for example, only 18
percent of Blacks share the belief that Black litigants are treated fairly in the justice system (Lyles, 1997:
237). Perceptions of discrimination, moreover, are reinforced by two-thirds of lawyers who say they have
personally witnessed racial bias in the legal system over the past three years (Carter, 1999).
Similarly, a nation-wide survey of Latino lawyers demonstrates that 53 percent of respondents
have had experiences with discrimination (Chavez, 2011). Latinas in the legal profession also maintain the
belief that they are subject to tokenism, glass ceiling effects, and subordination by their colleagues (Cruz
and Molina, 2009). Similarly, perceptions of more systemic discrimination remain high among Latinos in
the legal profession. For example, 91 percent of Latinos say that they believe racial prejudice is moderate to
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“different points of view” are not based on ideology, but rather on experiences with
discrimination (Goldman 1978-1979: 494; Scherer, 2004-2005).11 Research focusing on
judges’ career paths, for example, suggests that minorities are not afforded the same
opportunities as their white counterparts (Walker and Barrow, 1985), as they are more
likely to graduate from public law schools, hold government positions, and earn less
money throughout their careers (Goldman and Saronson, 1994-1995; Slotnick, 19831984). Thus, racial and ethnic minority judges will not only come to the bench with
different life experiences, but it is argued that these same life experiences will also
translate into divergence in voting behavior between minority and white judges.
The argument that experiences with discrimination motivate voting behavior is
further supported by the oral testimony of African American, Latino, and female jurists.
For example, Judge Judith Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals stated, “After a
lifetime of different experiences and a substantial period of survival in a male-dominated
profession, women judges unquestionably have developed a heightened awareness of the
problems that other women encounter in life and in law; it is not all surprising that they
remain particularly sensitive to these problems” (Tobias, 1990: 178). Similarly, Judge A.
Leon Higginbotham, one of the longest serving African American judges on the U.S.

substantial for the average Latino lawyer (Chavez, 2011). Thus, perceptions of discrimination among
Latinos are as prevalent as African Americans in the legal profession.

11

In 1993, for example, an African American judge was arrested on suspicion of using a stolen credit card

at an upscale shopping mall in New Jersey. Despite showing his identification and adamantly denying the
charges, the police took him into custody where he was chained to a wall for three and a half hours
(Margolick, 1994).
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Appellate Courts said that “lacking such [minority] outsiders, a court will be left with
only its own self-perpetuating views, preferences and prejudices to inform its decisions”
(Higginbotham, 1993: 1042). Most recently, Justice Sotomayor, who once served on the
Appeals Court for the Second Circuit, made national headlines when she said, “I would
hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would more often
than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn’t lived that life”
(Sotomayor 2002: 92). In all, these examples highlight how life experiences associated
race, ethnicity, and gender can translate into unique perspectives that are different from
their white and male colleagues.
The theory of descriptive representation also posits that divergence in behavior
between minority and non-minority jurists depends on the presence of those policy issues
considered to be important to racial and ethnic minorities, such as civil rights and crime
(Goldman, 1978-1979; Songer et al., 1994; Walker and Barrow, 1985). The extant
research focusing on descriptive representation and individual voting behavior in the
courtroom, however, demonstrates rather mixed results (Scherer 2004-2005; Boyd et al.
2010). For example, African American judges in the federal courts are no more likely
than white judges to rule in favor of Black policy issues and employment discrimination
cases (Segal, 2000: 174; Walker and Barrow, 1985; Farhang and Wawro, 2004
Gottschall, 1983-1984). Still, others find important differences between Black and white
judges in criminal cases (Gottschall 1983-1984). While Gottschall (1983-1984) shows
that Black jurists are more likely to rule in favor of the defendant in criminal cases more
generally, Scherer (2004-2005) demonstrates a similar trend among Black judges in
search and seizure cases –a subset of criminal cases. These findings, moreover, are
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reinforced by more recent work that examines the intersectionality of race and gender, as
women of color are more likely than their male counterparts to rule in favor of the
defendant (Collins and Moyer, 2008).
In comparison to African American judges, though, studies demonstrate much
different behavior among Latino judges. Different from theoretical expectations, Latino
judges in the lower federal courts are less likely to rule in favor of the defendant in
criminal cases (Manning, 2004), but no more likely than non-Latino judges to rule
against the plaintiff across race and employment discrimination claims more generally
(Manning, 2004; Farhang and Wawro, 2004, footnote 16). In all, the findings suggest that
the theory of descriptive representation may not necessarily explain more favorable
decisions among under-represented groups in the federal courts. To explain these
different results, Manning (2004) reasons that Latino jurists may represent a “special
cadre” within their own ethnic group, as they may be subject to a number of extra-legal
influences including, ideology, judicial norms and culture, and socio-economic
differences that can mitigate the role of discrimination in voting behavior (11). In all, the
research focusing on the individual voting behavior of African American and Latino
judges suggests that minority jurists not only vote differently from one another in
criminal court cases, but divergence in voting behavior between minority and nonminority jurists is not as consistent across policy issues considered salient to racial and
ethnic minorities.
Diversity on the Bench and Influence Over Voting Behavior
As judges who sit on three-member panels, it has also been well established that a
great deal of interaction takes place among panel colleagues (Collins and Martinek,
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2011). Consequently, a burgeoning line of research considers the role of “panel effects,”
or the influence that judges can have on their panel colleagues (Cross, 2007: 148).
Assuming that judges are motivated by both policy and non-policy goals (Baum, 1997),
this line of research contends that racial and ethnic minority judges, who represent
polarizing interests, can crystallize issues of race and ethnicity among their panel
colleagues (Mansbridge, 1999), threaten panel consensus and gain bargaining leverage by
filing dissenting opinions (Van Winkle, 1997; Songer et al. 1994; see also Farhang
Wawro, 2004), and create cues of policy specialization through their mere presence on
the bench (Kastellec, forthcoming). While minority judges are expected to vote more
favorably towards policy issues considered to salient to racial and ethnic minorities
(Boyd et al., 2010), white judges are expected to defer to their minority colleagues and
vote differently than how they would otherwise on homogenous-white panels. For
example, African American judges sitting on majority-white panels are found to increase
the probability of a favorable ruling in affirmative action and voting rights cases
(Katellec, forthcoming; Cox and Miles, 2008). Across employment discrimination
claims, however, the presence of an African American judge has no significant effect on
both individual votes and panel outcomes (Farhang and Wawro, 2004). Latino judges
sitting on majority-white panels also have no substantive effect on panel outcomes when
it comes to affirmative action and employment discrimination claims (Kastellec,
forthcoming; Farhang and Wawro, 2004). Thus, the research on panel effects also
demonstrates mixed results with regards to voting behavior, even when the social
composition of the panel is taken into account.
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The Role of Claimant Effects
Perhaps one reason why studies find mixed results and even sometimes more
conservative behavior is because they do not account for the race and ethnicity of the
claimant and the role that claimants’ background characteristics might have on the
behavior of African American and Latino judges. According to Steffensmeier and
Demuth (2001), judges rarely have complete information about cases (147). To reduce
uncertainty, therefore, judges rely on a number of different sources for their information,
ranging from the facts of the case and legal precedent to amicus curiae briefs and the use
of case law by the appealing and defending parties. Additionally, judges may also rely on
the appellants’ background characteristics to facilitate their rulings, including the race,
gender, and social class of the appellant (Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2001:145). Acting
as informational cues, the presence of a claimant with similar characteristics may trigger
feelings of commonality and highlight experiences with discrimination that can lead to
more favorable rulings (Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2001: 145). This is not to suggest,
however, that descriptive representatives engage in bias behavior. Rather, by treating
minorities with greater leniency, descriptive representatives essentially “level the playing
field” and ensure that racial and ethnic minorities do not receive harsher treatment than
they might deserve (Welch, Combs, and Gruhl, 1988: 127).
Even though there has been an increase in the amount of research that focuses on
the individual voting behavior of federal court judges, this argument has been largely
tested across courts at the state and local level of government. However, these analyses
have demonstrated mixed results at best. Welch, Combs, and Gruhl, (1988), for example,
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find that African American judges in “Metro City” are more likely to send white
defendants to prison and sentence Black defendants to jail for shorter periods of time.
Female jurists are also more likely to treat men and women defendants more equally,
countering the more paternalistic behavior of male judges who have a tendency to give
lighter sentences to female defendants (Gruhl, Spohn, and Welch, 1981). Still, others
show that African American and Latino judges tend to rule against co-racial and coethnics claimants (Steffensmeier and Britt, 2001; Spohn, 1990; Uhlman, 1978). In the
state district courts in El Paso, Texas, for example, Holmes et al. (1993) find that Latino
judges are more likely than white judges to rule against both whites and Latinos in
criminal cases (Holmes et al., 1993). Steffensmeier and Britt, (2001) also find a similar
pattern among African American judges in Pennsylvania, as Black judges are more likely
to sentence both Black and white defendants to prison than their white colleagues.
Several arguments have been offered to explain this more conservative behavior
among African American and Latino judges. As judges who are subject to partisan and
non-partisan elections, some argue that the voters can screen out minority candidates with
polarizing interests (Spohn, 1990; Uhlman, 1978). Here, constituents are less likely to
vote for judicial candidates who represent more ideologically extreme viewpoints. Still
others contend that judges may be less willing to diverge from the preferences of their
colleagues to pursue non-policy goals (Spohn, 1990; Welch, Combs, and Gruhl, 1988).
According to this view, minority judges may prefer collegiality and good working
relations to feelings of isolation, which can result from viewpoints that run counter to
judicial norms (Carp, Stidham, and Manning, 2004). The selection process can also have
an important effect on voting behavior (e.g. Brace and Hall, 1997; Hall and Brace, 1992).
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Holmes et al. (1993), for example, argue that minority judges may be subject to pressures
from the local community to find justice for the victim. Similarly, Hall and Brace (1989)
reason that judges who disagree with their constituents’ preferences must alter their
behavior and be careful not to distinguish themselves from the rest of the court,
especially among those policy issues considered to be salient or controversial (396).
In the federal courts, however, the selection process is much different, as judges
are appointed and given lifetime tenure on good behavior. Federal judges, moreover, are
assumed to have a great deal of latitude to vote according to their most preferred
preferences (Rhode, 1972; Rhode and Spaeth, 1976: 72). In the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
especially, the ability to pursue their preferences is reinforced by the low probability of
being appointed to the Supreme Court and its de facto “court of last resort” status, which
can moderate other goals, such as career mobility, and reduce the probability of
appellate-court decisions being overturned by higher-court authorities.12
Hypotheses
Based on the above arguments Hypothesis 1 states that an African American and
Latino judge will be more likely to rule in favor of a co-racial or co-ethnic claimant.
Research focusing on panel effects also suggests that minority jurists will continue to
demonstrate divergence in behavior when they sit on majority-white panels. Thus,
Hypothesis 2 states that minority judges, sitting on majority-white panels, will be more
12

This does not suggest that appellate-court judges are not held to any constraints entirely, as research

demonstrates that judges can be constrained by the preferences of their panel colleagues (see Epstein and
Knight, 1998; Collins and Moyer, 2008) and judicial hierarchies when there is a lack of congruence in
policy preferences (Van Winkle, 1997).
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likely to rule in favor of co-racial and co-ethnic claimants. Finally, I expect the presence
of a co-racial or a co-ethnic claimant to improve the quality of deliberation among
minority judges and enhance the perception that minority judges are policy specialists.
Thus, Hypothesis 3 states that white judges, sitting on racially and ethnically diverse
panels, will be more likely to rule in favor of co-racial and co-ethnic claimants.
Data and Methods
Focusing on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, I analyze 3,985 individual votes across a
universe of Title VII employment discrimination claims based on race and national
origin. 13 The period of study is between 2001 and 2009. 14 Since the data contains a
13

Since the there are three judges per panel, the total number of observations is typically divisible by three.

In this case, five observations were excluded from the analysis. First, I excluded Asian American judges
from the analysis because there were very few observations (2 observations). Also, three observations were
excluded from the analysis due to missing data.
It is also important to note the changes in the total number of observations between Table 2.5 and
2.7. To ease the interpretation of the results and because some of the variables accounting for “panel
effects” did not have enough observations for proper analysis, the number observations decreases from
3,985 to 3,930. These include all female panels (12 observations), majority-Latino panels (3 observations),
and panels consisting of one African American, Latino, and white judge (36 observations). Ideally, these
variables would have been identified as Female Judge (two female colleagues), White Judge (two Latino
colleagues), Latino judge (one Latino colleague), White Judge (Black and Latino colleague), Black Judge
(Latino and white Colleague), and Latino Judge (Black and white colleague). Finally, I exclude Asian
American judges (4 observations) from the analysis. I retested the model by including the above variables
in the baseline category. The results demonstrate no substantive changes.

14

These decisions are collected between 1/1/2001 and 12/31/2009. Since there are few African American

judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals and even fewer Latino judges, I chose to begin the analysis in 2001 to
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universe of decisions in which judges are randomly assigned to three-member panels, it
also captures a representative pool of Latino and African American appellate-court
judges during the period of study.15 Specifically, the dataset includes 13 Latino and 17
African American judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Five additional judges from the
U.S. District Courts (1 Latino and 4 African American judges) are also included in the
dataset. Serving as a judge designate, these judges acted in a temporary capacity in order

capture all Clinton appointees at the onset of the analysis. The appointments made by President Clinton
currently represent one of the greatest efforts to diversify the racial and ethnic composition of the Appeals
Court since the Carter administration. President Clinton is responsible for appointing over half of the
Latino judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, increasing the total number from 5 to 12. Similarly, President
Clinton is also responsible for appointing 9 African American judges, increasing the total number of
African Americans on the appeals-court bench to 20. I chose end the analysis in 2009 because it
represented the most current decisions during the time of collection. The dataset does not include any
judges appointed by President Obama.

15

Due to regular appointments and judges leaving office, the number of African American and Latino

judges has fluctuated throughout the years. Between 2001 and 2009, the mean average of Latino judges
sitting in the U.S. Courts of Appeals was approximately 14. The average number of African American
judges was approximately 19.
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to improve the efficiency of the Appeals Court. 16 All decisions are published in the
Federal Reporter and are accessible through Westlaw.17
I focus on Title VII claims for several reasons. Following previous scholarship, I
expect divergence in judicial behavior between descriptive representatives and white
judges to be conditional upon the presence of policy issues considered salient to racial
and ethnic minorities (Songer et al., 1994). Despite the passage of the Civil Rights Act
1964 (Title VII), discrimination in the workplace continues to be an important problem
facing both groups (e.g. Acs and Loprest, 2009; Coleman, 2003; Darity and Mason, 1998;
Espino and Franz, 2002; Goldsmith, Hamilton, and Darity, 2006; Kenny and Wissoker,
1994). These experiences, moreover, have translated into divergent attitudes towards
discrimination between whites and racial and ethnic minorities (Pew Center, 2005; Pew
Hispanic, 2006; Rodriguez, 2008). Second, Title VII claims based on race and national
origin offer judges more discretion to rule their most preferred policy position, as studies
demonstrate circuit court splits over the interpretation of Supreme Court precedent
(Green, 1999: 997-998; Lanctot, 2000-2001). Finally, by narrowing the case selection to
16

Refer to Table A.1 in Appendix A for a complete list of African American and Latino Judges who

participated in Title VII employment discrimination cases between 2001 and 2009.

17

All published decisions involving race and national origin are accessible through the Westlaw Database,

using Key Numbers Search. Cases are organized by subject and are located in the Civil Rights Folder. The
use of published decisions is well established by judicial scholars (Manning et al., 2004), as they represent
cases with higher precedential value and greater discretionary interpretation. This argument, moreover, is
reinforced by studies that examine the behavior of judges across published and unpublished decisions
(Keele, Malmsheimer, Floyd, and Zhang, 2009; Ringquist and Emmert, 1999).
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discrimination cases in the workplace, I improve the ability to control for legal precedent,
as discrimination cases based on discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work
environment maintain similar legal frameworks.
Following Segal (2000), the unit of analysis is the individual vote of each judge
per grievance within a case.18 More specifically, this includes all decisions involving a
discrimination, hostile-work environment, or retaliation claim. 19 In the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, for example, individual cases can range from a single dispute to multiple

18

Since I am interested in individual-level variables and because judges appear in the dataset multiple times

within and across cases, I chose to cluster around each individual judge (e.g. Collins and Martinek, 2011;
Collins and Moyer; 2008). Clustering around the judge also represents a more cautionary approach, as the
size of the standard errors tend to increase for variables that measure judges’ characteristics (Zorn, 2006).
Finally, in Table A.2 in Appendix A, I also re-estimated the model by clustering around the panel decision
since it accounts for the introduction of case-stimuli (e.g. case facts, legal precedent, type of grievance) (see
Collins and Moyer, 2008; Farhang and Wawro, 2004). The results indicate no substantive changes with
regards to the main independent variables.

19

According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, discrimination involves treating someone

unfavorably because of race or personal characteristics associated with race (E.E.O.C. n. d). Examples of
discrimination include but are not limited to “hiring, firing, pay, job assignments, promotions, layoff,
training, fringe benefits, and any other term or condition of employment” (E.E.O.C., n. d.). Hostile work
environment or harassment generally refers to offensive behavior by an employer, supervisor, or coworker. This includes “racial slurs, offensive or derogatory remarks, or displays of racially offensive
symbols” (E.E.O.C., n. d). Finally retaliation refers to any attempt to discriminate against an employee for
filing a charge of discrimination, complaining to their employer about discrimination, or participating in an
employment discrimination proceeding (E.E.O.C., n. d).
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grievances. If a case included more the one claimant, I recorded all grievances per
claimant. A case involving two claimants, for example, rendered four individual votes per
judge if both claimants appealed two issues apiece. Since there are the three judges per
panel, the total number of observations or votes would be twelve. If, however, multiple
claimants were treated as a collective group by the panel of judges in the opinion, such as
a class action lawsuit, all claimants were then recorded as an individual claimant. In all,
the strategy led to 2,401 individual votes involving discrimination claims, 486 votes
involving hostile work environment, and 1,098 votes involving claims of retaliation.
It is important to note that this collection strategy is much different from previous
collection efforts. Though studies focusing on judicial behavior slightly differ, one
strategy is to record cases where there is a clear victor. This involves cases that were
either unanimously decided across all issues (e.g. Martinek and Collins, 2008) or splitdecision cases where the majority of decisions were decided in favor of one party over
another (e.g. Farhang and Wawro, 2004). Take for instance, a claimant who appeals their
case with three specific grievances: discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work
environment. If a panel rules in favor of the claimant in at least two of the three issues,
one would be able to identify the claimant as the clear victor and not the employer. The
dependent variable would then be coded as a single “favorable vote” for each individual
judge on the panel. If, however, a case involved four issues in which the claimant and
employer each won half of the decisions, the case would then be excluded from the entire
analysis.
Overall, this collection strategy has several advantages. Different from other
research, one is able to account for the full range of decisions made by judges in the U.S.
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Courts of Appeals. Consequently, it is possible to increase the number of observations per
judge, including the number of decisions made by under-represented groups, such as
Latino and African American judges. Second, one is able to account for different types of
discrimination claims, such as claims based on retaliation, discrimination, and hostile
work environment. Otherwise, researchers are limited to explaining the voting behavior
of judges across discrimination cases more generally. Finally, and most pertinent to this
study, it is possible to account for decisions involving multiple claimants from diverse
racial and ethnic backgrounds. Not only does this strategy improve one’s ability to
examine how judges rule towards specific claimants, but it also provides an added
dimension to the study of descriptive representation by focusing on the direct
consequences that judges’ decisions can have on racial and ethnic minorities who come
before the courts to appeal their case.
Dependent Variable
The main dependent variable is Favorable Vote, which captures the individual
votes for each judge per grievance in the analysis. A vote in favor of the claimant is
coded as “1” (26 percent). More specifically, these decisions include votes in favor of
employees who file discrimination claims against their employer, supervisor, or coworker.20 By contrast, a vote against the claimant is coded as “0” (74 percent). In this
case, a judge rules against the employee. Although the distribution of the dependent
variable illustrates the difficulty in winning a race discrimination case (Selmi, 20002001), it also suggests that a vote in favor of the claimant is more meaningful. Given the

20

I refer to employees as “claimant” since they can represent either the appellant or the appellee.
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dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, I utilize Logistic regression analysis to test
all hypotheses (Long and Freese, 2006).

Independent Variables
The main independent variables are Latino Judge and African American Judge.
Both variables are dichotomous and are coded as “1” if a judge involved in the decision is
identified as either Latino or African American by the Judicial Biographical Database
(Federal Judicial Center, n.d.). Non-African American and Non-Latino judges are,
therefore, coded as “0.” Next, I interacted Latino Judge with Latino Claimant and African
American Judge with Black Claimant to test the extent to which racial and ethnic cues
can condition the voting behavior of Latino and African American judges. Both
interaction effects are coded as “1” to indicate an African American judge or a Latino
judge voting on a Black or Latino claimant, respectively. All other judge-claimant
combinations are coded as “0.”
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the main independent variables in
the analysis, showing the distribution of votes by the race and ethnicity of the judge and
the race and ethnicity of the claimant. In all, decisions involving African American and
Latino judges account for 9.56 percent (381) and 4.37 percent (174) of the observations,
respectively. Excluding Asian American judges from the analysis, white judges serve as
the baseline for comparison. 21 In comparison to other claimants, the table also

21

I excluded Asian American judges from the analysis because they only accounted for 2 observations

during the period of study.
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demonstrates that Latino judges ruled towards another Latino claimants 0.88 percent (35)
of the time. African American judges, by contrast, ruled towards Black claimants with
much greater frequency, as African American judges voted on a Black claimant more
than 6.62 percent (264) of the time. This distribution is not surprising since Black
claimants represent the largest group of claimants during the period of study.
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55.17%
2.41%
(96)

20.11%
0.88%
(35)

2.87%
0.13%
(5)

8.05%
0.35%
(14)

0.57%
0.03%
(1)

13.22%
0.58%
(23)

100%
4.37%
(174)

63.82%
12.54%
4.84%
2.92%
0.87%
15.01%
100%
54.93%
10.79%
4.17%
2.51%
0.75%
12.92%
86.07%
(2,189)
(430)
(166)
(100)
(30)
(515)
(3,430)
Note: For each cell, the top row depicts row percentages and the second row depicts total percentages. The number of observations is in
parentheses. Since total percentages are rounded, they do not total 100%

White Judge

Latino Judge

Table 2.1: Distribution of Votes by the Race and Ethnicity of the Judge and the Claimant in Discrimination Claims (2001-2009)
Latino
Middle Eastern
White
Black
Claimant
Asian
Claimant American Indian Claimant
Claimant (Non-Black) Claimant (Non- Black)
Claimant (non-Latino) Total
69.29%
6.30%
5.25%
1.31%
0.79%
17.06%
100%
African American
6.62%
0.60%
0.50%
0.13%
0.07%
1.63%
9.56%
Judge
(264)
(24)
(20)
(5)
(3)
(65)
(381)

Following research on panel effects, I also account for the social composition of
panels (Kastellec, forthcoming; Boyd et al., 2010; Farhang and Wawro, 2010, 2004; Cox
and Miles, 2008). In line with Farhang and Wawro’s (2004) coding scheme, I included
three variables that account for African American and Latino judges sitting on majoritywhite and majority-minority panels. These variables include the following: African
American Judge (two white colleagues), African American Judge (one Black colleague),
and Latino Judge (two white colleagues). Similarly, I also control for a host of variables
that consider how white judges vote while sitting on racially and ethnically diverse
panels. These variables include the following: White Judge (one Black colleague), White
Judge (two Black colleagues), and White Judge (one Latino colleague). All white panels,
therefore, serve as the baseline for comparison. All variables are dichotomous and are
coded as “1” to indicate each panel combination and “0” if otherwise. Taking into
consideration the role of claimant effects, I also interacted Latino Judge (two white
colleagues) and White judge (one Latino colleague) with Latino Claimant. Similarly, I
also interacted African American Judge (two white colleagues) and White Judge (one
Black colleague) with Black Claimant. These variables are coded as “1” to indicate
racially and ethnically diverse panels and their decisions involving Black claimants. A
coding of “0” indicates otherwise.
Similar to the previous table, Table 2.2 shows the distribution of votes by the race
and ethnicity of the judge and the claimant across different panel compositions. The table
demonstrates that African American and Latino judges sitting on majority-white panels
ruled towards co-racial and co-ethnic claimants 5.27 percent (207) and 2.24 percent (88)
of the time, respectively. The relative distribution of white judges ruling towards Black
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and Latino claimants is similar to African American and Latino judges sitting on
majority-white panels. However, their frequency is somewhat greater given that white
judges are over-represented in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. While white judges sitting on
a panel with one African American judge ruled towards a Black claimant 10.53 percent
(414) of the time, white judges sitting on a panel with one Latino judge ruled towards a
Latino claimant 4.48 percent (176) of the time. In all, the distribution of individual votes
across these different panel compositions demonstrates that racially diverse panels are
more likely to adjudicate a claim involving a Black claimant than an ethnically diverse
panel adjudicating a claim involving a Latino claimant.
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88.89%
0.61%
(24)
55.00%
4.48%
(176)
64.12%
39.69%
(1,560)

White Judge (two
Black colleagues)

White Judge (one
Latino colleague)

White Judge (all
white panel)
13.07%
8.09%
(318)

20.62%
1.68%
(66)

0%
0%
(0)

7.05%
1.12%
(44)

4.69%
2.90%
(114)

3.12%
0.25%
(10)

0%
0%
(0)

6.73%
1.07%
(42)

3.12%
0.13%
(5)

0%
0%
(0)

6.41%
0.51%
(20)

2.59%
1.60%
(63)

8.75%
0.71%
(28)

3.70%
0.03%
(1)

0.96%
0.15%
(6)

8.75%
0.36%
(14)

3.70%
0.05%
(2)

0.96%
0.08%
(3)

0.99%
4.48%
(24)

0.62%
0.05%
(2)

0%
0%
(0)

0.64%
0.10%
(4)

0.62%
0.03%
(1)

0%
0%
(0)

0.96%
0.08%
(3)

14.55%
9.00%
(354)

11.88%
0.97%
(38)

7.41%
0.05%
(2)

18.27%
2.90%
(114)

11.88%
0.48%
(19)

7.41%
0.10%
(4)

18.27%
1.45%
(57)

100%
61.91%
(2433)

100%
8.14%
(320)

100%
0.69%
(27)

100%
15.88%
(624)

100%
4.07%
(160)

100%
1.37%
(54)

100%
7.94%
(312)

Note: For each cell, the top row depicts row percentages and the second row depicts total percentages. The number of observations is in
parentheses. Since total percentages are rounded, they do not total 100%

66.35%
10.53%
(414)

20.62%
0.84%
(33)

55.00%
2.24%
(88)

Latino Judge (two
white colleagues)

White (one Black
colleague)

0%
0%
(0)

88.9%
1.22%
(48)

African American
Judge (one Black
colleague)

7.05%
0.56%
(22)

66.35%
5.27%
(207)

African American
Judge (two white
colleagues)

Table 2.2: Distribution of Votes by the Race and Ethnicity of the Judge and the Claimant in Discrimination Claims (2001-2009)
Latino
Middle Eastern
White
Black
Claimant
Asian
Claimant
American
Claimant
Claimant
(Non-Black)
Claimant
(Non- Black)
Indian Claimant (non-Latino)
Total

Control Variables
In addition to the variables of interest, I also control for a host of background
characteristics, which are found to have a significant influence on judicial behavior.
Table 2.3 provides the descriptive statistics for all control variables. Following research
that finds female judges to rule more liberally in employment discrimination cases
(Songer et al., 1994), I include a variable for Female Judge. This variable is coded as “1”
to indicate the presence of a female judge and “0” to indicate male judges. Similarly, I
also control for the gender composition of panels (Boyd et al., 2010; Farhang and
Wawro, 2004). These variables include the following: Female Judge (two male
colleagues), Female Judge (one female colleague), Male Judge (one female colleague),
and Male Judge (two female colleagues). A coding of “1” indicates one of the above
panel compositions. A coding of “0” indicates otherwise.
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Table 2.3. Descriptive Statistics
Variables
Female Judge (two male colleagues)
Female Judge (one female colleague)
Male Judge (one female colleague)
Female Judge (two female colleagues)
Female Judge
Born in South
Age of Judge
Former Prosecutor
Ivy League Education
Designate Judge
Judge Ideology
Ideology of Panel Median
Ideology of Circuit Median
Ideology of Supreme Court Median
Lower Court Decision (Favorable Vote)
Amicus Curiae Brief
Discrimination Case
Hostile Work Environment Case
Latino Claimant
Black Claimant
Asian Claimant
Middle Eastern Claimant
American Indian Claimant
1st Circuit
2nd Circuit
3rd Circuit
4th Circuit
5th Circuit
6th Circuit
7th Circuit
8th Circuit
10th Circuit
11th Circuit
D.C. Circuit
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Mean
0.101
0.889
0.196
0.461
0.195
0.151
63.873
0.427
0.2070
0.061
0.129
0.146
0.247
0.387
0.061
0.055
0.603
0.122
0.123
0.640
0.048
0.030
0.009
0.037
0.045
0.018
0.047
0.080
0.074
0.272
0.183
0.072
0.053
0.077
0.019
0.175
0.190
0.130
0.108
0.102
0.089
0.068
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Std. Dev.
0.301
0.284
0.397
0.210
0.396
0.358
9.733
0.495
0.405
0.240
0.362
0.313
0.203
0.237
0.240
0.228
0.489
0.327
0.328
0.480
0.214
0.170
0.092
0.189
0.208
0.133
0.213
0.271
0.261
0.445
0.387
0.259
0.223
0.266
0.136
0.380
0.393
0.337
0.311
0.302
0.285
0.252

Min
0
0
0
0
0
0
39
0
0
0
-0.580
-0.538
-0.309
0.007
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Max
1
1
1
1
1
1
98
1
1
1
0.577
0.577
0.549
1.18
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

I also control for the Age of the judge at the time the case was decided, as
Manning et al. (2004) find that judges representing older age cohorts are more likely to
rule in favor of the claimant in age discrimination claims. Following Songer and Davis
(1990), I also expect judges born in the South to rule against racial and ethnic minorities.
Born South is a dichotomous variable coded as “1” if a judge was born in the South and
“0” if otherwise.22 Career backgrounds, such as prosecutorial experiences, can also have
an important and socializing effect on behavioral outcomes (e.g. Tate, 1981). For
example, Tate (1981) finds that former prosecutors are more likely to rule conservatively.
Former Prosecutor is a dichotomous variable coded as “1” if a judge was a former
prosecutor or attorney general prior to being appointed to the federal court. A coding of
“0” indicates otherwise. In addition I control for judges’ educational backgrounds, as
Tate (1981) finds judges from more prestigious backgrounds to behave more liberally.
Ivy League Education is coded as “1” if a judge graduated from one of the eight ivyleague law schools.23 All information regarding judges’ background characteristics can
be found at the Judicial Biographical Database (Federal Judicial Center, n. d.). Also,
since I am interested in the behavior of appellate-court judges, I control for Designate
Judge. Designate Judge is coded as “1” if a judge is from the U.S. District Courts or

22

I define the South as the following: Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida,

Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, and Arkansas.

23

Ivy league schools include the following: Brown University, Columba University, Cornell University,

Dartmouth University, Harvard University, Pennsylvania University, Princeton University and Yale
University (Leicth, 1978).
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other specialty federal courts, such as the International Trade Court. All appeals-court
judges, therefore, are coded as “0.”
The third cluster of variables accounts for attitudes, strategic bargaining, and
intra-branch relations. Following Segal and Spaeth (1993), I control for judges’ attitudes
or Ideology. The attitudinal model predicts that judicial behavior is a function of attitudes
vis a vis the facts of the case (Segal and Spaeth, 1993). Therefore, I expect judges with a
more liberal ideology to vote in favor of racial and ethnic minorities. To measure
attitudes, I utilize Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers (GHP) (2001) coding scheme, which
range from -1 (most liberal to 1 (most conservative).24 A negative coefficient, therefore,
indicates that judges with more conservative ideologies are less likely to rule in favor of
the claimant. However, judges do not make decisions in a vacuum (Collins and Martinek,
2011). The strategic model of voting behavior, for example, posits that judges “realize
that their ability to achieve their goals depends on the consideration of the preferences of
other actors, the choices they expect others to make, and the institutional context in which
they act” (Epstein and Knight, 1998: 10). Following Collins and Moyer’s (2008) coding

24

It is important to note that partisanship and GHP scores are highly correlated (.90). However, I opted to

use GHP scores because they capture key actors involved in the appointment process. Specifically, the
coding scheme is based upon Poole-Rosenthal Common Space scores that measure the ideology of the
president and home-state senators. In the absence of senatorial courtesy, a judge’s ideology score is the
same as the president’s. If one home-state senator shares the same party affiliation as the president, then a
judge’s ideological score reflects the ideological score of the home-state senator. Finally, if two home-state
senators share the same party affiliation as the president, then a judge’s ideological score is the mean value
of the senator’s scores (see Giles et al., 2001).
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scheme, I control for the Panel’s Ideological Median, as the judges representing the
ideological median may have the greatest influence on her panel colleagues. Similarly, I
control for the Circuit’s Ideological Median, as decisions may be overturned by a court
en banc if rulings do not conform to the ideological preferences of the circuit (Van
Winkle, 1997). Both the Panel Ideological Median and Circuit Ideological Median are
measured as the median GHP ideological score at the time of the decision. Finally, judges
may be responsive to the Supreme Court since it has control over its own docket and the
power to overturn lower-court decisions (Songer, Segal, and Cameron, 1994, but see
Cross and Tiller, 2008). To measure Median Supreme Court Justice, I use Martin and
Quinn (2002) ideological scores for each calendar term. These scores are unbounded,
with negative values representing more liberal Courts and positive values representing
more conservative Courts. Finally, to account for routine cases, I control for Lower Court
Decision (Favorable Vote) (see Collins and Moyer, 2008). This variable is coded as “1”
if the lower federal court ruled in favor of the claimant and “0” if otherwise.
The dataset also provides the unique opportunity to control for the facts of the
case, which can significantly mediate the behavior of judges. Most notably, I control for
the race and ethnicity of the claimant, including Black Claimant, Latino Claimant (nonBlack), Asian American, Middle Eastern Claimant (non-Black), and American Indian
Claimant. Following research that focuses on the relationship between discrimination,
skin color, and national origin (Kim, 1999; see also Espino and Franz, 2002; Goldsmith
et al., 2006) I expect judges to be less likely to rule in favor of Black claimants than any
other racial and ethnic group.

All claimant variables are coded as “1” to indicate

claimants’ racial and ethnic backgrounds and “0” if otherwise. Non-Latino white
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claimants, therefore, serve as the baseline for comparison. The race and ethnicity of the
claimants are recorded in the Federal Reporter.25 I also control for Amicus Curiae briefs,
as studies demonstrate that special interest groups can influence judicial behavior
(Collins and Martinek, 2011). Briefs intended to influence a favorable outcome for racial
or ethnic minorities are coded as “1” and “0” if otherwise. Finally, I account for
Discrimination Claims and Hostile Work Environment Claims, holding retaliation claims
as a baseline for comparison (Parker, 2009). Both claim types are coded as “1” to indicate
the presence of a discrimination or hostile work environment issue and

“0” if

otherwise.26

25

Black Claimant refers those who “socially considered to be black,” regardless of national origin

(Abramson, 1977). This coding decision is supported by research that indicates that darker skin color is
positively correlated with heightened levels of discrimination (Espino and Franz, 2002). Evidence also
indicates that skin color can play an important role in Latinos’ perceived commonality with African
Americans (Nicholson, Pantoja, and Segura, 2005). Latino Claimants (non-Black) include individuals “with
ancestors from national origins in which Spanish is a significant and often dominant language” (Garcia and
Sanchez, 2008: 7). Non-Black Middle Eastern Claimants refer to individuals whose ancestors originate
from the Middle East and Northern Africa. Asian Claimants refer to “having origins in any of the original
peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the Indian Subcontinent” (Lien, Conway, and Wong, 2004: 3).
American Indian Claimants, though, are more difficult to define. Wilkins (2002) suggest that the definition
can be clustered around five categories: 1) blood quantum 2) membership of a federally recognized
indigenous community 3) residence on an Indian reservation 4) decadency, and 5) self-identification.

26

Parker (2009), for example, demonstrates that judges are less likely to rule for the plaintiff in retaliation

cases, though the differences were small.
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The last cluster of variables accounts for the circuit norms and the political
context during the time of the decision (see Farhang and Wawro, 2004). Specifically, I
control for each of the 11 circuits in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, including the Circuit
Court for Washington D.C. Since the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals tends to be more liberal
than other circuits (Scherer, 2004-2005), the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals shall serve as
the baseline for comparison. Finally, I account for yearly controls to take into
consideration the political context in which decisions were made across Title VII claims.
Results
Focusing on Title VII employment discrimination claims, Table 2.4 compares the
proportion of favorable votes of African American and Latino judges with white judges.
In line with expectations, the results indicate that African American judges are more
likely than white judges to rule in favor of the claimant more generally (p < .10)
demonstrating a 3 percentage-point difference between the two groups. The preliminary
results also show that Latino judges are less likely than their white colleagues to rule in
favor of the claimant (p < .01). In fact, the proportion of favorable rulings among Latino
judges is about 9 percentage-points less than white judges and more than 12 percentagepoints less than African American judges. Interestingly, this less-than favorable behavior
also continues to hold when Latino judges sit on majority-white panels (p < .01).
In the context of claimant effects, the preliminary results demonstrate partial
support for my hypotheses. For example, Latino judges are also less likely than their
white colleagues to rule in favor of other Latino claimants (p < .01) and this is especially
the case when Latino judges sit on majority-white panels (p < .001). African American
judges, however, demonstrate much different behavior, as they are more likely than white
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judges to rule in favor of other Black claimants (p < .01). This more favorable voting
behavior also continues to hold when African American judges sit on majority-white
panels (p < .001). Interestingly, the proportion of favorable votes is about 11 percentagepoints greater than white colleagues sitting on all-white panels. In all, these initial
findings suggest that while African American judges are more likely than white and
Latino judges to rule in favor of the claimant, African American and Latino judges are
conditioned by the presence of co-racial and co-ethnic cues but in different ways.

Table 2.4: Proportion of Favorable Votes by White, African American, and Latino
Judges across Employment Discrimination Claims (2001-2009)
All Claimants
Black Claimant
Latino Claimant
Favorable
Favorable
Favorable
SE
SE
SE
Vote
Vote
Vote
Individual Level
White Judge
0.2601
0.007
0.2243
0.008
0.4209
0.024
African American
Judge

0.2992†

Latino Judge

0.1724** 0.028

0.023

0.3068**

---

0.028

---

---

---

0.1429**

0.060

0.5000

0.281

Panel Level
White Judge (All
white panel)

0.2679

0.008

0.2173

0.010

African American
Judge (Two white
colleagues)

0.3044

0.026

0.3236*** 0.032

---

---

Latino Judge (Two 0.1562** 0.028
----0.0909*** 0.051
White Judges)
†p <. 10 two-tailed, *p < .05, two-tailed, **p < .01 two-tailed, ***p < .001, two-tailed.
Note: Table compares the proportion of favorable votes among white, Latino, and
African American judges (t-test). It also compares African American, Latino, and white
voting behavior for judges sitting on majority-white panels. The dependent variable is a
vote in favor of the claimant.
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The next step in the analysis is to test whether the bivariate results continue to
hold once alternative explanations of judicial behavior are taken into account. Table 2.5
presents two Logistic regression models. Specifically, model 1 presents the constrained
model, which analyzes the behavior of African American and Latino judges towards all
claimants. Model 2 presents the fully specified model, which captures how Latino and
African American judges rule towards co-ethnic and co-racial claimants. Specifically, the
intent here is to examine the extent to which the voting behavior of Latino and African
American judges is mediated by the presence of racial and ethnic cues.
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Table 2.5: Logistic Model of Individual Voting Behavior in the U.S. Court of Appeals (2001-2009)
Model 1 (Constrained Model)
Model 2 (Full Model)
Variables
Coef.
SE
Discrete
Coef.
SE
Discrete
Robust
Change
Robust
Change
(minmax)
(minmax)
Background Characteristics
Latino Judge

-1.220*

Latino Judge*Latino Claimant

---

African American Judge

0.334†

African American Judge*Black
Claimant

---

Female Judge

0.305†

Born in South

0.473
--0.195
---

-0.1481

-0.950*

0.410

-0.1246

---

-1.224

1.075

-0.1439

0.0615

-0.156

0.300

-0.0257

---

0.688*

0.348

0.1364

0.169

0.0549

0.314†

0.168

0.0566

0.039

0.168

0.0067

0.029

0.168

0.0049

Age of Judge

-0.001

0.009

-0.0067

0.000

0.009

-0.0027

Former Prosecutor

-0.090

0.162

-0.0153

-0.113

0.162

-0.0192

Ivy League Education

-0.201

0.174

-0.0333

-0.212

0.172

-0.0351

Designate Judge

-0.117

0.290

-0.0195

-0.120

0.293

-0.0199

-0.411†

0.216

-0.0837

-0.456*

0.211

-0.0932

Ideology of Panel Median

0.452

0.290

0.0836

0.474†

0.284

0.0874

Ideology of Circuit Median

-0.628

0.625

-0.0962

-0.636

0.623

-0.0975

0.376

1.046

0.0789

0.429

1.043

0.0903

2.156***

0.217

0.4826

2.169***

0.219

0.4851

Attitudes & Strategic Interaction
Judge Ideology

Ideology of Supreme Court Median
Lower Court Decision (Favorable
Vote)
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Table 2.5 (cont.): Logistic Model of Individual Voting Behavior in the U.S. Court of Appeals (2001-2009)
Case Facts
Amicus Curiae Brief
Discrimination Case

0.750**
-0.036

0.265

0.1509

0.138

-0.0061

0.807**
-0.044

0.265

0.1640

0.137

-0.0076

Hostile Work Environment Case

0.373*

0.161

0.0688

0.364*

0.161

0.0669

Latino Claimant

0.604*

0.277

0.1162

0.651*

0.289

0.1260

Black Claimant

-0.178

0.172

-0.0310

-0.252

0.178

-0.0440

Asian Claimant

-0.250

0.375

-0.0401

-0.241

0.372

-0.0387

0.135

0.348

0.0239

0.108

0.340

0.0190

-2.912***

0.718

-0.2082

-2.729***

0.757

-0.2046

Middle Eastern Claimant
American Indian Claimant
Circuit Norms
1st Circuit

-2.078***

0.609

-0.1962

-2.050***

0.607

-0.1947

nd

-0.282

0.417

-0.0448

-0.214

0.410

-0.0346

rd

3 Circuit

-1.091*

0.463

-0.1349

-1.077*

0.452

-0.1336

4th Circuit

2 Circuit

-1.162*

0.494

-0.1439

-1.122*

0.492

-0.1404

th

-0.507

0.559

-0.0765

-0.475

0.551

-0.0722

th

6 Circuit

-0.440

0.413

-0.0674

-0.383

0.407

-0.0595

7th Circuit

-1.831***

0.468

-0.2471

-1.769***

0.459

-0.2402

-0.954*

0.470

-0.1365

-0.917*

0.463

-0.1320

10 Circuit

-0.171

0.472

-0.0281

-0.129

0.464

-0.0214

11th Circuit

-1.549**

0.592

-0.1728

-1.489*

0.586

-0.1687

D.C. Circuit

-1.251*

0.582

-0.1549

-1.150*

0.575

-0.1461

5 Circuit

th

8 Circuit
th
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Table 2.5 (cont.): Logistic Model of Individual Voting Behavior in the U.S. Court of Appeals (2001-2009)
Yearly Controls
2002

0.294

0.405

0.0543

0.287

0.404

0.0529

2003

-0.405

0.323

-0.0642

-0.404

0.322

-0.0640

2004

-0.077

0.383

-0.0130

-0.086

0.381

-0.0146

2005

-0.155

0.521

-0.0256

-0.138

0.525

-0.0229

2006

-0.227

0.257

-0.0370

-0.237

0.254

-0.0384

2007

-1.190***

0.302

-0.1527

-1.201***

0.300

-0.1536

2008

-0.511

0.403

-0.0773

-0.503

0.398

-0.0761

2009

-0.238

0.590

-0.0384

-0.269

0.589

-0.0430

Constant
0.095
0.806
0.059
0.797
N
3,985
3,985
Log pseudo likelihood
-1919.4224
-1914.0917
% Correctly Predicted
78.17%
78.09%
† p < .10, two-tailed; *p < .05, two-tailed; **p < .01, two-tailed; ***p < .001, two-tailed.
Note: The dependent variable is a vote in favor of racial and ethnic minorities. Both models cluster around the
individual judge (305 clusters).
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Overall, the results demonstrate only partial support for Hypothesis 1, which
states that minority judges will be more likely to rule in favor of co-ethnic or co-racial
claimants in Title VII employment discrimination claims. Interestingly, the results show
that descriptive representatives are not monolithic in their individual voting behavior. In
model 1, for example, African American Judge is significant and positive (p < .10),
suggesting that Black judges are more likely than non-Black judges to rule in favor of the
claimant more generally. The presence of an African American judge versus a non-Black
judge, moreover, has a substantive influence on voting behavior, increasing the
probability of a favorable ruling by 6 percent. The propensity to rule in favor of the
claimant is also conditioned by the presence of co-racial cues. In model 2, for example,
African American*Black Claimant is significant and positive (p < .10), suggesting that
African American judges are more likely than non-Black judges to rule in favor of other
Black claimants. Even after controlling for judges’ ideology and holding all other
independent variables at their respective means and modes, Figure 2.1 illustrates clear
differences in voting behavior between Black and white judges. When both sets of judges
are held at their most liberal ideologies (-1), the probability of an African American judge
ruling in favor of a Black claimant is 40.87 percent versus 28.87 percent for white judges.
As the ideology of African American and white judges become more conservative (1),
the probability decreases to 21.72 and 14.01 percent, respectively. Although both groups
are impacted by ideology, the gap in the predicted probability between African American
and white jurists implies that race and ethnicity have an independent effect on the voting
behavior of judges. In all, these findings provide empirical support for the argument that
Black claimants serve as important racial cues that lead to more favorable votes.
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The voting behavior of Latino judges contrasts sharply with the voting behavior
of African American judges. In model 1, for example, Latino Judge is significant and
negative (p < .05), suggesting that Latino judges are less likely than non-Latino judges to
rule in favor of the claimant. The discrete change in the predicted probability further
illustrates this finding, as the presence of a Latino judge decreases the probability of
ruling in favor of the claimant by about 15 percent. The apparent lack of support for the
claimant is also reinforced by the presence of co-ethnic claimants. In model 2, for
example, Latino Judge*Latino Claimant is significant and negative (p < .05), suggesting
that Latino judges are less likely than non-Latino judges to rule in favor of a co-ethnic
claimant. After controlling for judges’ ideology and holding all other independent
variables at their respective means and modes, Figure 2.2 shows important differences in
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the individual voting behavior between Latino and white jurists. When both sets of judges
are held to their most liberal ideologies (-1), the probability of a Latino judge ruling in
favor of a co-ethnic claimant is 10.22 percent, which is 39.81 percent less than the
probability of a white judge ruling in favor of a Latino claimant. As judges’ ideologies
become more conservative (1), however, the probability of a favorable vote decreases to
4.37 percent and 28.67 percent for Latino and white judges, respectively. While these
results run counter to my hypothesis, the results are similar to previous research that finds
Latino are less likely to rule in favor of Latino defendants at the state level (Holmes et al.,
1993). Overall, the findings clearly demonstrate that the presence of a Latino claimant
can have a substantive and independent effect on Latino voting behavior, regardless of
Latino judges’ ideological positions.
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Given the small number of Latino judges in the analysis, further investigation also
demonstrates that the results are not necessarily generalizable across all Latino judges in
the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Table 2.6, for example, provides a list of Latino judges and
their voting behavior towards Latino claimants. Of the 13 Latino appellate-court judges
in the dataset, the table demonstrates that only 5 Latino judges have ever made a decision
involving a Latino claimant. More specifically, these judges include 2 judges appointed
by a Democratic president (J. Fortunato Benevides; J. Carlos F. Lucero) and 3 judges
appointed by a Republican president (J. Emilo M. Garza; J. Edward C. Prado; J. Juan R.
Torruella). In line with the results in the fully specified model (Table 2, model 2), the
majority of Latino judges, both Democrat and Republican in partisanship, tend to rule
against Latino judges. In fact, Emilio M. Garza, a Republican from the 5th Circuit Court
of Appeals in Texas, is the only judge to have a more favorable record towards other
Latinos in discrimination cases. In addition to generalizability issues, Table 3 shows that
Judge Carlos F. Lucero, a Democrat from the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Colorado,
is an important outlier driving the results in the fully specified model (Table 2.5, model
2). In comparison to the other four judges, Judge Carlos F. Lucero was involved in 20 of
the 35 decisions, or 57 percent of the total observations. Of these 20 decisions, Judge
Carlos F. Lucero ruled against 11 different individual Latino claimants 100 percent of the
time.27

27

Given this outlier, I added a dummy variable for Judge Lucero to the full model. The results demonstrate

no substantive changes with regards to Latino voting behavior (see Table A.3 in Appendix A).
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Table 2.6: The Voting Behavior of Latino Judges towards Latino Claimants
by Partisanship
Unfavorable
Favorable
Vote
Vote
Total
Appointed by Democratic
President
Fortunato Benavides

20 (100%)

0 (0%)

3 (100%)
20
(100%)

Emilio M. Garza

1 (25%)

3 (75%)

4 (100%)

Edward C. Prado

1 (100%)

0 (0%)

1 (100%)

Juan R. Torruella

6 (85.7%)

1 (14.28%)

7 (100%)
35
(100%)

Carlos F. Lucero
Appointed by Republican
President

2 (66.67%)

1 (33.33%)

30 (85.71%)
5 (14.29%)
Total
Note: Percentages in parentheses reflect row percentages.

Why are Latinos less likely to rule in favor of other Latino claimants in Title VII
employment discrimination cases? The results from this analysis suggest that experiences
with discrimination may work differently for Latino judges. In fact, one explanation
suggests that socialization, or attempts to fit in with the dominant group in the courts, will
actually cause racial and ethnic minorities or out-groups to behave more conservatively
towards other co-racial or co-ethnic members. This argument is reinforced by work that
focuses on gender group roles in the workplace, which finds that women managers have a
tendency to take on more masculine behavior in order to achieve upward mobility
(Wood, 1997). Consequently, women managers are more likely than their male peers to
distance themselves and treat other women with forceful tactics (Wood, 1997; Van de
Vliert 1994). Latino judges, who face similar acclimation effects, may therefore have
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similar responses to co-ethnics when they come to the federal courts to appeal or defend
their case.
The next step in the analysis is to examine whether the individual voting behavior
of Latino and African American jurists continues to hold once the social composition of
the panel is taken into account. Table 2.7 presents models 3 and 4, which examine the
voting behavior of African American and Latino judges in Title VII cases when panels
are comprised of majority-white and majority minority panels. Overall, the results show
partial support for Hypothesis 2, which states that the presence of a co-racial or co-ethnic
claimant will condition the behavior of minority judges when they are randomly assigned
to majority-white panels. In model 3, for example, Latino Judge (two white colleagues) is
significant and negative (p < .001), suggesting that Latino judges sitting on majority
white panels are less likely to rule in favor the claimant. This effect, moreover, is quite
substantive, as the addition of a Latino judge to an all-white panel decreases the
probability of a favorable vote by 15 percent. This less-than-favorable behavior towards
claimants is also heightened by the presence of co-ethnic claimants. For example, Latino
Judge (two white colleagues)*Latino claimant is significant and negative (p < .10),
suggesting that Latino judges sitting on majority-white panels are less likely to rule in
favor of other Latino claimants. After controlling for the ideology and holding all other
variables at their respective means and modes, Figure 2.3 shows important differences
between Latino and white judges. When holding both sets of judges to their most liberal
ideologies (-1), the probability of voting in favor of a Latino claimant is only 2.12 percent
for Latino judges sitting on majority-white panels and 54.98 percent for white judges
sitting on all-white panels. As the judges’ ideologies become more conservative (1),
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however, the probability decreases to 0.67 percent and 27.62 percent for Latino and white
judges, respectively. In all, these findings demonstrate that Latino judges continue vote
against other Latino claimants in Title VII cases, even when the social composition.
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Table 2.7: Logistic Model of Individual Voting Behavior Across Different Panel Compositions in the U.S.
Court of Appeals (2001-2009)
Model 3 (Constrained)
Model 4 (Full Model)
Discrete
Discrete
Robust
Variables
Coef.
Change
Coef.
Robust SE Change
SE
(minmax)
(minmax)
Panel Effects
Latino Judge (two white colleagues)
Latino Judge (two white
colleagues)*Latino Claimant
Black Judge (two white colleagues)
Black Judge (two white
colleagues)*Black Claimant
Black Judge (one Black colleague)
White Judge (one Latino colleague)
White Judge (one Latino
colleague)*Latino Claimant
White Judge (one Black colleague)
White Judge (one Black
colleague)*Black Claimant

-1.984***
--0.458†
--0.230
-1.674***
--0.486*
---

0.506
--0.246
---

-0.1833

-1.535***

0.448

-0.1594

---

-2.057†

1.085

-0.1752

0.0836

-0.439

0.328

-0.0639

1.284**

0.421

0.2710

0.300

0.456

0.0531

-1.246***

0.353

-0.1460

-1.960*

0.799

-0.1740

-0.138

0.263

-0.0218

0.394

0.1759

---

0.480

0.0402

0.330

-0.1773

--0.224
---

--0.0875
---

0.901*

White Judge (two Black colleagues)

-0.283

0.715

-0.0427

-0.233

0.696

-0.0354

Female Judge (two male colleagues)

0.266

0.247

0.0463

0.321

0.241

0.0562

Female Judge (one Female colleague)

0.852***

0.232

0.1672

0.919***

0.227

0.1811

Male Judge (one female colleague)

0.352†

0.182

0.0614

0.406*

0.182

0.0709

Male Judge (two female colleagues)

1.045**

0.348

0.2152

1.133***

0.327

0.2350
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Table 2.7 (cont.): Logistic Model of Individual Voting Behavior Across Different Panel Compositions in the
U.S. Court of Appeals (2001-2009)
Background Characteristics
Born in South

0.080

0.174

0.0133

0.060

0.176

0.0099

Age of Judge

-0.001

0.009

-0.0105

-0.001

0.008

-0.0116

Former Prosecutor

-0.150

0.154

-0.0245

-0.166

0.149

-0.0268

Ivy League Education

-0.131

0.180

-0.0211

-0.142

0.180

-0.0225

Designate Judge

-0.250

0.270

-0.0384

-0.258

0.266

-0.0392

-0.549*

0.239

-0.1087

-0.582*

0.234

-0.1145

0.759*

0.308

0.1314

0.302

0.1353

0.685

-0.0837

0.698

-0.0721

0.445
2.452***

1.091
0.213

0.0904
0.5395

0.663
2.490***

1.109
0.219

0.1367
0.5462

Amicus Curiae Brief

0.238

0.256

0.0415

0.410

0.256

0.0739

Discrimination Case

-0.044

0.136

-0.0072

-0.093

0.135

-0.0152

Attitudes & Strategic Interaction
Judge Ideology
Ideology of Panel Median
Ideology of Circuit Median
Ideology of Supreme Court Median
Lower Court Decision (Favorable
Vote)

-0.570

0.791**
-0.497

Case Facts

Hostile Work Environment Case

0.401*

0.175

0.0717

0.361*

0.174

0.0635

Latino Claimant

0.629*

0.260

0.1174

0.857**

0.291

0.1650

Black Claimant

-0.055

0.168

-0.0090

-0.328†

0.186

-0.0549

Asian Claimant

-0.360

0.404

-0.0535

-0.306

0.390

-0.0458

0.544

0.367

0.1026

0.359

0.347

0.0642

Middle Eastern Claimant
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Table 2.7 (cont.): Logistic Model of Individual Voting Behavior Across Different Panel Compositions in the
U.S. Court of Appeals (2001-2009)
American Indian Claimant
-3.234***
0.748
-0.2014
-2.823***
0.783
-0.1933
Circuit Norms
1st Circuit

-1.897**

0.681

-0.1787

-1.785**

0.695

-0.1717

2nd Circuit

-0.438

0.475

-0.0637

-0.118

0.462

-0.0186

rd

-1.682***

0.483

-0.1644

-1.588***

0.466

-0.1580

th

4 Circuit

-1.769**

0.581

-0.1753

-1.637**

0.571

-0.1665

5th Circuit

3 Circuit

-0.788

0.623

-0.1052

-0.771

0.611

-0.1024

th

-1.077*

0.507

-0.1326

-0.826†

0.482

-0.1079

th

-2.606***

0.562

-0.3097

-2.432***

0.545

-0.2915

th

-1.412**

0.527

-0.1753

0.529

0.0178

6 Circuit
7 Circuit
8 Circuit

-1.564**

0.538

-0.1907

th

-0.095

0.546

-0.0153

th

11 Circuit

-2.153**

0.678

-0.1933

-1.981**

0.670

-0.1841

D.C. Circuit

-2.062**

0.667

-0.1973

-1.787**

0.654

-0.1811

10 Circuit

0.106

Yearly Controls
2002

0.358

0.448

0.0647

0.328

0.457

0.0584

2003

-0.465

0.325

-0.0698

-0.427

0.336

-0.0640

2004

0.039

0.393

0.0064

-0.027

0.400

-0.0043

2005

-0.017

0.520

-0.0028

0.038

0.530

0.0062

2006

-0.205

0.276

-0.0321

-0.253

0.270

-0.0389

2007

-1.204***

0.304

-0.1465

-1.264***

0.302

-0.1500

2008

-0.713

0.436

-0.0977

-0.703†

0.416

-0.0957
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Table 2.7 (cont.): Logistic Model of Individual Voting Behavior Across Different Panel Compositions in the
U.S. Court of Appeals (2001-2009)
2009
-0.348
0.619
-0.0522
-0.530
0.621
-0.0749
Constant
0.363
0.835
0.268
0.805
N
3,930
3,930
Log pseudo likelihood
-1797.4517
-1774.3258
% Correctly Predicted
79.80%
79.95%
† p < .10, two-tailed; *p < .05, two-tailed; **p < .01, two-tailed; ***p < .001, two-tailed.
Note: The dependent variable is a vote in favor of racial and ethnic minorities. Both models cluster around the
individual judge (303 clusters).
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In comparison to ethnically diverse panels, Black Judge (two white colleagues) is
statistically significant (p < .05). Thus, the results indicate that Black judges, sitting on
majority-white panels, increase the probability of a favorable vote by 9 percent. While
the findings mirror those found in the model 1, the results also demonstrate that majoritywhite panels do not suppress the behavior of African American and Latino jurists. In line
with expectations, Black Judge (two white colleagues)*Black Claimant is significant and
positive (p < .01). Thus, African American judges sitting on majority-white panels are
more likely to rule in favor of Black claimants. The effect, once again, is quite
substantive. After controlling for judges ideology and holding all other independent
variables at their respective means and modes, Figure 2.4 shows that the probability of
ruling in favor of a Black claimant is much higher for African American judges sitting on
75

majority-white panels than white judges sitting on all-white panels. When Black and
white judges are held to their most liberal ideologies (-1), the probability of ruling in
favor of a Black claimant is 56.48 percent for African American judges sitting on
majority-white panels and 27.18 percent for white judges sitting on all-white panels. In
all, this represents a near 30 percent difference in the predicted probability in individual
vote outcomes. As the ideology of African American and white judges become more
conservative (1), the probability decreases to 21.35 and 10.45 percent, respectively. Once
again, the finding with regards to panel effects reinforces the argument that divergence in
behavior depends on the presence of a co-racial claimant, even when the racial
composition of the panel is taken into account.
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Model 4 also tests Hypothesis 3, which states that white judges will be more
likely to rule in favor of Black or Latino claimants when they are sitting on racially or
ethnically diverse panels. The results in model 4, however, demonstrate only partial
support for the hypothesis. For example, White Judge (one Latino colleague) is
significant negative (p < .001), suggesting that the presence of a Latino judge decreases
the likelihood that a white judge will vote in favor of the claimant in a Title VII
discrimination case. Contrary to Hypothesis 3, though, the findings also indicate that the
presence of a Latino judge can also decrease the probability that a white judge will rule in
favor of a Latino claimant. After holding all variables at their respective means and
modes, Figure 2.3 shows that the probability of a white judge ruling in favor of a Latino
claimant is only 4.13 percent at their most liberal ideology score. Given that Latino
judges have a tendency to rule against the claimant, these findings suggest that the
presence of a Latino judge may ultimately lead to different cues that fail to trigger more
favorable decisions among their white colleagues.
The presence of a Black judge on a panel has a much different effect on the white
judges’ individual voting behavior. In line with previous research that focuses on panel
effects, White Judge (one Black colleague) is significant and positive (p < .05),
suggesting that the presence of an African American judge increases the likelihood that a
white judge will rule in favor of a claimant. In support of Hypothesis 3, the results also
suggest that co-racial cues can increase the probability of a favorable vote among white
judges sitting on racially diverse panels. For example, Figure 2.4 illustrates that the
probability of ruling in favor of a Black claimant peaks at 44.47 percent, which is nearly
as high as African American judges sitting on majority-white panels. While the presence
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of a Black claimant can improve the quality of deliberation among African American
judges, the results reinforce the argument that racial cues can serve to crystallize issues of
race among white judges. In all, these results provide mounting evidence to suggest that
Latino and African American can significantly influence their white colleagues on the
bench.
In addition to the main independent variables, the fully specified model in Table
2.5 demonstrates that judges’ background characteristics significantly influence rulings
towards claimants who go to appeal or defend their case. Models 1 and 2, for example,
show that Female Judge is significant an positive (p < .05), suggesting that female jurists
are more likely than their male colleagues to rule in favor of the claimant. At the panel
level, models 3 and 4 also demonstrate some interesting results. Although Female Judge
(two male colleagues) is insignificant in the model, Female Judge (one female colleague)
is significant and positive, suggesting that female jurists rule more favorably once
another female colleague is added to a panel. Taken together, these findings diverge from
Farhang and Wawro (2004) that find female judges, when on their own, bring a different
voice to the bench (see also Boyd et al., 2010). This is not to suggest, however, that
female judge do not exert any influence over their male colleagues. In fact, both Male
(one female colleague) and Male Judge (two female colleagues) variables are significant
and positive across both models, suggesting that the presence of at least one female judge
can significantly influence the voting behavior of their male colleagues.
As expected, and following previous studies on the relationship between attitudes
and judicial behavior (Segal and Spaeth, 1993), Ideology is also significant and positive
across the four models, indicating that judges are less likely to rule in favor of the
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claimant as their ideology becomes more conservative. Interestingly, ideology does not
have the greatest substantive impact on judicial behavior once background characteristics
and other institutional factors are taken into account. Model 2, for example, shows that as
attitudes become more liberal, the probability of a favorable ruling increases by 8 percent
as judges become more liberal. In all, these results provide further support the contention
that background characteristics matter and have an independent and substantive effect on
judicial behavior.
Strategic factors and circuit norms are also important for explaining behavior
outcomes. Ideology of the Panel Median is also significant across the four models.
However, the sign of the coefficient is positive, suggesting that judges whose, median
judge is ideologically more conservative are more likely to rule in favor of the claimant.
This makes intuitive sense given that Democratic judges on a majority-Republican panel
can increase the probability of more liberal panel outcomes (Kastellec, 2011, Sunstein et
al., 2006). Accounting for more routine cases, Lower Court Decision (Favorable Vote) is
also significant and positive (p < .001). The near 49 percent change in the predicted
probability is expected, as the appellate courts rarely overturn lower-court decisions.
Several of the circuit variables are also found to be significant and negative in the model.
In comparison to the 9th Circuit, therefore, claimants from the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 11th,
and D.C. Circuit are less likely to receive a favorable decision. All other circuits
demonstrate no significant differences. Overall, these findings make intuitive sense given
that the circuits listed above cover many parts of the south and the Midwest where issues
of race have dominated the political landscape.
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The results also demonstrate that case facts can influence the behavior of judges.
For example, Hostile Work Environment Case is significant and positive (p < .05),
suggesting that claimants are more likely than receive a favorable vote in hostile work
environmental claims than other kinds of grievances. The results from model 1 also
demonstrate that the racial and ethnic minorities are also treated differently. For example,
Latino Claimant is significant and positive (p < .05), but American Indian Claimant is
significant and negative (p < .001). Latino claimants, therefore, are more likely to receive
more favorable treatment than other minorities, including Black claimants. American
Indian claimants, by contrast, tend to fair much worse, as they are less likely to receive a
favorable vote. Overall, this finding may reflect judges’ overt skepticism towards
particular minority groups, including American Indian claimants and Black claimants
who are over-represented in the federal court system (Selmi, 2000-2001).
Conclusion
Over the years, the lower federal courts have become more diverse in their racial
and ethnic composition. Not only is racial and ethnic diversity important for establishing
a sense of symbolic representation, but it can also lead to more substantive outcomes
(Pitkin, 1967). This study examined the latter of the two merits of descriptive
representation by focusing on the voting behavior of African American and Latino judges
across Title VII employment discrimination claims in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
Following research on the state and lower courts, this study emphasized the role of
claimant effects, arguing that the presence of a co-racial or co-ethnic claimant can play an
important and mediating role in the behavior of African American and Latino judges.
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The results from this study demonstrate that African American and Latino judges
are not monolithic in their voting behavior in employment discrimination claims based on
race and national origin. African American judges, for example, are more likely to rule in
favor of the claimant, especially when a Black claimant is present. Moreover, these
results continue to hold once the social composition of the panel is taken into account.
While African American judges sitting on majority-white panels are more likely rule in
favor of co-racial claimants, the results from this analysis also suggest that Black judges,
through mechanisms of deliberation, specialization, and strategic bargaining, can
influence the voting behavior of their white-panel colleagues.
In comparison to African American judges, though, the voting behavior of Latino
judges is much different. Contrary to expectations, Latino judges have a tendency to rule
in the opposite direction by handing down less-than favorable decisions towards coethnic claimants, even when they sit on majority-white panels. Interestingly, though,
Latino judges continue to wield influence over their colleagues, as the results
demonstrate that white judges sitting on ethnically diverse panels are also less likely to
rule in favor of the claimant and other Latinos. In all, these differences in voting behavior
suggest that discrimination, which is central to understanding voting behavior among
minority judges, may work differently for Latinos. While surveys of Latinos lawyers
suggest that Latinos in the legal profession may suffer from fewer experiences with
discrimination than Blacks (Chavez, 2011), efforts to assimilate into the lower federal
courts may ultimately lead to more conservative behavior towards claimants and other
Latinos. Indeed, this last argument is supported by work that finds female managers to be
less supportive of their female employees (e.g. Williams and Locke, 1999).
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These differences in behavior speak directly to scholars who are interested in the
relationship between descriptive and substantive representation in the federal courts
(Scherer, 2004-2005; Segal, 2000; Songer et al., 1994; Walker and Barrow, 1985). Over
the years, the federal courts have made it more difficult to win discrimination cases
(Selmi, 2000-2001). Consequently, the number of reversals has been extremely low
(Selmi, 2000-2001). African American judges, however, can contribute to the
development of Title VII policies by crystalizing issues of race and ethnicity to their
panel colleagues. Assuming that African American judges are on the winning side of the
panel decision, they will have greater opportunities to write the majority opinion, set the
policy agenda, and challenge the content of those opinions that can act as legal barriers to
more winnable claims.
The study also provides an added dimension to the study of descriptive
representation by examining the more direct impact diversity can have on claimants
themselves. In the U.S. Courts of appeals, Blacks claimants are over-represented in cases
involving Title VII employment discrimination claims. Moreover, the number of filings
has remained quite high, as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission reported
over 35,000 individual race-related claims in 2011 alone. (E.E.O.C., n. d.). The findings
from this analysis suggests that African American judges can level the playing field by
being more responsive to Black claimants when they go to appeal or defend their case. As
Welch, Combs, and Gruhl (1988) suggest, “this level of responsiveness may ultimately
ensure that racial and ethnic minorities do not receive harsher treatment than they
deserve” (127). Still, Black claimants may continue to face an uphill battle since African
American judges continue to be under-represented in the federal courts.
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The study of descriptive representation and voting behavior towards specific
minority groups prompts further investigation of Latino and African American judicial
behavior. In the following chapter, this dissertation will address the following research
question: does the presence of African American and Latino judges on an appeals-court
panel improve the probability that claimants will win their discrimination claims?
Although this study analyzes panel effects in relation to individual voting behavior, a
number of studies are beginning to focus on those factors that predict panel outcomes
(Kastellec, forthcoming, Boyd et al., 2010; Cox and Miles, 2008; Farhang and Wawro,
2004). While research in this area typically focuses on the social composition of panels,
the results from this analysis suggest that the race and ethnicity of the claimant can also
play an important mediating role in the behavior of three-judge panels. Indeed, this is an
important question because panel outcomes ultimately depend on the cooperation of
judges and their panel colleagues. In all, this study provides an important step towards
understanding the conditional nature of African American and Latino judicial behavior in
the collegial courts.
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CHAPTER 3
AFRICAN AMERICAN and LATINO INFLUENCE OVER PANEL OUTCOMES
(Justice) Marshall could be a persuasive force just by sitting there. He
wouldn’t have to open his mouth to affect the nature of the conference and
how seriously the justices would take matters of race. ~Justice Antonin
Scalia

Much of the research focusing on descriptive representation in the courtroom
examines the individual voting behavior African American and Latino jurists (Collins
and Moyer, 2008; Scherer 2004-2005; but see Segal, 2000; Walker and Barrow, 1985)
Chapter 2 of this dissertation added to this existing line of research by examining the
extent to which the voting behavior of racial and ethnic minority judges are mediated by
the presence of co-racial and co-ethnic claimants. The results from the previous chapter
demonstrated that Latino and African American judges are not monolithic in their
behavior, even when they sit on majority-white panels. While African American judges
are more likely to rule in favor of other Black claimants, Latino judges behave much
differently by ruling against other Latinos. The results from the previous chapter also
indicated that African American and Latino judge could influence their white panel
colleagues, as white judges were likely to follow the preferences of their African
American and Latino colleagues.
Indeed, these last findings suggest that decision-making in the collegial courts
does not occur in a vacuum (Collins and Martinek, 2011). In the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
judges sit on rotating three-member panel, where at least two judges must agree with one
another to reach a final decision. As policy makers whose decisions can have an
important impact on the development of law (Segal and Spaeth, 1993), the ability to form
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majority coalitions is especially important. While those in the majority have opportunities
to write the majority opinion and shape the direction policy, judges who disagree with
their panel colleagues must either dissent or conform to the preferences of the majority.
In this regard, the research on individual voting behavior does not fully allow one to
understand the extent to which diversity can translate into outcomes that benefit racial
and ethnic minorities.
In response to this panel dynamic, a bourgeoning line of research has sought to
understand how the racial, ethnic, and gender composition of panels can affect panel
outcomes (Farhang and Wawro, 2004, Kastellec, forthcoming; Boyd, Epstein, and
Martin, 2010). Although earlier work in this area demonstrates some mixed results with
regards to these “panel effects” (Boyd et al., 2004), more recent evidence indicates that
favorable panel outcomes depends on the presence of salient policy issues, such as claims
based on sex discrimination (Boyd et al., 2010), sexual harassment (Farhang and Wawro,
2010), and affirmative action (Kastellec, forthcoming). Less understood, however, is the
role of the other possible factors that may motivate African American and Latino judges
to influence their panel colleagues. While the presence of salient policy issues provides
one condition, it does not consider the role of “claimant effects,” or the influence that coracial and co-ethnic cues might have on African American and Latino judicial behavior.
In this chapter, I examine how racially diverse and ethnically diverse panels rule
towards co-racial and co-ethnic claimants. Following research that focuses on “panel
effects,” this chapter argues that racial and ethnic minority judges, through their ability to
crystallize issues of race and ethnicity, enhance perceptions of policy specialization, and
threaten panel consensus, will be able to influence their panel colleagues and determine
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the outcome of panel decisions. In addition to these “panel effects,” the ability to
influence panel outcomes may also depend on “claimant effects” or the presence of racial
or ethnic cues. Not only will the presence of a co-racial or a co-ethnic claimant improve
the quality of deliberation among minority judges, but their presence will also enhance
perceptions of policy specialization that will lead to panel decisions that favor the
claimant.
To test this argument, I analyze panel effects using an original dataset that
captures a universe of Title VII employment discrimination cases based on race and
ethnicity between 2001 and 2009. The dataset is unique in that it provides one of the first
opportunities to control for the racial and ethnic background characteristics of the judges
as well as the race and ethnicity of the claimant. This chapter finds that African American
judges have much greater success at persuading their panel colleagues when a co-racial
claimant is present. The presence of a Latino judge on a panel, however, decreases the
probability that a claimant will win their discrimination claim, regardless of the race and
ethnicity of the appellant. In all, the findings have important implications for the
relationship between descriptive and substantive representation. Contrary to research that
suggests that racial and ethnic minorities suffer from a “paradox of representation”
(Lublin, 1997; see also Preuhs, 2006; Bratton and Haynie, 1999; Hawkesworth, 2003),
descriptive representatives who operate in small-groups have greater opportunities to
pursue their policy goals and provide more equitable justice to racial and ethnic
minorities who come to the bench to defend or appeal their case.
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Attitudes and Strategic Interaction
In the U.S. Court of Appeals, judges sit on rotating three-member panels, where at
least two judges must agree in order to reach a final decision. The institution of majority
rule plays an important role in the policy making process. Those belonging to the
majority coalition are not only awarded with the opportunity to write the majority opinion
and set the policy agenda of the court (Maltzman and Whalbeck, 2004), but, through the
interpretation of law, they are also given the chance to modify, completely change, or
even create new legal precedent (Segal and Spaeth, 1993, 2002). The ability to set legal
precedent, moreover, is quite expansive, as their jurisdictions cross state lines and
regional territories, such as Puerto Rico and Guam. Judges who disagree with their panel
colleagues, on the other hand, may opt to write a separate dissenting opinion, apart from
the majority. Although this dissenting opinion may ultimately affect the legitimacy of the
opinion by contributing to the “market place of ideas” (Hettinger et al., 2003: 217), it
does not carry the same precedential value as the majority opinion.
This institutional dynamic has led several researchers to an examination of “panel
effects” or “intra-panel dynamics of circuit-court judges who seek to persuade or
otherwise influence their colleagues” (Cross, 2007: 148). The dominant research focusing
on judicial behavior assumes that judges are single-minded seekers of policy. Perhaps the
most prominent explanation of judicial behavior is the attitudinal model. The attitudinal
model holds that the judges decide disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the
ideological attitudes and values of the justices (Segal and Spaeth, 2002: 86). Thus, judges
vote according to their most sincere preferences by “supporting the case outcomes and
doctrines they most prefer” (Baum, 1997: 90). In other words, “conservative judges vote
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the way they do because they are conservative and liberal judges vote they way they do
because they are liberal” (Segal and Spaeth, 2002: 86). Support for the attitudinal model
is well documented, especially in its ability to predict the voting behavior of appellatecourt judges (Segal and Spaeth, 1993, 2002). In more recent years, it has also been
utilized to explain Appeals Court decisions to reverse lower court rulings (Hettinger et
al., 2006) and write separate dissenting opinions, apart from the majority (Hettineger et
al., 2004a).
In the context of panel effects, the model predicts that panel outcomes largely
depend on the partisan or ideological balance of the panel. Take for example, the Black’s
(1948) median voter theorem, which predicts that the ideological middle will determine
the outcome of panel decisions. This argument assumes that judges’ decisions are
independent of one another and that each vote is of equal value. On a two-dimensional
ideological space, it also assumes that judges’ policy preferences are “single peaked” in
that each judge has a most-preferred policy outcome and that the utility for each judge
declines as one moves further away from their ideal point. Based on these assumptions,
the theory presumes that the judge representing the ideological middle will have no need
to compromise since her panel colleagues will prefer the policy preferences of the median
judge to those who are more ideologically distant. Thus, a panel consisting of two
Democratically-appointed judges and one Republican-appointed judge is expected to
render a 2-1 majority vote, with the Republican judge filing a separate dissenting opinion.
Under this circumstance, judges are not subject to persuasion.
To the extent that the ideological middle can predict outcomes, most research has
focused on the Supreme Court. As Martin and Quinn (2005) suggest, “Black’s Median
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Voter Theorem now figures prominently and crucially in a wide array of research of the
Court” (1278). Not only can the median justice explain voting behavior and panel
outcomes (Whalbeck, 1997), but it can also explain the assignment of the majority
opinion and how justices control the policy agenda (Epstein and Knight, 1998; Murphy,
1964; Bonneau, Hammond, Maltzman, and Whalbeck, 2007). However, more recent
work demonstrates that the median voter may not figure as prominently in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals as Martin and Quinn (2005) and others suggest (see also Epstein,
Knight, and Martin, 2003). For example, Collins and Moyer (2008) find that the panel
median can influence the voting behavior of her panel colleagues. At the same time,
Cross (2007) finds that the median voter theorem “appears entirely inapplicable to circuit
courts” after controlling for institutions that place important constraints on judicial
behavior.
Decision-making in the collegial courts, however, rarely occurs in a vacuum
(Collins and Martinek, 2011). From the moment a panel receives a case to the moment
judges reach their final decisions, judges have several opportunities to interact with one
another, bargain, and make compromises (Epstein and Knight, 1998: 58). Given this level
of interaction, proponents of the strategic interaction model contend that judges are
rational actors whose “ability to achieve goals depends on the consideration of the
preferences of other actors, the choices they expect others to make, and the institutional
context in which they act” (Epstein and Knight 1998: 10). Faced with both internal and
institutional constraints, therefore, judges are understood to be “policy maximizers,” as
they rank their policy preferences according to their utility and attempt to approximate
their most desirable outcomes.
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Although support for the strategic account of voting behavior is well documented
on the Supreme Court (e.g. Epstein and Knight, 1998; Maltzman and Spriggs, and
Wahlbeck, 2000; Hammond, Bonneau, and Sheehan, 2005), our understanding of the
strategic model is far from extensive on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. In particular, this
research highlights smaller group panels and the intermediary role the Appeals Courts
play in the federal court system. For example, Collins and Martinek (2011), show that
judges’ moderated ideology, measured as the ideological mean of their colleagues, is
significantly correlated with individual votes. Still, much of this research has a tendency
to focus on intra-branch relations and the extent to which judges are constrained by
higher court authorities. For example, Songer, Segal, and Cameron (1994) find that the
appellate courts tend to be congruent with the decisions of the Supreme Court. Once
decisions move away from the preferences of the Supreme Court, judges can act
strategically by “whistle blowing” on their panel colleagues by filing a separate
dissenting opinion (Cross and Tiller, 1998).
In addition to the Supreme Court, Appellate Court judges are also held to more
internal constraints within the circuit. Judges dissatisfied with a panel’s decision may
wish to initiate a court en banc, which has the power to collectively overturn a panel’s
decision. For example, Van Winkle (1997) finds that judges are more likely to file a
separate dissenting opinion when the ideological preferences of the majority panel are not
congruent with the preferences of the circuit. However, Hettinger et al. (2004a), in their
comparison of both attitudinal and strategic models, find the strategic account does not
have any significant impact on the decision to dissent from the majority panel even when
it’s most advantageous. In this regard, Collins and Martinek (2011) contend that the
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strategic model may be less applicable in the U.S. Courts of Appeals since judges have
larger workloads and, thus, less time to consider cases strategically (184). By focusing on
the intermediary courts in my analyses, I am able to test whether judges act as strategic
actors.
Panel Effects and Small Group Theory
Another argument in the literature focuses on the social and psychological aspects
of small group interaction. Small group theory generally holds that the way judges relate
to one another affects their behavior on the court (Ulmer, 1971). Different from the
strategic interaction model, it relaxes the assumption that judges are single-minded
seekers of policy, arguing that judges are also motivated by non-policy goals, such as
personal standing with court audiences, career, and collegiality on the court (see Baum,
1997). Although non-policy goals may be important for achieving more distant policyrelated goals, the content of legal policy may not necessarily be the most proximate goal
of every judge (Baum 1997: 16-17). For example, judges who prioritize collegiality and
adherence to circuit norms may wish to conform to the panel majority despite having
some disagreement over policy. Thus, judges can either moderate or completely change
their policy positions in order to achieve non-policy related goals (Howard 1978).
Small group theory has been particularly useful in understanding how group roles
can influence individual judicial behavior (Collins and Martink, 2011; see also Atkins
1973; Ulmer 1971; Atkins and Zavoina, 1974; Haynie 1992; Klein and Morrisoe, 1999).
This research contends that judges often conform to the preferences of judges in
leadership positions. For example, Hettinger (2006) finds that the presence of a chief
judge increases the probability of reversing a lower-court decision. Conversely, judges
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who are either new or temporary may also be more susceptible to collegial influence. For
example, Hettinger et al. (2004b) find that freshman judges are less likely to write
separate dissenting opinions apart from the majority panel. Collins and Martinek (2011)
also demonstrate that while designate judges, who act as temporary judges in the service
of the Appeals Courts, are no more variable in their behavior than appellate-court judges,
they are more likely to conform to the preferences of their panel colleagues.
Researchers also demonstrate that judges in less-than-advantageous positions or
panel outliers can influence panel outcomes. The deliberative process provides one
possible mechanism of panel influence. According to this view, “judges simply take each
other’s opinion seriously in the deliberative process and can be swayed by an articulate
and well-reasoned argument from a colleague with a different opinion” (Carp and
Stidham, 1991: 176; see also Cross 2007: 154-155; Edwards 2003: 1656-61; Sunstein et
al. 2006: 73). Work focusing on the social psychology of small groups, for example,
demonstrates that heterogeneous viewpoints can play an important role in the ability to
change the quality of discussion and influence outcomes. Not only can divergent interests
lead to a greater exchange of information (Sommers, 2006: 597; Phillips and Loyd,
2006), but it can also cause those in the majority to articulate minorities’ views more
carefully (Sommers, 2006; Antonio et al., 2004) as well as convince others in the
majority to support the minority position (Moscovisi, Lage, and Naffrechoux, 1969).
Since informal norms of the court require that judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals take
each other’s opinions seriously (Cross, 2007), a similar intra-personal dynamic may also
occur among judges once in conference.
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The second mechanism of panel influence entails external processes that
emphasize the role of strategic bargaining. This argument maintains that judges in the
minority position can influence panel outcomes by threatening the norm of consensus,
which is considered to be an important goal of appellate-court judges (Farhang and
Wawro, 2004). In the U.S. Courts of Appeals, decisions are overwhelmingly unanimous,
as the number of dissents average approximately 6 to 8 percent (Farhang and Wawro,
2004: 306). The reasons for consensus are straightforward. Not only does panel
consensus establish a unified front on the interpretation of law, but it also establishes a
sense of institutional legitimacy, which is necessary for the execution of court orders by
other governmental entities (Farhang and Wawro, 2004).28 In addition to ensuring panel
consensus, judges may also wish to modify their positions in order prevent their decisions
from being overturned (Baum, 1997). For example, Songer, Segal, and Cameron (1994)
find that the appellate courts tend to be congruent with the decisions of the Supreme
Court (but see Cross and Tiller 1997). Similarly, Hall (2009) finds that panels consisting
of three judges appointed by Democrats quintupled the chances of the Supreme Court
overturning lower-court decisions. Van Winkle (1997) also finds that judges are more
likely to file a separate dissenting opinion when the ideological preferences of the
majority panel are not congruent with the preferences of the circuit. To avoid reversal of
the panel’s decision, the presiding judge may, therefore, choose to select a more

28

Furthermore, unanimity may be also explained by other factors, such as workload (e.g. Atkins and Green,

1976), coercive consensus norm (Atkins and Green, 1976; Atkins, 1973), organizational loyalty, and the
loneliness of dissent (Atkins and Green, 1976; Farhang and Wawro, 2004: 306).
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ideologically distant judge to write the majority opinion in order to satisfy the preferences
of the circuit and the Supreme Court.
It is important to note, however, that it is difficult to show which mechanisms are
at play, especially since judges’ arguments made during conference are generally not
available to the public (Kastellec, forthcoming; but see Owens and Black, 2009). Still,
research generally shows that judges are able to influence panel outcomes when it comes
to both the partisanship and social composition of the panel. For example, the presence of
a Democrat on a majority-Republican panel can significantly increase the probability that
a panel will rule more liberally (Revesz 1997; Cross and Tiller 1998; Sunstein et al. 2006;
Kastellec 2011). However, Kastellec (2011) notes that panel effects are not consistent
over time, demonstrating that panel effects have a greater effect when the ideological
preferences of higher court authorities favor judges in the minority position (see also
Kastellec, 2007). Farhang and Wawro (2004, 2010) also show that the presence of a
female judge increases the probability that a panel will rule in favor of a claimant across
employment discrimination and sexual harassment cases (see also Peresie, 2005). Finally,
Boyd, Epstein, and Martin (2010) extend this research by comparing the ability to
influence across salient and non-salient cases. Similarly, they find gender to increase the
likelihood that claimants will win their case across gender-specific policies.
Racial and Ethnic Diversity, Influence, and Panel Outcomes
Following small group theory, there is good reason to expect that racial and ethnic
compositions matter for understanding influence and panel outcomes. There are three
reasons why racial and ethnic minority judges may be able to influence their panel
colleagues: the ability to persuade judges on the merits, their mere presence, and the
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ability to threaten panel unanimity. Following research that focuses on internal
mechanisms of deliberation, minority judges, given their unique backgrounds and
experiences, are theorized to crystallize un-crystalized interests (Mansbridge, 1999). For
example, Mansbridge (1999) describes how Carol Moseley-Braun, the only African
American member of the U.S. Senate at the time, was able to kill an amendment calling
for the renewal of a design patent featuring the Confederate flag. In this instance, her
objection to the amendment not only crystallized the issue of race, but it also created a
signal to other members of the Senate, which was enough to persuade her colleagues to
reverse their positions. The ability to crystalize issues may also apply to the courts.
Speaking for a unanimous, all-male court, for example, Sandra Day O’Connor argued
that, “a victim of sexual harassment need not suffer a nervous breakdown to sue her
employer” (see Harris vs. Forklift Systems, Inc., 1993). Prior to the Supreme Court’s
decision, precedent required that women must suffer a material a psychological damage
to have standing to sue.
The presence of an African American or Latino judge can also play an important
role in the behavior of their white colleagues. According to one line of research, judges
rely on cues for information and show greater deference to judges who are perceived to
be more credible or expert (see Atkins, 1974; Klein, 2003). In the context of race and
ethnicity, a similar outcome may also occur, as white judges may also defer their
judgment to African American and Latino judges when they are presented with policy
issues affecting racial and ethnic minorities. This argument, moreover, is reinforced by
the vast number of issue domains that are presented before the court and the tendency for
judges to specialize in different areas of law (Atkins 1974). On the other hand, diverse
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panels may also improve the quality of deliberation of white judges. For example,
Sommers (2006), in his study of jury deliberations, examines the behavior of white and
Black jurors when a Black defendant is before the court. After placing two Black jurors
on an majority-white panel, the author finds that white jurists were not only more lenient
towards Black defendants, but that they were also more likely to cite more case facts,
make fewer factual errors, and appeal directly to Black jurors in the group to validate
concerns of racism. As Justice Antonin Scalia once said, “Marshall could be a persuasive
force just by sitting there.” He wouldn’t have to open his mouth to affect the nature of the
conference and how seriously the justices would take matters of race (Liptak, 2009). In
this case, the mere presence of a minority judge has the potential to serve as important
cues that crystallize race or ethnicity across an institutional setting dominated by white
jurists.
The desire to select judges who are most “credible” or “expert” may also be
reinforced by racial and ethnic stereotypes. For example, Cruz and Molina (2009), in
their study of Latina lawyers, find that Latinas in the legal profession are subject to
“ethnic oriented roles,” such as providing translations or practicing in areas such as
immigration law (42). Similar acts of tokenism have also been found by Chavez’s (2011)
study of Latino lawyers –one of the most comprehensive surveys of Latinos in the legal
profession to date. Her study finds that Latino lawyers tend to be used by professional
organizations and law firms for more symbolic means. Surrounded by their white
colleagues, Latinos lawyers felt as if they were not given a voice and often subject to
negative stereotypes (67-69).
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The third reason for minority influence over panel decisions is that minority
judges can threaten the norm of consensus. Although the actual occurrence of a dissent is
an empirically rare event, racial and ethnic minorities are more likely than their white
counterparts to dissent from the majority opinion (Hettinger et al., 2003, 2004ab) but no
more different than whites to file separate concurring opinions (Hettinger et al. 2004ab).
To reconcile these differences, Hettinger et al. (2003) suggest that dissents are more
likely than concurrences to trigger ideological responses because they deal with the
outcome of a case rather than the “legalities” of the decision (237). Moreover, minority
judges may be motivated by the added payoff of initiating the en banc process and
overturning a panel’s decision by crystallizing race-related issues. Thus, this track record
may increase the perception that minority judges are more likely to incur the costs of
writing a dissenting opinion when they are at odds with the majority’s decision.
Finally, research on panel effects suggests that diverse panels may be conditioned
by the presence of policy issues that are important for other racial and ethnic minorities
(Boyd et al., 2010). There are two reasons to expect this outcome. First, the presence of
salient policy issues may motivate racial and ethnic minority judges to persuade their
white colleagues. For example, Goldman (1978-1979) argues that racial and ethnic
minority judges will be more empathetic to issues surrounding discrimination policies
and inequality in the United States. Second, the presence of salient policy issues dealing
with race and ethnicity may heighten perceptions of policy specialization among their
white-colleagues (Atkins, 1974). Thus, the presence of salient policy issues may provide
African American and Latino jurists with much greater leverage over their panel
colleagues.
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Indeed, this argument has been supported by research that examines diversity in
the appellate courts. For example, Songer et al. (1994) shows that female judges are more
likely than their male colleagues to vote in favor of the claimant across job discrimination
cases but not policy areas dealing with crime or obesity. Boyd et al. (2010) also
demonstrate this conditional effect across panel outcomes. After analyzing 13 different
policy areas, they show that the presence of a female judge on a panel can significantly
increase the probability that a claimant will win across a single policy area: Title VII sex
discrimination claims. Finally, research suggests that panel effects are conditioned by the
presence of policy issues that deal exclusively with the group of interest. For example,
Farhang and Wawro (2004) find minority jurists to have no significant effect on panel
outcomes when it comes to Title VII employment discrimination claims. However, their
analysis incorporates all discrimination cases, including cases based on age, religion, and
sex where one would not expect to find divergence in voting behavior between minority
and white jurists. Although subsequent research on panel effects has narrowed the case
selection to more salient policy areas, such as sexual harassment (Farhang and Wawro,
2010) and affirmative action cases (Kastellec, forthcoming), the research focusing on
panel effects is relatively young and has yet to fully examine how the racial and ethnic
composition can affect panel outcomes across other salient-policy issues, such as
discrimination or crime. Based on the above arguments, I expect panels consisting of a
single African American or Latino judge to increase the probability of ruling in favor of
the claimant. Thus, I hypothesize the following:
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H1: I expect presence of a single African American or Latino judge to increase the
probability that panel will rule in favor of the claimant.
The Role of Claimant Effects
In addition to the presence of salient policy issues that are important to racial and
ethnic minorities, the ability to influence panel outcomes may also be conditioned by the
presence of claimants who share similar background characteristics. According to
Steffensmeier and Demuth (2001), judges may rely on the appellants’ background
characteristics to facilitate their rulings, including the race, gender, and social class of the
appellant (145). Acting as informational cues, the presence of a claimant with similar
characteristics may trigger feelings of commonality and highlight experiences with
discrimination that can lead minority judges to rule in favor of other co-racial and coethnic claimants (Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2001: 145). Goldman (1978-1979) also
makes a similar claim, as judges coming from racial and ethnic backgrounds will be
empathetic to marginalized groups in society. In all, the above argument not only
provides an additional condition to behavior of individual judges, but it also explains how
individual judges vote towards co-racial and co-ethnic claimants.
In the context of “panel effects,” the presence of co-racial or co-ethnic cues may
also condition the likelihood of a racial or ethnic minority winning their claim. According
to this view, the presence of a co-racial or co-ethnic claimant will not only trigger
feelings of commonality, but also improve the quality of deliberation among African
American and Latino jurists. In so doing, African American and Latino jurists can
crystallize issues of race and ethnicity and persuade white judges to rule much differently
than how they would otherwise. In addition to the presence of salient policy issues, the
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presence of co-racial and co-ethnic cues may also enhance the perception that minority
judges are policy specialists and cause white judges to defer to the preferences of their
African American and Latino colleagues on the bench. Based on this reasoning, I expect
the presence of co-racial or co-ethnic claimant to have an important influence on panel
outcomes. Thus, I hypothesize the following:

H2: The likelihood of ruling in favor of a claimant will increase with the presence of a
single minority judge and a co-racial or co-ethnic claimant.

Data and Methods
Following previous research focusing on panel effects (e.g. Farhang and Wawro,
2004, 2010), I am primarily interested in understanding the extent to which racial and
ethnic minorities can influence the final outcome of the panel decisions across
employment discrimination claims based on race and ethnicity. More specifically, I
analyze judicial influence across a universe of Title VII employment discrimination
claims based on race and national origin between 2001 and 2009.29 The total number of

29

These decisions are collected between 1/1/2001 and 12/31/2009. Since there are few African American

judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals and even fewer Latino judges, I chose to begin the analysis in 2001 to
capture all Clinton appointees at the onset of the analysis. The appointments made by president Clinton
currently represent one of the greatest efforts to diversify the racial and ethnic composition of the Appeals
Court since the Carter administration. President Clinton is responsible for appointing over half of the
Latino judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, increasing the total number from 5 to 12. Similarly, president
Clinton is also responsible for appointing 9 African American judges, increasing the total number of
African Americans on the appeals-court bench to 20. I chose to end the analysis in 2009 because it
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panel decisions per grievance is 1,274.30 Of these panel decisions, the dataset captures a
representative pool of Latino and African American appellate-court judges who were
either in active or senior status during the period of study. 31 Specifically, the dataset
includes 13 Latino and 16 African American judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Five
additional judges from the U.S. District Courts (1 Latino and 4 African American judges)
are also included in the dataset. Serving as a judge designate, these judges acted in a
temporary capacity in order to improve the efficiency of the appeals court. All panel
decisions are published in the Federal Reporter and are accessible through Westlaw.32
represented most current decisions during the time of collection. The dataset does not include any judges
appointed by President Obama.

30

The original dataset includes 1,361 observations. Given the under-representation of racial and ethnic

minorities, I was unable to control for majority-minority panels and majority-female panels (44
observations total). The model also excludes American Indian claimants from the analysis since the number
of observations is too small (11 observations). Finally, discrimination claims were excluded from the
analysis if other information was missing, such as ideology scores (1 observation), and the race and
ethnicity of the claimant (31 observations).

31

Due to regular appointments and judges leaving office, the number of African American and Latino

judges has fluctuated throughout the years. Between 2001 and 2009, the mean average of Latino judges
sitting in the U.S. Courts of Appeals was approximately 14 (5.07%). The average number of African
American judges was approximately 19 (6.88%).

32

All published decisions involving race and national origin are accessible through the Westlaw Database,

using Key Numbers Search. Cases are organized by subject and are located in the Civil Rights Folder. The
use of published decisions is well established by judicial scholars (Manning et al. 2004), as they represent
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I focus on Title VII claims for several reasons. Following previous scholarship, I
expect minority judges to be motivated by the presence of policy issues considered
salient to racial and ethnic minorities (Songer et al., 1994). Despite the passage of the
Civil Rights Act 1964 (Title VII), discrimination in the workplace continues to be an
important problem facing both groups (e.g. Acs and Loprest, 2009; Coleman, 2003;
Darity and Mason, 1998; Espino and Franz, 2002; Goldsmith, Hamilton, and Darity,
2006; Kenny and Wissoker, 1994). These experiences, moreover, have translated into
divergent attitudes towards discrimination between whites and racial and ethnic
minorities (Pew Center, 2005; Pew Hispanic, 2006; Rodriguez, 2008). For example,
research focusing on individual voting behavior demonstrates that policy issues, such as
discrimination and crime, play an important role in the behavior of descriptive
representatives (Songer et al., 1994; Gottschall, 1983). Similarly, Boyd et al. (2010) finds
that the gender composition of panels to also be conditioned by salient policy issues after
comparing panel effects across different policy areas. Thus, a similar outcome should
also occur with panels consisting of either one African American or Latino judge.
In addition to the presence of salient policy issues, a focus on Title VII
discrimination claims provides other advantages. For example, Title VII claims based on
race and national origin offer judges more discretion to rule their sincere or most
preferred preferences (Scherer, 2004-2005), as studies demonstrate circuit court splits
over the interpretation of Supreme Court precedent (Green, 1999, p. 997-998; Lanctot,
cases with higher precedential value and greater discretionary interpretation. This argument, moreover, is
reinforced by studies that examine the behavior of judges across published and unpublished decisions
(Keele, Malmsheimer, Floyd, and Zhang, 2009; Ringquist and Emmert, 1999).
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2000-2001). More specifically, the presence of circuit court splits provide a clear
indication that judges are given distinct “choice” situations where extra-legal factors are
expected to play a role in the behavior. Otherwise, circuit courts would theoretically
arrive at similar interpretations of Supreme Court precedent. Finally, by narrowing the
case selection to race discrimination cases in the workplace, I improve the ability to
control for legal precedent, as Title VII cases based on work-related discrimination,
retaliation, and hostile work environment maintain similar legal frameworks.
The unit of analysis is the panel outcome per grievance or issue. 33 Following
Segal (2000), the dataset records all judge decisions made within a case. This includes all
judges’ decisions made across issues or grievances. In the U.S. Courts of Appeals, for
example, individual cases can range from a single dispute, such as a hostile work
environment claim to multiple grievances involving discrimination, hostile work
environment, and retaliation. If a case included more the one claimant, I recorded all
grievances per claimant. A case involving two claimants, for example, rendered four
individual votes per judge if both claimants appealed two issues. Since there are the three
judges per panel, the total number of observations or votes would be twelve. If, however,
multiple claimants were treated as a collective group by the panel of judges in the
opinion, all claimants were then recorded as an individual claimant.
This collection strategy offers several advantages. Different from previous
research, which tends to aggregate multiple decisions within in a case (e.g. Martinek and
33

To control for the non-independence of observations, I estimate the model using robust standard errors,

clustering around three-judge panels. In doing so, I account for the introduction of stimuli (e.g. case facts,
legal precedent) that may vary from one grievance to another.
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Collins, 2011), one is able to account for the full range of decisions made by judges in the
U.S. Courts of Appeals.

34

Consequently, it is possible to increase the number of

observations per judge and, thus, the number of decisions made by under-represented
groups, such as racial and ethnic minority judges. Second, one is able to account for the
different types of discrimination claims, such as retaliation, discrimination, and hostile
work environment, brought before the court. Otherwise, researchers are limited to
explaining the voting behavior of judges across discrimination cases more generally.
Finally, and most pertinent to this study, it is possible to account for decisions involving
multiple claimants from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds. Not only does this
collection strategy improve one’s ability to examine how judges rule towards specific
claimants, but it also provides an added dimension to the study of descriptive representation by focusing
on the direct consequences that judges’ decisions can have on racial and ethnic minorities who come before
the courts to appeal their case.

34

It is important to note that this collection strategy is much different from previous collection efforts.

Though studies focusing on judicial behavior slightly differ, one strategy aggregates all grievances so that
three individual votes are recorded per case. Another strategy is to record cases where there was a clear
victor. This involves cases that were either unanimously decided across all issues (e.g. Martinek and
Collins, 2011) or split-decision cases where the majority of decisions were decided in favor of one party
over another (e.g. Farhang and Wawro, 2004). Take for instance, a claimant who appeals their case
involving three specific grievances: discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. If a panel
rules in favor of the claimant in at least two of the three issues, one would be able to identify a clear victor.
The dependent variable would then be coded as a single “liberal vote” or “favorable vote” for each judge
on the panel. If, however, a case involved four issues in which the claimant and employer each won half of
the decisions, the case would be excluded from the entire analysis.
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Dependent Variables
The dependent variable for both units of analyses is Rules in Favor of Claimant.
Following Songer et al. (1994), this variable is coded as “1” if a judge or a panel votes in
favor of the claimant. The variable is coded as “0” if otherwise. At both the individual
and panel levels, approximately 74 percent of the decisions are against the claimant and
26 percent of the decisions are coded as for the claimant. While the distribution of the
dependent variable illustrates the difficulty in winning a race discrimination case (Selmi,
2000-2001), it also suggests that a vote in favor racial and ethnic minorities is
substantively more meaningful. Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable,
I utilize Logistic regression analysis to test all hypotheses
Independent Variables
The main independent variables measure the racial and ethnic composition of the
panel. Here I test the argument that the presence of descriptive representatives will lead
to favorable panel outcomes: One Latino Judge on Panel, One Black Judge on Panel. I
coded all panels consisting of one Latino and two white judges as “1” and “0” if
otherwise. Likewise, panels were coded as “1” if they consisted of one African American
judge and two white judges. All other panels were coded as “0.” 35 I also interacted the
two main independent variables to test the hypothesis that the presence of a co-racial and
35

It is important to note that this coding strategy departs from previous research, which has a tendency to

treat racial and ethnic minority judges as monolithic groups (e. g. Farhang and Wawro, 2004; Boyd,
Epstein, and Martin, 2010). For example, Farhang and Wawro (2004) create a dichotomous, “minority
judge” variable to measure the presence of African American, Latino, and Asian American judges. As a
result, researchers are unable to examine the extent to which race and ethnicity play a role in judicial
behavior.
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a co-ethnic claimant will play a conditional role in the ability to influence more favorable
decisions towards the claimant. Both variables are dichotomous in nature. One Latino
Judge on a Panel*Latino Claimant is coded as “1” to indicate an ethnically diverse panel
(one Latino judge on panel) ruling over a Latino claimant. A coding of “0” indicates
otherwise. Similarly, One Black Judge on a Panel*Black Claimant is coded as “1” to
indicate a racially diverse panel (one Black judge on a panel) ruling over a Black
claimant. A coding of “0,” therefore, indicates otherwise.
The frequencies for all independent variables are included in Table 3.1 below.
More specifically, it shows the distribution of panel decisions by the race and ethnicity of
the claimant across different panel compositions. Between 2001 and 2009, panels
consisting of one Latino judge and panels consisting of one African American judge
accounted for 12.4 percent (158) and 24.41 percent (311) of all decisions, respectively.
Since Black claimants are overwhelmingly represented in Title VII discrimination claims,
the frequency of panel decisions involving a Black claimant was much higher for all
panel compositions. While panels consisting of all-white judges made a decision
involving Black claimant about 41 percent (522) of the time, panels involving one Black
judge and one Latino judge accounted for 16 percent (207) and 7 percent (87) of all
decision, respectively. The frequency of panel decisions involving a Latino claimant was
much lower in comparison. In all, 8 percent (106) of the decisions involved an all-white
panel, followed by ethnically diverse panels, which accounted for 2.65 percent (33) of all
decisions. Racially diverse panels, on the other hand, accounted for 1.73 percent (22) of
all decisions.

106
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55.06%
6.83%
(87)

20.89%
2.65%
(33)

3.16%
0.39%
(5)

8.86%
1.10%
(14)

12.03%
1.49%
(19)

100%
12.40%
(158)

66.84%
13.17%
4.72%
2.73%
14.53%
100%
40.97%
8.32%
2.98%
1.73%
9.18%
63.19%
(522)
(106)
(38)
(22)
(117)
(805)
Note: For each cell, the top row depicts row percentages and the second row depicts total percentages. The number of
observations is in parentheses. Since total percentages are rounded, they do not total 100%

All White Panel

One Latino on a Panel

Table 3.1: Distribution of Votes by the Race and Ethnicity of the Judge and the Claimant in Discrimination Claims
(2001-2009)
Middle
Latino
Eastern
White
Black
Claimant
Asian
Claimant
Claimant
Claimant
(non-Black)
Claimant
(non- Black) (non-Latino)
Total
One African American
66.56%
7.07%
6.75%
0.96%
18.65%
100%
Judge on a Panel
16.25%
1.73%
1.65%
0.24%
4.55%
24.41%
(207)
(22)
(21)
(3)
(58)
(311)

Control Variables
In addition to the main independent variables, I also control for a host of
background characteristics. Table 3.2 provides the descriptive statistics for all control
variables. All information regarding judges’ background characteristics is found at the
Judicial Biographical Database (Federal Judicial Center, n. d.). First, I control for the
gender composition of the panel. Specifically, these variables include: One Female Judge
on Panel and Two Female Judges on a Panel. All variables are dichotomous variables,
which are coded as “1” for the presence of a one or two minority judges on a panel and
“0” if otherwise. Following research that finds age to have a significant influence on
discrimination (Manning et al., 2004), I control for the Average of the Panel at the time
of the decision.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
One Latino Judge on a Panel

Mean
0.262

SD
0.439

Min
0

Max
1

One Black Judge on a Panel

0.124

0.329

0

1

Two Black Judges on a Panel

0.244

0.429

0

1

One Female Judge on a Panel

0.299

0.458

0

1

Two Female Judges on a Panel

0.139

0.346

0

1

Average Age of Panel

63.951

5.091

47

82

Panel Ideological Median

0.150

0.312

-0.538

0.577

Circuit Ideological Median

0.247

0.202

-0.309

0.549

Supreme Court Ideological
Median

0.387

0.238

0.007

1.18

Favorable Lower Court
Decision

0.063

0.244

0

1

Discrimination Case

0.603

0.489

0

1

Hostile Work Environment
Case

0.124

0.329

0

1

Amicus Curiae Brief

0.055

0.229

0

1

Black Claimant

0.640

0.480

0

1

Latino Claimant

0.126

0.332

0

1

Asian Claimant

0.050

0.218

0

1

Middle Eastern Claimant

0.030

0.172

0

1

1st Circuit

0.038

0.192

0

1

2nd Circuit

0.045

0.208

0

1

3rd Circuit

0.016

0.127

0

1

4th Circuit

0.049

0.216

0

1

5th Circuit

0.079

0.270

0

1

6th Circuit

0.069

0.253

0

1

7th Circuit

0.281

0.449

0

1

8th Circuit

0.175

0.380

0

1

10th Circuit

0.041

0.199

0

1

11th Circuit

0.074

0.262

0

1

D.C. Circuit

0.053

0.224

0

1
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In addition to the social composition of the panel, the third cluster of variables
accounts for attitudes and the strategic bargaining and intra-branch relations. First, I
control for the Ideology of the Panel Median, as the median voter theorem predicts that
judges representing the ideological median may have the greatest influence on panel
outcomes (see Collins and Moyer, 2008). Similarly, I control for the Ideology of the
Circuit Median, as decisions may be overturned by a court en banc if rulings do not
conform to the ideological preferences of the circuit (Van Winkle, 1997). Both the Panel
Median and Circuit Median are measured as the median GHP ideological score at the
time of the decision. To identify the ideological position of the median judge and the
circuit median, I utilize Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers (GHP) (2001) coding scheme,
which ranges from -1 (most liberal) to 1 (most conservative).36 A negative coefficient,
therefore, indicates that judges or panels with more liberal ideologies are more likely to
rule in favor of the claimant. Finally, judges may be responsive to the Supreme Court
since it has control over its own docket and the power to overturn lower court decisions
(Cross and Tiller, 1998; Songer, Segal, and Cameron, 1994).

36

To measure Median

It is important to note that partisanship and GHP scores are highly correlated (.90). However, I opted to

use GHP scores because they capture key actors involved in the appointment process. Specifically, the
coding scheme is based upon Poole-Rosenthal Common Space scores that measure the ideology of the
president and home-state senators. In the absence of senatorial courtesy, a judge’s ideology score is the
same as the president’s. If one home-state senator shares the same party affiliation as the president, then a
judge’s ideological score reflects the ideological score of the home-state senator. Finally, if two home-state
senators share the same party affiliation as the president, then a judge’s ideological score is the mean value
of the senator’s scores (see Giles et al., 2001).

110

Supreme Court Justice, I use Martin and Quinn (2002) ideological scores for each
calendar term. These scores are unbounded, with negative values representing more
liberal Courts and positive values representing more conservative Courts. Finally, to
control for routine cases, I control for Lower Court Decision. This variable is coded as
“1” if the circuit court upheld the lower court’s decision and “0” if otherwise.
The dataset also provides the unique opportunity to control for the facts of the
case. Following research that finds discrimination to be influenced by skin color and
“foreignness” (Espino and Franz, 2002; Goldsmith et al. 2006; Kim, 1999), I expect
judges to be less likely to rule in favor of African Americans than Latinos and other
minorities. Specifically, Black Claimant, Latino Claimant, Asian Claimant, Asian
American Claimant, Middle Eastern Claimant, and Native American Claimant are each
coded as “1” and “0” if otherwise. White claimants serve as the baseline for comparison.
Second, I control for Amicus Curiae briefs, as studies demonstrate that special interest
groups can influence judicial behavior (Collins and Martinek, 2011). Briefs intended to
influence a favorable outcome for racial or ethnic minorities are coded as “1” and “0” if
otherwise. Following previous studies, which find significant differences between claim
types (Parker, 2009), I account for Discrimination and Hostile work environment claims,
holding retaliation claims as a baseline for comparison. Both claim types are coded as “1”
and “0” if otherwise.37
Finally, to take into account the political context and circuit norms (see Farhang
and Wawro, 2004), I include dummy variables for each year and circuit, including the

37

Parker (2009), for example, demonstrates that judges are less likely to rule for the plaintiff in retaliation

cases, though the differences were small.
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D.C. circuit. In the models I present below, the 9th circuit serves as the baseline for
comparison, as studies demonstrate the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals to be more liberal
than other circuits (Scherer, 2004-2005). Yearly controls are also added, with 2001
serving as the baseline for comparison
Results
Table 3.3 tests the influence that Latino and African American judges have on
three-judge panels at the bivariate level. The preliminary results do not show support for
Hypothesis 1, which states that the presence of a Latino or an African American judge
will increase the probability that a panel will rule in favor of the claimant in Title VII
claims. In terms of racially diverse panels, the results demonstrate that the presence of
one African American judge on a panel does not have any significant influence on panel
outcomes. Latino judges, on the other hand, tend to have much greater influence over
their panel colleagues. Contrary to theoretical expectations, though, the presence of a
Latino judge on a panel has an unexpected effect on the panel decision, as ethnically
diverse panels are less likely to rule in favor of the claimant across Title VII
discrimination claims.
I next sub-divided the data in Table 3.3 by the race and ethnicity of the claimant
to examine the extent to which “panel effects” are conditioned by “claimant effects.” The
results provide preliminary support for Hypothesis 2, which states that the presence of a
co-racial or co-ethnic claimant will increase the probability that a racially or ethnically
diverse panel will rule in favor of the claimant in Title VII discrimination claims.
Demonstrating partial support for Hypothesis 2, the table shows that panels consisting of
one African American judge rendered a favorable decision towards the claimant 30
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percent of the time, which is about 8 percentage points greater than panels consisting of
all white judges. The presence of a Latino judge, however, has a much different effect.
Contrary to Hypothesis 2, the presence of a Latino judge decreases the likelihood that a
white judge will render a favorable decision. In fact, the percentage of favorable votes is
only 9% when the claimant is a Latino, which is about 41 percent less than panels
consisting of all-white panels. In all, these findings suggest that while African American
and Latino judges have greater influence over their panel colleagues when a co-racial or
co-ethnic claimant is present, Latino judges’ ability to influence outcomes is not in the
theorized direction.

Table 3.3: Favorable Panel Outcomes by the Racial and Ethnic Composition of
the Panel and the Race and Ethnicity of the Claimant

All White Panel

Full Model
Black Claimant Latino Claimant
Proportion SE Proportion SE Proportion SE
0.270
0.015
0.218
0.018 0.500
0.048

One African American
Judge on a Panel

0.289

0.025

One Latino Judge on a
Panel

0.164** 0.029

0.300*

0.032

---

---

--0.090***

--0.050

† p <.10, two-tailed *p < .05, two-tailed. **p < .01, two-tailed. ***p < .001, two-tailed.
Note: Table depicts a difference of means test (t-test). It compares the proportion of
all white judges ruling in favor of the claimant with panels consisting of either one
Latino or African American judge. The dependent variable is a vote in favor of the
claimant.

Using Logistic Regression to analyze my models, the next step in the analysis is
to test whether the bivariate results continue to hold once alternative explanations of
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voting and panel behavior are taken into account. Table 3.4 presents both models 1 and 2,
which examine both panel and claimant effects on panel voting behavior. Model 1 is the
constrained model, which tests the argument that the presence of one minority judge on a
panel can influence panel outcomes. Model 2 is the full model, which includes the two
interaction effects that consider the mediating role that claimant cues might have on the
ability to influence
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Table 3.4: Logistic Model of Panel Outcomes in the U.S. Court of Appeals (2001-2009)
Model 1 (Constrained Model)
Model 2 (Full Model)
SE
Discrete
SE
Discrete
Coef.
Variables
Robust
Change
Coef.
Robust
Change
(min  max)
(min max)
Social Composition of Panel
One Latino Judge on a Panel
One Latino Judge on a Panel*Latino
Claimant
One Black Judge on a Panel

-1.671*** 0.311
---

---

-0.1920
---

-1.199***

0.323

-0.1513

-2.139**

0.797

-0.1883

0.492*
---

0.199
---

0.0886
---

-0.240
1.047**

0.336
0.376

-0.0385
0.2072

One Female Judge on a Panel

0.302

0.204

0.0526

0.343†

0.206

0.0595

Two Female Judges on a Panel

0.858*** 0.263

0.1684

0.940***

0.265

0.1852

Average Age of Panel

0.000

0.015

-0.0029

-0.001

0.015

-0.0049

Panel Ideological Median

0.392

0.313

0.0715

0.393

0.319

0.0709

Circuit Ideological Median

0.179

0.987

0.0255

0.248

1.024

0.0348

Supreme Court Ideological Median

0.795

1.197

0.1710

0.979

1.222

0.212

Favorable Lower Court Decision

2.313*** 0.317

0.5134

2.357***

0.317

0.5215

One Black Judge on a Panel*Black
Claimant

Attitudes & Strategic Interaction

Case Facts
Discrimination Case

-0.002

0.179

-0.0003

-0.055

0.181

-0.0092

Hostile Work Environment Case

0.350

0.246

0.0633

0.304

0.247

0.0539

Amicus Curiae Brief

0.067

0.317

0.0115

0.236

0.323

0.0416

Black Claimant

0.006

0.217

0.001

-0.287

0.250

-0.0488
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Table 3.4 (cont.) Logistic Model of Panel Outcomes in the U.S. Court of Appeals (2001-2009)
Latino Claimant
0.650*
0.304
0.1241
0.886**
0.312
Asian Claimant
Middle Eastern Claimant

0.1742

-0.157

0.443

-0.0253

-0.138

0.438

-0.0222

0.570

0.537

0.1103

0.355

0.513

0.0647

Circuit Norms
1st Circuit

-2.496**

0.900

-0.2216

-2.228*

0.921

-0.2078

nd

-2.468

0.923

-0.2060

-2.364

0.948

-0.1999

rd

-0.286*

0.504

-0.0446

0.020*

0.499

0.0034

th

-1.575**

0.664

-0.1640

-1.505**

0.652

-0.1579

th

5 Circuit

-2.017

0.730

-0.1931

-1.891

0.736

-0.1847

6th Circuit

-1.003

2 Circuit
3 Circuit
4 Circuit

0.865

-0.1303

-0.984

0.865

-0.1268

th

-1.021*** 0.655

-0.1311

-0.771***

0.648

-0.1047

th

7 Circuit
8 Circuit

-2.800*

0.728

-0.3396

-2.623*

0.727

-0.3197

th

-1.733

0.690

-0.2085

-1.583

0.694

-0.1934

th

11 Circuit

-0.141**

0.668

-0.023

0.667

0.0122

D.C. Circuit

-2.438**

0.804

-0.2107

-2.296*

0.811

-0.2027

10 Circuit

0.072**

Yearly Controls
2002

0.266

0.545

0.0481

0.201

0.567

0.0353

2003

-0.498

0.377

-0.0761

-0.487

0.387

-0.0736

2004

-0.155

0.428

-0.0253

-0.256

0.445

-0.0408

2005

-0.063

0.503

-0.0105

-0.027

0.521

-0.0044

2006

-0.616†

0.366

-0.0898

-0.662†

0.363

-0.0942

2007

-1.415*** 0.420

-0.1676

-1.486**

0.424

-0.1707
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Table 3.4 (cont.): Logistic Model of Panel Outcomes in the U.S. Court of Appeals (2001-2009)
2008
-1.011*
0.489
-0.1322
-1.005*
0.478

-0.1299

2009

-0.1127

Constant
N
Log Pseudo Likelihood

-0.670

0.745

0.174

1.319

-0.0948

-0.847

0.752

0.132

1.328

1,274

1,274

-589.5812

-581.18178

Correctly Predicted
79.75%
79.67%
†p <.10, two tailed; *p < .05, two-tailed; **p < .01, two-tailed; ***p < .001, two-tailed.
Note: The dependent variable is panel ruling in favor of the claimant. Observations clustered around panel (1,274
clusters).
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Overall, model 1 demonstrates partial support for Hypothesis 1, which states that
the presence of at least one minority judge will lead to more favorable outcomes. After
controlling for alternative explanations of voting behavior, the results from the analysis
show that the presence of a Latino judge leads to less –not more as expected- favorable
outcomes. One Latino Judge on a Panel is significant and negative (p < .001), suggesting
that the presence of a Latino judge decreases the probability that an appellant will win a
claim. However, One Black Judge on a Panel is both significant and positive (.05),
suggesting that the presence of an African American Judge increases the likelihood of a
favorable outcome. Figure 3.1 compares the predicted probability of a claimant winning a
discrimination claim when the panel consists of all white judges and when the panel is
racially and ethnically diverse. Holding all variables at their appropriate means and
modes, the figure illustrates that the racial and ethnic composition of the panel can play
an important role in determining panel outcomes. While claimants have the greatest
chance of winning their claim when the panel is racially diverse, the presence of Latino
judge has the opposite effect on panel outcomes. For example, the presence of an African
American judge on a panel increases the predicted probability of a claimant winning their
claim by 26.81 percent, nearly 9 percentage points greater than all-white panels. By
contrast, the probability of a claimant winning a discrimination claim is at its lowest
when at least one Latino judge is present on a panel. In all, the direction of panel
outcomes supports previous research that concentrates on the individual voting behavior
of African American and Latino judges. For example, African American judges are more
likely than white judges to vote in favor of the claimant in race discrimination cases and
criminal cases (Gottschall, 1983-1984; Scherer; 2004-2005; Collins and Moyer 2008).
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Among Latino judges, however, the story is much different. Although Manning (2004)
finds that Latino judges are no more likely than their white colleagues to rule against the
claimant across discrimination claims, Chapter 2 of this dissertation finds that Latino
judges have a tendency to rule against the claimant when Title VII employment
discrimination claims are solely based on race and ethnicity. Thus, the presence of a
Latino judge may not provide the same cues as their African American colleagues that
lead to more favorable outcomes.

Figure 3.1: Probability of Winning a Discrimination Claim
(2001-2009)

Pr(Favoable Outcome)

50%

40%

30%
26.81%
20%

18.30%

10%
4.04%
0%

One Latino Judge
All White Panel
One Black Judge
Note: Dependent Variable is Favorable Outcome. Depicts
95% Confidence Intervals

Model 2 (Table 3.4) next tests Hypotheses 2, which states that racially diverse and
ethnically diverse panels will be more likely to rule in favor of the claimant when a co-
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racial or co-ethnic claimant is present. Overall, the findings suggest that panels consisting
of one Latino judge tend to behave differently than panels consisting of all-white judges.
Different from my expectations, One Latino Judge Panel *Latino Claimant is significant
and negative (p < .01), suggesting that Latino claimants are less likely to win their claims
when a Latino judge is present on a panel. The overall effect of having a Latino judge on
a panel, moreover, is quite substantial once the ethnicity of the claimant is taken into
account. After holding all other control variables at their appropriate means and modes,
Figure 3.2 shows that the probability of ruling in favor of a Latino claimant is about 2.12
percent for panels with one Latino judge and 37.89 percent for panels consisting of allwhite judges. It is also important to note that the main independent variable, One Latino
Judge on a Panel, also remains significant in the model (p < .001). However, the sign of
the coefficient is also negative, which suggests that panels with one Latino judge are less
likely than panels that are not ethnically diverse to rule in favor of non-Latino claimants.
Thus, panels consisting of one Latino judge have a tendency to rule against the claimant
more generally.
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Figure 3.2: Proabability of a Latino Claimant Winning a
Discrimination Claim (2001-2009)

Pr(Favorable Ruling)

60%
50%
40%

37.89%

30%
20%
10%

0%

2.12%

-10%
One Latino Judge

All White Panel

Note: Dependent Variable is Favorable Outcome. Depicts
95% Confidence Intervals

These findings should be interpreted with some caution, however. Similar to the
previous chapter, further investigation demonstrates that the results are not necessarily
generalizable across all Latino judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Table 3.5, for
example, provides a list of Latino judges and their voting behavior towards Latino
claimants. Of the 13 Latino appellate-court judges in the dataset, the table demonstrates
that only 5 Latino judges have ever made a decision involving a Latino claimant. More
specifically, these judges include 2 judges appointed by a Democratic president (J.
Fortunato Benevides; J. Carlos F. Lucero) and 3 judges appointed by a Republican
president (J. Emilo M. Garza; J. Edward C. Prado; J. Juan R. Torruella). In line with the
results in the fully specified model (Table 3.4, model 2), the majority of Latino judges,
both Democrat and Republican in partisanship, tend to rule against Latino judges. In
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addition to generalizability issues, Table 3.5 shows that Judge Carlos F. Lucero, a
Democrat from the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Colorado, is an important outlier
driving the results in the fully specified model (Table 3.4, model 2). In comparison to the
other four judges, Judge Carlos F. Lucero was involved in 20 of the 33 panel rulings, or
60.60 percent of the total observations, involving another Latino claimant. Of these 20
panel decisions, the panel ruled against 11 different individual Latino claimants 100
percent of the time.

Table 3.5: The Voting Behavior of Latino Judges Towards Latino Claimants
by Partisanship
Unfavorable
Favorable
Outcome
Outcome
Total
Appointed by Democratic
President
Fortunato P. Benavides

33.33% (1)

100% (3)

100% (20)

0% (0)

100% (20)

Emilio M. Garza

50% (1)

50% (1)

100%(2)

Edward C. Prado

100% (1)

0% (0)

100% (1)

Juan R. Torruella

85.71% (6)

14.29% (1)

100% (7)

90.90% (30)
9.10% (3)
Total
Note: Percentages in parentheses reflect row percentages.

100% (33)

Carlos F. Lucero

67.67% (2)

Appointed by Republican
President

In comparison to panels involving one Latino judge, the presence of a co-racial
claimant has a much different effect on racially diverse panels. Following Hypotheses 2,
model 2 demonstrates that One African American Judge on a Panel*Black Claimant is
significant and positive (p < .01). Thus, Black claimants are more likely to win their
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individual claims when an African American judge is present on a panel. Holding all
control variables at their appropriate means and modes, Figure 3.3 illustrates that the
probability of a Black claimant winning their individual claim is 32.12 percent –nearly 15
percentage points higher than Black claimants facing all-white panels. Overall, the
findings support the argument that Black claimants serve as important cues that foster
perceptions of commonality with other African American judges.

Figure 3.3: Probability of a Black Claimant Winning a
Discrimination Claim (2001-2009)

Pr(Favorable Vote)

50%
40%
30%

32.12%

20%

17.44%

10%
0%
One Black Judge
All White Panel
Note: Dependent Variable is Favorable Outcome. Depicts
95% Confidence Intervals

In addition to race and ethnicity, the models control for a host of variables found
to influence the voting behavior of judges. For example, Two Female Judges on a Panel
is significant and positive across the claimant-based models (p < .001) but One Female
Judge on a Panel is not. Taken together, the two findings suggest that female judges can
only influence panel outcomes when they are in the majority. Following the work of
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Boyd et al. (2010), the findings may also highlight the importance of salient cases in
judicial behavior, as female jurists are most influential when issues are most salient to
female jurists and not issues dealing specifically with racial and ethnic minorities (see
also Songer et al., 1994).
Interestingly, many of the attitudinal and strategic interaction variables are
insignificant in the models. More specifically, the results show that the panel ideological
median, circuit ideological median, and Supreme Court ideological median do not have
any apparent influence on the panel outcomes. 38 Accounting for more routine cases,
though, Lower Court Decision is significant and positive (p < .001). In other words,
Courts of Appeals judges are more likely to render a favorable panel decision when the
lower court’s decision is also in favor of the claimant. The overall effect on panel
outcomes is quite substantive, representing a 52 percent change in the predicted
probability. This outcome is not surprising, though, given that the appellate courts rarely
overturn the decisions in the lower courts.
In addition to the attitudes and strategic interaction, the race and ethnicity of the
claimant can have significant influence over panel outcomes. For example, Latino
Claimant is significant and positive (p < .05), suggesting that Latino claimants are more
likely than non-Latinos to win their discrimination claim. Despite evidence that Latino
38

Table B.1 in Appendix B also tests for panel effects by examining the partisan composition of the panel.

Kastellec (2011; 2007), for example explains that the presence of a counter-judge or a judge in the minority
position, such as a Democratic judge sitting on a majority-Republican panel, can influence panel outcomes.
The results from the model confirm this argument by showing that the presence of one Democrat judge on
a panel increases the probability of a favorable panel ruling. Perhaps more importantly, the main
independent variables continued to hold, even after controlling for these partisan effects.
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claimants tend to lose in the state courts (Steffensmeier and Britt, 2001; Holmes et al.,
1992), the results suggest that Latino claimants are not necessarily marginalized in the
appellate-court system.
The last cluster of variables shows that institutional norms are important for
understanding panel behavior (Farhang and Wawro, 2004). Holding the 9th circuit as the
baseline for comparison, the results from the full model demonstrate that several circuits,
including the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 11th circuits are less likely to rule in favor of
claimants. Taken together, these findings suggest that the 9th Circuit Courts of Appeals,
which generally represents the west coast and parts of the Northwest, tend to be more
liberal than the other regional circuits (Scherer 2004-2005). Once again, these findings
make intuitive sense given that the circuits listed above cover many parts the South and
the Midwest where issues of race have dominated the political landscape.
Conclusion
Over the years, the Courts of Appeals have become more diverse. Not only is
diversity important for establishing a sense of symbolic representation, but it can also
lead to more substantive policy outcomes. This chapter examined the latter of the two
merits of descriptive representation by moving beyond individual voting behavior and
analyzing the extent to African American and Latino judges can improve the likelihood
of claimants wining their disputes across Title VII discrimination claims. Following small
group theory and panel effects, this chapter argued that African American and Latino
could significantly influence their panel colleagues to rule in favor of the claimant. While
the presence of salient cases, such as Title VII claims, provides one condition for more
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influential behavior, this chapter also argued that their ability to influence their panel
colleagues would be also be enhanced by the presence of co-racial or co-ethnic claimants.
The results from this analysis demonstrated only partial support for my
hypotheses, however. While the presence of an African American judge significantly
increases the probability that claimants in Title VII cases will win their disputes, the
results also demonstrated that this more favorable behavior is largely conditioned by the
presence of a co-racial claimant. Contrary to expectations, though, panels with one Latino
judge decrease the probability of a favorable outcome, regardless of whether or not coethnic claimants are present. Therefore, ethnically diverse panels, consisting of one
Latino judge, are less likely than racially diverse and all-white panels to rule in favor of
the Latinos and non-Latinos alike.
These findings have important implications for the relationship between
descriptive and substantive representation. Previous research focusing on the descriptive
representation suggests that institutional rules prevent racial and ethnic minorities from
being responsive to a wider array of racial and ethnic minority communities (Lublin,
1997). According to this view, racial and ethnic minority judges will have a difficult time
overcoming the institution of majority rule “since their policy preferences are reinforced
by racial cleavages, and not by broader liberal or conservative ideologies” (Preuhs, 2006,
587). Indeed, Chapter 2 of this dissertation supports this assertion to some extent. Since
African American and Latino judges vote differently from their white colleagues (and
from each other) and because the probability of sitting on a majority-minority panel is
quite low, the appellate-courts offer few opportunities for racial and ethnic minority
judges to form majority coalitions. At the same time, the previous chapter also

126

demonstrates that white judges, who sit on racially and ethnically diverse panels, tend to
conform to the voting behavior of African American and Latino judges. In this instance,
white judges vote differently than how they would otherwise vote if they were sitting on
all-white panels.
This chapter builds on these last findings by showing that racial and ethnic
minorities are not marginalized in the courtroom. Although African American and Latino
jurists represent “polarizing interests,” the presence of a single African American or
Latino judge on a panel can significantly influence the voting behavior of their white
colleagues and determine the outcome of panel decisions. Through their ability to form
majority coalitions, the results from this analysis suggest that African American and
Latino judges actually have more opportunities, not less, to shape and craft policy. Given
their ability to influence their panel colleagues, there is good reason to believe that
African American and Latino jurists will be more likely to write the majority opinion and
set the policy agenda (Maltzman and Whalbeck, 2004). Subsequently, minority judges
can challenge existing legal precedent that prevents racial and ethnic minorities from
winning their claims in the future.
Finally, this chapter has implications for the federal courts as a policy-making
institution. Over the years, African American and Latinos have relied on a “legal
strategy” to pursue their policy agenda to compensate for a lack of representation in
Congress and state legislative institutions. So long as the federal courts become more
diverse in their racial and ethnic composition, the findings from this chapter suggest that
the courts will continue to be a viable option for racial and ethnic minorities who wish to
either appeal their Title VII claims or pursue an even more broad policy agenda related to
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employment discrimination. In the U.S. Courts of Appeals, especially, the institution of
majority rule plays an important role in determining panel decisions. Although judges
prefer unanimity to divided panels (Atkins, 1974), minority judges need only to persuade
one of their panel colleagues to reach a final decision. Moreover, the small-group context
of the collegial courts can allow racial and ethnic minority judges to have greater
bargaining leverage than minority representative across other political institutions, such
as Congress. This chapter reinforces this view, as African American and Latino judges,
who represent polarizing interests, are able to influence their panel colleagues and
determine panel outcomes.
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CHAPTER 4
MAJORITY OPINION WRITING AND THE SELECTION OF AFRICAN
AMERICAN and LATINO JUDGES

In the U.S. Courts of Appeals, judges must be able to influence their panel
colleagues and establish a majority coalition an in order to achieve their policy goals. The
previous chapter in this dissertation, therefore, moved beyond research that focuses on
the individual voting behavior of judges by examining the extent to which African
American and Latino judges can influence panel outcomes. Contrary to research that
contends African American and Latino judges are marginalized in the courtroom (see
Hawkesworth, 2003), Chapter 3 of this dissertation demonstrated that racial and ethnic
minority judges can influence the voting behavior of their white-panels colleagues. In
addition to the presence of salient policy issues, however, this dissertation also
demonstrated that the ability to influence is also conditioned by the presence of a coracial or co-ethnic claimant. While racially diverse panels are more likely to rule in favor
of Black claimants, ethnically diverse panels are less likely to rule in favor of Latino and
non-Latino claimants alike. In all, the results suggest that African American and Latino
judges are not marginalized in the federal collegial courts, as they will have more
opportunities to determine panel outcomes and even write the majority opinion.
In the U.S. Courts of Appeals, the assignment of the majority opinion is one of the
most important responsibilities of the presiding judge. Not only is it at the core of the
policy making process (Segal and Spaeth, 2002), but it also represents the ability to
shape the policy agenda and promote the organization of the court (Maltzman and
Wahlbeck, 2004). In comparison to the U.S. Supreme Court (Maltzman and Wahlbeck,
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2004, 1996; Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck, 2000; Segal and Spaeth, 2002; Brenner
and Spaeth, 1986, 1988; Rhode, 1972; Slotnick, 1978, 1979), however, much less
scholarship has been dedicated to understanding those factors that shape the decision to
assign the majority opinion in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (but see Owens and Black,
2009; Atkins, 1974; Cheng 2007). While some have examined the policy specialization
of judges (Atkins, 1974; Cheng, 2007), others have focused more indirectly on the
subject by examining the content of the majority opinion (but see Owens and Black,
2009) and decisions to write separate concurring and dissent opinions (but see Hettinger
et al., 2003, 2004ab).
Scholarship focusing on majority opinion writing in the federal courts, however,
has yet to examine whether the background characteristics of judges can play an
important role in understanding the decision to assign the majority opinion (but see
Owens and Black, 2009). In this chapter, I add to the extant research by examining those
factors that shape the presiding judges’ decision to assign the majority opinion. In
particular, I focus on the role of background characteristics in the decision-making
process by examining the extent to which racial and ethnic minority judges are selected to
write the majority opinion. In comparison to the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Courts of
Appeals provides a unique opportunity to examine these two research questions. Not only
does the regional variation of the appeals-court circuits allow for greater levels of racial
and ethnic diversity, but random panel assignments also give researchers the opportunity
to examine how racial and ethnic minority judges behave once they are in the more
formal role of the presiding position and able to assign the majority opinion. Following
research that focuses on small group theory and panel effects, this chapter contends that,
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minority judges hold a distinct advantage over their panel colleagues, as the presiding
judge may wish to promote non-policy goals, such as unanimity, specialization, and
credibility across cases considered salient to racial and ethnic minorities.
Focusing on Title VII employment discrimination cases based on race and
ethnicity between 2001 and 2009, this chapter finds support for my argument.
Specifically, the presiding judge is more likely to assign the majority opinion to African
American judges, but not to Latino judges, though important differences emerge once
non-presiding, Latino judges are compared to other non-presiding, non-Latino judges.
The likelihood of writing the majority opinion, moreover is not conditioned by the formal
role of the presiding judges, as African American and Latino judges are no more likely
than their white colleagues to assign the majority to themselves when given the
opportunity. In all the findings have important implications for the relationship between
descriptive representation and substantive policy outcomes in the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
as African American and Latino jurists can promote policies that make it easer for racial
and ethnic minorities to win employment discrimination claims.
Background
In the U.S. Courts of Appeals, opinion assignment responsibilities are delegated
to the presiding judge in the panel-majority. In the U.S. Courts of Appeals, the presiding
judge is the chief judge who acts as the head administrator for each of their individual
circuits (Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek, 2003). Internal rules and operating
procedures stipulate that in order to qualify as a chief judge, a candidate must be in
regular active service who is senior in commission of those judges who are 1) 64 years of
age or under 2) have served for one year or more as a judge and 3) have not previously
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served as a chief judge (Court of Appeals, n. d.). In the absence of the chief judge, the
presiding judge is the most senior or tenured judge in active service.39
The power to assign the majority opinion is important for several reasons. Most
notably, the majority opinion reflects the core of the policy making process (Segal and
Spaeth, 1993, 2002). Judges use the majority opinion to clarify the interpretation of law,
not only to help fulfill their error correction responsibilities, but also to set legal
precedent, which serves as important guidelines for lower federal courts and
administrative agencies. The majority opinion also gives judges in the presiding position
the opportunity to set the policy agenda (Maltzman and Wahlbeck, 2004: 551). This
agenda-setting power is reinforced by internal rules and procedures that give the
majority-opinion writer the power to circulate the initial draft to her panel colleagues for
approval. Consequently, judges can determine the scope of issues that are initially
addressed at the onset of conference. Finally, the majority opinion promotes the
administration of the circuit (Malzman and Wahlbeck, 2004). The presiding judge can
create equity and foster a sense of collegiality through the careful distribution of
workloads (Rehnquist, 1987; Spaeth, 1984; Slotnick, 1979), improve legitimacy of a
decision by identifying judges who specialize in distinct areas of law (Atkins, 1974), and
promote the overall efficiency of the circuit by assigning judges who have records of
disposing cases at a faster rate (Matlzman and Wahlbeck, 1996; Brenner and Palmer
39

The presiding judges, therefore, exclude judges who are in senior status. At the age of 65, judges are

given the option to retire or assume senior status, which requires a minimum of 15 years in active service
(Courts of Appeals Faqs, n.d).
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1988). For these reasons, the presiding judge holds a distinct advantage over her panel
colleagues.
The importance of the presiding judge has led several scholars to examine those
factors that shape the judges’ decision to assign the majority opinion in the Supreme
Court. This research assumes that judges are single-minded seekers of policy (Segal and
Spaeth, 1993; Epstein and Knight, 1998). However, the ability to pursue policy goals is
constrained by the “preferences of other actors, the choices they expect others to make,
and the institutional context in which they act” (Epstein and Knight 1998, 10; Epstein and
Jacobi, 2010). Thus, judges are understood to be “policy maximizers,” as they rank their
policy preferences according to their utility and attempt to approximate their most
desirable outcomes. Assuming that the chief justice is in the majority, the model posits
that the chief justice will pursue her policy goals by either assigning the majority opinion
to herself or by selecting a judge in the majority coalition who has the closest ideological
preferences to her own (Murphy 1964; Ulmer 1970; Rhode 1972; Rhode and Spaeth,
1976; Segal and Spaeth, 1993).
Students of the courts also assume that appellate-court judges play a similar
strategic role. For example, Collins and Martinek (2011), show that judges’ moderated
ideology, measured as the ideological mean of their colleagues, is significantly correlated
with individual votes. Different from the Supreme Court, however, appellate-court judges
are also constrained by judicial hierarchies, such as a court en banc and the Supreme
Court that have the power to overturn panel decisions. For example, Songer, Segal, and
Cameron (1994) find that the appellate courts tend to be congruent with the decisions of
the Supreme Court (but see Cross and Tiller 1997). Similarly, Hall (2009) finds that
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panels consisting of three judges appointed by Democratic presidents quintupled the
chances of the Supreme Court overturning the lower-courts’ decision. Van Winkle (1997)
also finds that judges are more likely to file a separate dissenting opinion when the
ideological preferences of the majority panel are not congruent with the preferences of
the circuit. To avoid reversal of the panel’s decision, the presiding judge may, therefore,
choose to select a more ideologically distant judge in order to satisfy the preferences of
the circuit and the Supreme Court.
The presiding judge’s decision to self-assign the majority opinion may also be
heightened by the presence of politically salient cases or cases that have potential to set
precedent. According to this view, “important cases raise the stakes for the presiding
judge, elevating the importance of securing a decision and outcome that best comports
with his or her policy views” (Malztman and Wahlbeck, 2004: 554). For example,
research focusing on the Supreme Court finds that the chief justice is more likely to retain
opinions in more important cases (Brenner 1993; Rohde 1972; Slotnick 1978). In the
absence of salient cases, however, “judges are more likely to compromise on policy
objectives and assign cases to judges who are ideologically more proximate to their own
preferences” (Malzman and Wahlbeck, 2004: 554).
In addition to the pursuit of policy, a burgeoning line of research suggests that the
presiding judge may also pursue non-policy objectives (Maltzman and Wahlbeck 2004;
Rhode, 1972). Baum (1997), for example, argues that judges are motivated by other goals
that may be more proximate, such as personal standing with court audiences, career, and
collegiality on the court. These goals, according to Baum (1997), may also be related to
the pursuit of more distant or “distal” or distant goals (Baum 1997: 16). For example, “a
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judge may seek popularity in the community as a means to maximize the chances in reelection” (Baum 1997: 16). Thus, the pursuit of more proximate, non-policy objectives
may ultimately allow judges to pursue good policy over the long run.
One goal of the presiding judge is to increase the size of the winning coalition and
adhere to the norm of consensus. It has been well established that appellate court judges
prefer panel unanimity to split decisions. In fact, appellate-court decisions are
overwhelmingly unanimous, as the rate of dissent averages approximately 6 percent to 8
percent (Farhang and Wawro, 2004: 306). Not only does panel consensus establish a
unified front on the interpretation of law, but it also creates a sense of institutional
legitimacy, which is necessary for the execution of court orders by other governmental
entities (Farhang and Wawro, 2004). To achieve this goal, the presiding judge may wish
to select the judge who is the most ideologically distant. In the U.S. Supreme Court, for
example, researchers find that the chief judge is more likely to assign the majority
opinion to justices who are closer to the dissenting coalition or the median justice when
the coalitions are especially fragile (Danelski, 1968; McLauchlan, 1972; Murphy, 1964;
Rohde, 1972; Rohde and Spaeth, 1976; Ulmer 1970; but see Brenner, 1982; Brenner and
Spaeth,1988; Rathjen, 1974). As a result, justices are able to moderate the positions of
potential dissenters while also promoting greater compromise and unanimity.
The decision to assign the majority opinion may also be conditioned by the formal
role of the chief judge. According to Hettinger et al. (2003), “the job requirements of the
chief judge are varied and demands, as chief judges bear the ultimate responsibility for
the efficient and effective operation of the entire circuit, including the work of all circuit,
district, bankruptcy, and magistrate judges” (91). Given these additional administrative
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responsibilities, the chief judge of each circuit may wish to reduce her overall workload
by assigning the majority opinion to her panel colleagues (Owens and Black, 2009). For
example, Hettinger et al. (2003) find that the chief judge is less likely to dissent from the
majority opinion, reasoning that judges who take on this more formal role may wish to
promote consensus and collegial relations in the court (99-101). Hettinger et al. (2003)
also note that separate opinion writing can be a costly enterprise. Thus, the added costs of
separate opinion writing can mitigate circuits’ ability to dispose of cases.
In a similar vein, the chief judge may also wish to distribute the workload evenly
in order to promote a friendly work environment and equity in the distribution of labor
(Rehnquist 1987: 297; Spaeth, 1984; Slotnick, 1979). For example, studies focusing on
the Supreme Court find that the chief judge is more likely to assign the majority opinion
to judges who have not previously been assigned the majority opinion (Rehnquist, 1987;
Spaeth, 1984; Slotnick, 1979). The chief judge may wish to assign cases to judges who
either specialize in certain areas of the law (Brenner 1984, 1985; Brenner and Spaeth,
1986; Atkins, 1974; Cheng, 2007) or who have a proven track record of disposing cases
quickly (Brenner and Palmer, 1988). In doing so, the presiding judge can improve the
circuit’s overall productivity and increase the quality of panel decisions.
The extant research on majority opinion assignments in the Supreme Court, and to
a lesser extent, the U.S. Courts of Appeals, demonstrates that the presiding judge is
motivated by policy and non-policy related objectives and that these objectives can
influence how presiding judges assign opinions. However, little research has focused on
the extent to which background characteristics, such as race and ethnicity, can influence
the decision to assign the majority opinion. Not only do background characteristics
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influence the behavior of judges (Gottschall, 1983; Scherer 2004-2005; Collins and
Moyer, 2008), but research also demonstrates that they can influence the behavior of
those in leadership positions. In Congress, for example, Rocca, Sanchez, and Morin
(2011) show that both gender and the minority status can have a significant influence on
committee assignments and decisions to move members of Congress up the committee
ladder. Heberlig and Larson (2007) also demonstrate that the Republican Party was more
likely during the 105th-108th Congress to reward minorities with leadership positions than
other white party members. In the context of the courts, race and ethnicity plays an
important role in the judicial appointment process, from the president’s decision to
nominate judicial candidates (Killian 2008; Solberg and Bratton, 2005) to the senate’s
decision to confirm those nominees (Hartley 2001; Bell 2002; Martinek et al. 2002;
Martinek et al. 2005; Massie et al., 2004). In all, there is good reason to expect that the
race and ethnicity of judges may also influence the decision-making of the presiding
judge. In the following section, I provide a theory of race and ethnicity as it relates to
majority opinion assignments.
Diversity, Panel Influence, and Majority Opinion Writing
Assuming that judges are motivated by non-policy objectives (Baum, 1997), there
is good reason to believe that the presiding judge will assign the majority opinion to
minority judges. There are three reasons to expect this outcome. First, the presiding judge
may wish to select judges who reflect polarizing interests. For example, research focusing
on the individual voting behavior of African American judges shows that racial and
ethnic minorities not only vote differently than their white colleagues (Gottschall, 19831984; Scherer 2004-2005; Manning, 2004; Collins and Moyer, 2008; but see Walker and
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Barrow 1985; Segal, 2000; Farhang and Wawro, 2004), but they are also more likely than
their white colleagues to write separate dissenting opinions apart from the majority
(Hettinger et al., 2003; 2004ab). By selecting an African American or Latino judge to
write the majority opinion, therefore, the presiding judge can achieve increase the size of
the winning coalition (Danelski 1968; McLauchlan 1972; Murphy 1964; Rohde 1972;
Rohde and Spaeth 1976; Ulmer 1970; but see Brenner 1982; and Spaeth 1988; Rathjen
1974), ensure a unified front on the interpretation of law, and create a sense of
institutional legitimacy in panel decisions (Farhang and Wawro, 2004).
A second reason racial and ethnic minority judges may be perceived to be more
credible or expert across issues considered important to racial and ethnic minorities
(Atkins, 1974). First, racial and ethnic minority judges can heighten perceptions of policy
specialization by crystallizing issues of race and ethnicity to their panel colleagues
(Mansbridge, 1999). For example, research focusing on panel effects demonstrates that
the presence of a single minority judge on majority-white panels are more likely to rule in
favor of the claimant (Kastellec, forthcoming; Farhang and Wawro, 2010). Thus, racial
and ethnic minority judges can persuade their white-panel colleagues and cause them to
vote differently than how they would otherwise. Second, racial and ethnic minorities can
heighten perceptions of policy specialization through their mere presence (Atkins, 1974;
Klein, 2003). According to this view, the presence of an African American or Latino
judge can improve the quality of deliberation among their white-panel colleagues. For
example, research focusing on jury deliberations demonstrates that white jurors on
racially diverse panels are more likely to cite more case facts, make fewer factual errors,
and appeal directly to Black jurors in the group to validate concerns of racism (Sommers,
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2006). Thus, the presiding judge may choose to defer the majority opinion to her African
American or Latino colleagues.
Finally, the desire to select judges who are most “credible” or “expert” may also
be reinforced by racial and ethnic stereotypes. For example, Cruz and Molina (2009), in
their study of Latina lawyers, find that Latinas in the legal profession are subject to
“ethnic oriented roles,” such as providing translations or practicing in areas such as
immigration law (42). Similar acts of tokenism have also been found by Chavez’s (2011)
study of Latino lawyers –one of the most comprehensive surveys of Latinos in the legal
profession to date. Her study finds that Latino lawyers experience tend to be used by
professional organizations and law firms for more symbolic means (68; See also Cruz
and Molina, 2009). In all, the three arguments suggest that the presiding judge will likely
select minority judges to write the majority opinion in order to promote specialization in
opinions and greater legitimacy through panel unanimity. Thus, I hypothesize the
following:

H1: African American and Latino judges will be more likely than non-minority judges to
write the majority opinion.

The above argument, however, may also be conditioned by the formal role of the
presiding judge. As judges who come to the bench with different points of view
(Goldman, 1978), both African American and Latino judges may prefer to write the
majority opinion when they are the chief judge or the most senior member on the court.
By assigning the majority opinion to themselves rather than assigning the majority
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opinion to their white-panel colleagues, racial and ethnic minorities can take advantage of
the presiding position and crystallize issues of race and ethnicity (Mansbridge, 1999).
Based on this reasoning, I hypothesize the following:

H2: Black and Latino judges will be more likely to write the majority opinion when they
are also presiding over a panel.

Data and Methods
The goal of this paper is to examine the extent to which the presiding judge is
likely to select an African American or Latino judge to write the majority opinion.
Focusing on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, I analyze decisions to assign the majority
opinion across a universe of Title VII employment discrimination claims based on race
and national origin between 2001 and 2009. 40 The unit of analysis, therefore, is the
presiding judge’s decision to assign the majority opinion.41 All decisions are published in
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These decisions are collected between 1/1/2001 and 12/31/2009. Since President Clinton is responsible

for appointing over half of the Latino judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeal, I chose to begin the analysis at
the very end of his term in order to increase the number of decisions involving a Latino judge.

41

Since I am interested in individual-level variables and because judges appear in the dataset multiple times

within and across cases, I chose to cluster around each individual judge (e.g. Collins and Martinek, 2011;
Collins and Moyer; 2008). Clustering around the judge also represents a more cautionary approach, as the
size of the standard errors tend to increase for variables that measure judges’ characteristics (Zorn, 2006).
Since judges also respond to case-stimuli, I also re-ran the models by clustering around the case in Table
C.1 of Appendix C. The results demonstrate no substantive differences with regards to the main
independent variables.
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the Federal Reporter and are accessible through Westlaw. 42 The dataset contains 486
cases. Since there are three judges per panel, the number of observations increases to
1,420.43
The total number of observations includes all judges belonging to the majority in
order to capture the pool of the candidates who are eligible for selection by the presiding
judge. All judges who dissent from the majority, therefore, are excluded from the
analysis. The total number of observations also captures all circuits, including the
Appeals Court for the D.C. circuit. According to internal rules and procedures, the
presiding judge is either the chief judge or the most senior member of the panel in active
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All published decisions involving race and national origin are accessible through the Westlaw Database,

using Key Numbers Search. Cases are organized by subject and are located in the Civil Rights Folder. The
use of published decisions is well established by judicial scholars (Manning et al., 2004), as they represent
cases with higher precedential value and greater discretionary interpretation. This argument, moreover, is
reinforced by studies that examine the behavior of judges across published and unpublished decisions
(Keele, Malmsheimer, Floyd, and Zhang, 2009; Ringquist and Emmert, 1999).

43

Since there are three judges per case, the original dataset contains 1,587 observations across 529 cases.

The number of observations decreases to 1420 for several reasons. First, I exclude judges who dissent from
the majority opinion (42 observations).
observations).

Second, I exclude all decisions made in the 4 th circuit (66

Third, I exclude per curium decisions where the panel is acting anonymously (54

observations). I also exclude Asian American judges from the analysis in order to draw comparisons among
white, African American, and Latino judges (2 observations). The number of observations also decreases
due to missing data. Three observations were cases were excluded because it was difficult to determine the
presiding judge (3 observations).
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service. In the 4th circuit, however, “Opinion assignments are made by the chief judge on
the basis of recommendations from the presiding judge of each panel on which the chief
judge did not sit” (Federal Rules and Procedure, 2011; see also Cheng, 2007). Therefore,
all cases from the 4th circuit are also excluded from the analysis. Finally, I exclude all per
curium decisions from the analysis since the opinion represents the decision of the panel
rather than any one particular judge in the majority. In these instances, moreover, the
authors of the majority opinion are anonymous.
I focus on Title VII claims for several reasons. Following previous scholarship, I
expect the decision to select racial and ethnic minorities will be conditional upon the
presence of policy issues considered salient to racial and ethnic minorities (Songer et al.,
1994). Despite the passage of the Civil Rights Act 1964 (Title VII), discrimination in the
workplace continues to be an important problem facing both groups (e.g. Acs and
Loprest, 2009; Coleman, 2003; Darity and Mason, 1998; Espino and Franz, 2002;
Goldsmith, Hamilton, and Darity, 2006; Kenny and Wissoker, 1994). These experiences,
moreover, have translated into divergent attitudes towards discrimination between whites
and racial and ethnic minorities (Pew Center, 2005; Pew Hispanic, 2006; Rodriguez,
2008). Second, Title VII claims based on race and national origin offer judges more
discretion to rule their sincere preferences (Scherer, 2004-2005), as studies demonstrate
circuit court splits over the interpretation of Supreme Court precedent (Green, 1999, p.
997-998; Lanctot, 2000-2001). Finally, by narrowing the case selection to race
discrimination cases in the workplace, I improve the ability to control for legal precedent,
as discrimination cases based on discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work
environment maintain similar legal frameworks.
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Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is the Majority Opinion Writer. Judges are assigned the
majority opinion are coded as “1.” Judges who are not assigned the majority opinion are
coded as “0.” Accordingly, 34.30 percent (487) of the eligible judges in the dataset wrote
the majority opinion and 65.70 percent (933) of the judges did not. Given the
dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, I use Logistic Regression for all analysis
(see Long and Freese, 2006).
Independent Variables
The main independent variables are African American Judge and Latino Judge.
Both variables are dichotomous. I coded all African American judges as “1” (8.94%) and
Non-Black Judges (91.06%) as “0”. Similarly, I coded all Latino judges as “1” (4.51%)
and Non-Latino Judges as “0” (95.49%). I also excluded all Asian American judges from
the analysis since they account for a relatively small number of observations. Thus, white
judges serve as the baseline for comparison. All information regarding judges’ race and
ethnicity can be found at the Judicial Biographical Database (Federal Judicial Center, n.
d.).
Control Variables
In addition to the race and ethnicity of judges, I control for a host of variables that
may play an important role in the assignment of the majority opinion. The descriptive
statistics for each control variable can be found in Table 4.1. First, I control for Female
Judge. Following work found on gendered institutions (Hawkesworth, 2003; Preuhs,
2006), I expect the presiding judge to be less likely to select female judges. Female Judge
is coded as “1” and male judges are coded “0.” Second, I control for judges’ educational
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backgrounds. In particular, I control for Ivy League Education, since the prestige of
judges’ education has been found to play an important role in the behavior of judges
(Tate, 1981). Educational prestige may also serve as an additional indicator of having
paramount credentials and expertise. This variable is coded as “1” if a judge graduated
from one of the 9 ivy-league law schools. Judges are coded as “0” if they graduated
elsewhere.

Both background characteristics can be found at Judicial Biographical

Database (Federal Judicial Center, n. d.).

Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Female Judge

Mean
0.2000

Std. Dev.
0.4001

Min
0

Max
1

Ivy league Education
Chief Judge

0.2394
0.0591

0.4268
0.2359

0
0

1
1

Designate

0.0669

0.2499

0

1

Presiding Judge

0.3429

0.4748

0

1

Proximate Judge
Distance Circuit
Multiple Issue

0.3570
0.2933
0.5676

0.4792
0.2664
0.4955

0
0
0

1
1.087
1

The strategic model also predicts that the Presiding Judge will also be more likely
to select herself to write the majority opinion in order to set the agenda and pursue her
most preferred policy outcome. Following the internal rules and procedures of each
circuit, the presiding judge is coded as “1” if the judge is either the chief judge during the
time of the decision or the most tenured member on the panel who is in active service. By
contrast, judges who are not the most tenured and who are identified as “senior status” by
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the Judicial Biographical Database during the time of the decision are coded as “0.”44 It
is important to note, however, that the Federal Reporter does not explicitly identify the
presiding judge in the majority opinion. Although this is potentially problematic, this
dissertation assumes that judges in the appeals court follow internal operating procedures
and work within the guidelines as mandated by each circuit. To identify the presiding
judge, I first determined judges’ seniority by calculating judges’ time on the bench from
the date of commission. Afterwards, I determined, using the Judicial Biographical
Database (Federal Judicial Center, n.d), whether a judge was acting as chief judge or in
full service during the time of the decision
I also interacted Presiding Judge with the Latino Judge, African American Judge,
and Female Judge. All multiplicative terms are coded as “1” to indicate the presence of a
Latino, African American, or Female presiding judge. All non-presiding judges all coded
as “0.” In all, the under-representation of racial and ethnic minorities in the courtroom
accounts for the disparity in majority opinion assignments between minority and white
judges. While Latino judges presided over panels 22 times (1.55%), African American
judges presided over the panel 24 times (1.69%). White judges, by contrast, ruled over a
case 479 times (30.30%). Interestingly, neither Latino nor African American judges were
chief judge at the time of the decision. Female judges, by contrast, presided over

44

The extant research also suggests that salient policy issues can have a conditional effect on the presiding

judges’ decision to assign the majority opinion. Following Maltzman and Wahlbeck (2004), this variable is
simply measured as the presence of an Amicus Curiae Brief. However, I am unable to account for this
variable because there are an inadequate number of cases (N=20).
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appellate-court panels with somewhat greater frequency and were responsible for
assigning the majority opinion 88 times (6.20%).
The extant research also indicates that the presiding judge will choose judges
whose ideological preferences are most proximate to their own (Rhode 1973; Maltzman
and Wahlbeck 1996; 2004; Segal and Spaeth, 1993). Therefore, I control for the most
Ideological Proximate Judge on the panel. This score is based upon Giles, Hettinger, and
Pepper’s (GHP) (2001), which I use to calculate the absolute distance between the
presiding judge and the judge of interest. 45 Judges are coded as “1” if they have the
closest ideology score to the presiding judge. All other judges are coded as “0.” In
addition to panel dynamics, the strategic interactions model also suggests that judges are
constrained by institutions, such as Court en banc (Van Winkle, 1997). Therefore, I
control for the Circuit Distance. Circuit Distance is measured as the absolute difference
in GHP ideologies between the panel median and the individual judge.46
45

Specifically, the coding scheme is based upon Poole-Rosenthal Common Space scores that measure the

ideology of the president and home-state senators. In the absence of senatorial courtesy, a judge’s ideology
score is the same as the president’s. If one home-state senator shares the same party affiliation as the
president, then a judge’s ideological score reflects the ideological score of the home-state senator. Finally,
if two home-state senators share the same party affiliation as the president, then a judge’s ideological score
is the mean value of the senator’s scores (see Giles et al., 2001).

46

It is also appropriate to control for the ideological distance between the presiding judge and the ideology

of the Supreme Court median. In this instance, I prefer to use Judicial Common Space scores developed by
Esptein, Martin, Segal, and Westerland (2007) because they place judges in the Supreme Court and the
U.S. Courts of Appeals in the same policy space. However, I am unable to control for this variable because
the scores are only available between 1953 and 2006.
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In addition personal characteristics and ideology, I expect the institutional role of
judges to have an important effect on the distribution of majority opinion assignments.
While there is reason to believe that the presiding judge will select herself to write the
majority opinion, the institutional role of the Chief Judge may condition this effect.
Charged with administrative responsibilities for their respective circuits, Hettinger et al.
(2003) suggest that chief judges not only prefer smooth operations within the circuit, but
they are less likely to incur the costs of separate opinion writing. Therefore, I expect the
Chief Judge to be less likely to assign herself to the majority-opinion. Chief Judges are
coded as “1” and “0” if otherwise. By contrast, I expect Judge Designates to take on a
greater role in the division of labor since appellate court judges rely on them to “facilitate
the processing of an increasing workload” (Collins and Martinek, 2011L 181). Judge
Designate is coded as “1” if they are Non-Appellate Court judges, such as District Court
judges and judges from specialty courts, such as the International Trade Court. Appellate
court judges are coded as “0.” Both of these formal roles can be identified through the
Judicial Biographical Database (Federal Judicial Center, n. d.).
The propensity to minimize the workload may also be conditioned by the
complexity or size of the case (Rehnquist 1987; 297; Spaeth 1984; Slotnick 1979a).
Therefore, I interacted the variables, Chief Judge and Judge Designate, with cases
involving Multiple Issues or grievances. While I expect larger workloads to decrease selfassignments among Chief Judges, I expect the number of issues to be positively
correlated with Judge Designates. Cases involving multiple issues are coded as “1.”
Cases involving a single issue are coded as “0.”
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Results
Table 4.2 presents the preliminary analysis that tests the main hypotheses at the
bivariate level. The first column compares the percentage of time the majority opinion
was assigned to African American, Latino, and white judges. The second column
examines the extent to which minority and white judges self assign the majority opinion
when they are presiding over a panel. Overall, the results show support for Hypothesis 1,
which states that African American and Latino judges will be more likely to write the
majority opinion. The differences, moreover, are quite substantial, as the proportion is
approximately 10 percentage points greater for both minority judges. The preliminary
results also indicate that assignments do not necessarily depend on minority judges being
in the presiding position, as the table demonstrates no statistical differences between
minority and white judges. Thus, African American judges and Latino judges are as
likely to self-select and write the majority opinion as their white colleagues on the bench.

Table 4.2: Assigning the Majority Opinion to White, African American, and
Latino Judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 2001-2009
All Judges
Proportion

Presiding Judge
SE

Proportion

SE

White Judge

0.3303*

0.0134

0.3628

0.0229

Black Judge

0.4173*

0.0439

0.5000

0.1042

0.4375†
0.0625
0.4090
0.1072
Latino Judge
Note: Table compares the proportion of a white judge being selected to write the
majority opinion with the proportion of a minority judge being selected to write the
majority opinion (t-test). †p <.10 two tailed test; *p <.05, two tailed test.
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The next step in the analysis is to test whether the bivariate results continue to
hold once alternative explanations of majority opinion writing are taken into account.
Table 4.3 provides two distinct models. Model 1 is the constrained model that tests the
first two competing hypotheses. Model 2 is the full model, which takes into account the
additional multiplicative terms. These interaction effects not only test the extent to which
the presiding judge can condition the likelihood of self-selection among minority and
female judges, but it also considers whether the behavior of chief and designated judges
are influenced by the size of the case.
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Table 4.3: Logistic Model of Majority Opinion Writing in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 2001-2009
Model 1 (Constrained)
Model 2 (Fully Specified)
Discrete
Discrete
Robust
Robust
Variables
Coef.
Change
Coef.
Change
SE
SE
(min  max)
(minmax)
Black Judge
0.512**
0.194
0.1208
0.480*
0.220
0.1129
Latino Judge
0.420
0.263
0.0989
0.606†
0.340
0.1446
Female Judge
-0.353*
0.168
-0.0760
-0.150
0.214
-0.0331
Ivy League Education
0.204
0.148
0.0465
0.212
0.152
0.0483
Chief Judge
-0.532**
0.179
-0.1088
0.053
0.310
0.0120
Judge Designate
-0.034
0.235
-0.0077
-0.178
0.350
-0.0386
Presiding Judge
0.567***
0.163
0.1298
0.706*** 0.181
0.1619
Proximate Ideological Judge
0.528**
0.153
0.1205
0.529*** 0.152
0.1205
Circuit Ideological Distance
0.099
0.258
0.0244
0.097
0.259
0.0237
Multiple Issues
-0.007
0.117
-0.0016
0.030
0.125
0.0067
Chief Judge*Multiple Issues
-1.217**
0.389
-0.2110
Designate Judge*Multiple
0.358
0.500
0.0839
Issues
Latino Judge*Presiding
-0.489
0.459
-0.0997
Judge
Black Judge*Presiding Judge
-0.092
0.481
-0.0203
Female Judge*Presiding
-0.587†
0.323
-0.1186
Judge
Constant
-1.086***
0.159
-1.157*** 0.164
0.1129
N
1420
1420
Log pseudo likelihood
-895.18409
-889.85468
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Table 4.3 (cont.) Logistic Model of Majority Opinion Writing in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 20012009
Correctly Predicted
65.42%
66.20%
th
Note: The dependent variable is Majority Opinion Writer. This model excludes the 4 circuit, judges who
dissent from the majority opinion, and per curium decisions. It also excludes Asian American judges to ease
the interpretation of the results. Observations are clustered around Case. There are 285 clusters. †p < .10
(two-tailed); *p<.05 (two-tailed); **p<.01 (two-tailed); *** p<.001(two-tailed).
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In comparison to the preliminary analysis, model 1 provides only partial support
for Hypothesis 1, which states that African American and Latino judges will be more
likely to write the majority opinion. For example, African American Judge is significant
and positive (p < .01), suggesting that the presiding judge is more likely to select an
African American judge to write the majority opinion in Title VII employment
discrimination cases. Figure 4.1 shows that the likelihood of selecting an African
American judge is quite substantial. After holding all independent variables to their
respective means and modes, the figure demonstrates that the probability of assigning the
majority opinion to an African American judge is 36.60 percent, nearly 11 percentage
points greater than the likelihood of selecting a white judge. These findings confirm the
argument that African American judges not only represent polarizing interests, but they
provide cues of policy specialization across Title VII employment discrimination cases.
Contrary to expectations, however, model 1 demonstrates that Latino Judge is
insignificant. Thus, Latino judges are no more likely than non-Latino judges to write the
majority opinion in Title VII employment discrimination cases. Thus, Latino judges are
neither marginalized nor viewed as specialists or stereotyped across discrimination cases
by their panel colleagues. One possible explanation for this outcome is that African
American judges may simply pose a greater threat to panel consensus than Latino judges.
For example, research demonstrates that African American judges are more likely than
white judges to vote in favor of the claimant in race discrimination cases and criminal
cases, including search and seizure suits (Gottschall 1983-1984; Scherer 2004-2005;
Collins and Moyer, 2008). Latino judges, however, demonstrate much different behavior,
as Manning (2004) finds that Latino judges are no more likely than their white colleagues
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to rule against the claimant in discrimination claims. Chapter 2 of this dissertation also
builds on this research by demonstrating that Latino judges are less likely than nonLatino judges to rule in favor of the claimant in employment discrimination claims based
on race and ethnicity. Consequently, Latino judges may be perceived as less threatening
to panel consensus.

Figure 4.1: Probability of Writing the Majority Opinion in
Discrimination Cases (2001-2009)

Pr(Majority Opinion Writer)

50
40
36.60%
30
25.72%
20
10
0
Black Judge
White Judge
Note: Dependent variables is majority opinion writer.
Depicts 95% confidence intervals

Model 2 next tests Hypothesis 2, which states that Black and Latino judges will
be more likely to write the majority opinion when they are also the presiding judge. As
judges who come to the bench with “different points of view” (Goldman, 1973), African
American and Latino judges may prefer to write the majority opinion to crystalize issues
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of race and ethnicity. Otherwise minority judges may lose their opportunity to shape
policy and maximize their benefits. To examine this possibility, I interacted Latino Judge
and African American Judge with the variable, Presiding Judge. The two interaction
effects, however, are insignificant in the model, suggesting that the formal role of the
presiding judge does not have any conditional effect on the self-assignment of African
American and Latino jurists. Given the previous results, Black judges may have no need
to increase the size of their already demanding workload, especially since they are more
likely to write the opinion across discrimination cases.
The main independent variables in model 2, however, show important differences
among non-presiding judges. For example, Black Judge remains significant in the model
(p < 01), suggesting that non-presiding, African American judges are more likely than
their non-presiding, white colleagues to write the majority opinion. Interestingly, though,
the inclusion of the interaction effect also changes the significance level of the main
independent variable, Latino Judge (p < .10). Thus, Latino judges are more likely than
non-Latino judges to write the majority opinion when both are not presiding over a case.
Figure 4.2, moreover, illustrates that the probability of selecting a Black or a Latino over
a white judge is quite substantial. Holding all other control variables to their respective
means and modes, the figure shows that the probability of selecting a Latino or African
American judge to write the majority opinion is 37.93 and 35.01 percent, respectively. In
comparison to minority judges, though, the probability of selecting a white judge to write
the majority opinion is only 25 percent. In all, the findings provide further evidence to
support the argument that presiding judges prefer panel unanimity to split decisions and
rely on ethnic cues and stereotypes to identify court specialists. It also suggests that these
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cues may give African American and Latino judges a distinct advantage in crafting
policy.

Figure 4.2: Probability of Writing the Majority Opinion
Among Non-Presiding Judges in Discrimination Cases (20012009)

Pr(Majority Opinion Writer)

60
50
40

37.93%

35.01%

30
25.00%
20
10
0
Latino Judge
Black Judge
White Judge
Note: Dependent variable is majority opinion writer. Depicts
95% confidence intervals

In addition to the main independent variables, several of the control variables
found in model 1 significantly influences the decision to assign the majority opinion.
Interestingly, the gender of the judge can play an important role in the decision to assign
the majority opinion. Although Female Judge is significant (p < .05), the coefficient is
negative, suggesting that the presiding judge is less likely to assign the majority opinion
to their female colleagues. In model 2, Female Judge was also interacted with Presiding
judge to examine whether the direction of the coefficient would change once given the
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opportunity to assign the opinion. However, the sign of the coefficient remains significant
and negative (p < .10), suggesting that female jurists in the presiding position are not only
less likely to write the majority opinion, but they are also more likely to distribute the
majority opinion to others. While female jurists may pursue discrimination cases to
promote a greater equality (Songer et al., 1994), this goal does not necessarily translate
into other forms of participation, such as majority opinion writing. Ultimately, the
distribution of majority opinion may be seen as one way to pursue other goals, such as
collegial relations, in a court dominated by male jurists.
Following previous research that assumes that judges are policy maximizers, both
Presiding Judge and Proximate Judge are significant and positive (p <. 001; p < .01).
Taken together, the two findings suggest that the presiding judge and the judge in the
most proximate ideological position to the presiding judge are more likely to write the
majority opinion than judges who are the most ideologically distant. Both models also
demonstrate that the substantive effect is slightly greater for judges in the most proximate
position than the presiding judge. In model 1, for example, the change in the predicted
probability for the presiding judge is 12.98 percent, about 1 percent greater than the most
proximate member on the panel. This makes intuitive sense, especially since the
presiding judge is the most tenured judge in active service and charged with dividing
labor equally among the circuit court panelist. This behavior, moreover, is much different
than the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court who has a preference to assign the majority
opinion to her more ideologically compatible colleagues (Maltzman and Wallbeck,
2005). The difference in the overall workload may provide one explanation for this
outcome. Since the lower federal courts are considered the workhorses of the federal
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judiciary, the presiding judge may choose to write the majority opinion to improve the
efficiency of the court and accommodate an ever-increasing workload.
The results also demonstrate that the formal roles can significantly influence
decisions to write the majority opinion. In model 1, for example, Chief Judge is
significant and negative (p < .01), suggesting that chief judges are less likely to write the
majority opinion. In charge of the day-to-day operations of the circuit, the results provide
further evidence that chief judges must be able to divide their time with other forms of
participation on the court. In model 2, however, Chief Judge*Multiple Issues is
significant and negative (p < .01), suggesting that likelihood of deferring the majority
opinion to a panel colleague depends on the number of issues or grievances involved in a
case. In other words, chief judges are willing to part ways with the majority opinion if the
assignment becomes too burdensome. Judge Designate, including the interaction effect,
Judge Designate*Multiple Issues, is insignificant in the model. Therefore, judges sitting
by designation are no more likely than Appeals Court judges to write the majority
opinion.
Conclusion
This chapter examined the extent to which the presiding judge assigns the
majority opinion to African American and Latino judges in cases dealing with
employment discrimination. It not only extends research that focuses on majority opinion
writing in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, but it also moves beyond more common predictors
of opinion writing found in the Supreme Court literature by focusing on the background
characteristics of judges. More specifically, this chapter argued that the presiding judge,
in an effort to achieve panel unanimity and improve perceptions of legitimacy of the
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panel’s decision, will be more likely to write select an African American or Latino judge
to write the majority opinion As judges who come to the bench with different points of
view, this chapter also tested the hypothesis that racial and ethnic minority judges will
take advantage of the presiding role by writing the majority opinion themselves.
This chapter finds partial support for the latter of the two arguments. Specifically,
it shows that the race and ethnicity of judges can have an important impact on the
decision-making of the presiding judge in Title VII discrimination cases. In the context of
race, the presiding judge is more likely to assign an African American judge to write the
majority opinion, but not necessarily Latino judges. Only when non-presiding Latino
judges and non-presiding white jurists are compared against one another do significant
differences emerge. In this instance, Latino judges are more likely than to write the
majority opinion when compared to other judges who do not have the power to assign the
majority opinion. The second major finding also shows that these differences are not
based upon the formal role of the presiding judge and power to assign majority opinions.
Rather, the results demonstrated that African American and Latino judges in the
presiding position are no more likely than their white colleagues to write the majority
opinion.
In all, the results have important implications for the substantive representation of
interests. Based on life experiences, previous research suggests that minority judges bring
with them a different voice to the bench, such as a sense of equitable justice (Goldman,
1978-1979). Not only do minority judges vote differently than their white colleagues
(Gotschall, 1983-1984; Scherer 2004-2005; Collins and Moyer, 2008), but they are also
more likely to write a separate dissenting opinion, apart from the majority panel
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(Hettinger et al. 2004ab). While voting on the merits gives judges the opportunity to take
positions on policy issues, judges can also file separate dissenting opinions to challenge
the legitimacy of a panel’s decision (Hettinger et al., 2003).
In addition to these other forms of participation, the majority opinion provides
another opportunity to be responsive. In comparison to separate opinion writing, the
majority opinion is at is at the core of the appeals courts’ ability to make policy (Songer
and Segal 1993). Over the years, the Supreme Court has made it more difficult for
appellants to prove that an employer’s decisions were based on racial animus and not on
some other non-discriminatory reason (Selmi, 2000-2001). By and large, this is because
employees must rely on circumstantial evidence to prove that the employer’s reason their
behavior was not legitimate and pretext for discrimination. In other words, an employer’s
decision was not pre-meditated with racial animus. This outcome is also reinforced by
inherent biases in the federal court system that place racial and ethnic minorities at a
distinct disadvantage (Selmi, 2000-2001). Consequently, the probability of winning a
case has been especially difficult for racial and ethnic minorities (Selmi, 2000-2001). By
authoring the majority decision, however, minority judges can moderate the content of
the decisions and promote policies that provide minorities appellants with greater
opportunities to win discrimination claims. In this chapter, I find evidence to suggest that
minority judges have opportunities to be more responsive to racial and ethnic minorities,
as African American and Latino judges are more likely to write the majority opinion in
Title VII cases.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
If we really want to talk in terms of creating equal justice in our courts,
cities and across the whole spectrum of options, it means that we have got
to be there; we have got to be a counterbalancing influence, to point out to
others what have been the highly significant unarticulated premises which
often are absolutely racist which they may not understand. ~ Judge A.
Leon Higginbotham

The Framers of the U.S. Constitution sought to establish a counter-majoritarian
institution that places important checks on legislative and executive authority. Through
the power of judicial review, federal judges can declare actions of the legislative and
executive branches invalid or unconstitutional. This ability to ensure the rights of the
minority, moreover, is reinforced by the independence of the court. Insulated from
internal and external political influences, federal judges are supposed to make impartial
decisions that are based on the facts of the case and guiding legal principles, such as
Framers intent, the Constitution, and legal precedent. In practice, however, the behavior
of federal judges is much different. Although guiding legal principles remain important
for understanding judicial decision-making to some degree (Bailey and Maltzman, 2011),
a wealth of scholarship demonstrates that federal-court judges not only rely on existing
legal principles to pursue their policy goals (Segal and Spaeth, 1993; Rhode and Spaeth,
1976; Rhode, 1972), but they also have a tendency to defer to the will of the majority by
being directly responsive to public opinion (Mishler and Sheehan, 1993, 1996). In this
context, the judicial branch has been often referred to as a “political institution” that
represents the will of the majority rather than one that is counter-majoritarian as the
Framers intended (Dahl, 1957).
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These majoritarian tendencies have been especially harmful towards specific
social groups in the U.S., including racial and ethnic minorities (Morin, 2005). From
slavery and land rights, to issues of citizenship and inclusion in the U.S. political system,
the Supreme Court has been selective in its willingness to grant full and equal rights
among all individuals in the U.S. The history of the federal courts as it relates to issues
of race and ethnicity has sparked much debate over the social composition of the courts
(Goldman, 1978-1979; Walker and Barrow, 1985). Critics of descriptive representation,
for example, generally take the position that judicial appointments should be based on
merit selection alone, arguing that selection of minorities can lead to heightened racial
and ethnic classifications, a decrease in the overall quality of decision-making, and extralegal influences that mitigate a more independent judiciary (see Goldman, 1978-1979).
Others, however, argue that racial, ethnic, and gender diversity in institutions is a
normative good (Mansbridge, 1999; Goldman, 1978-1979). Not only can the appointment
of racial and ethnic minorities improve positive attitudes towards government, but
African American and Latino judges may also bring with them different perspectives to
the bench that can compensate for past and continued injustices.
This dissertation entered into the debate by providing one of the first
comprehensive studies of African American and Latino judicial behavior in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals. Previous research has a tendency to analyze only one minority group,
such as African American judges across search and seizure cases (e.g. Scherer, 20042005) and Latino judges across employment discrimination cases (Manning, 2004).
Although certainly fruitful for understanding the role of descriptive representation in the
courtroom, the inability to control for both racial and ethnic groups across the same data
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has made it difficult to examine how racial and ethnic minority judges behave relative
their white colleagues on the bench and to one another. By controlling for both the race
and ethnicity of judges, therefore, this dissertation sought to test whether theory, which
has a tendency to assume that minority judges are monolithic in their behavior, is
applicable to African American and Latino judges across the same set of data.
The appellate courts provide an excellent opportunity to examine African
American and Latino Judicial behavior. First, appellate-court judges are considered to be
important policy makers where they “are called upon to monitor the performance of
federal district courts and agencies and to supervise their application and interpretation of
national and state laws” (Carp, Stidham, and Manning, 2004: 39-40). Second, the
appellate courts are divided into 12 regional circuits, which allows for greater diversity
within racial and ethnic groups. Finally, the collegial nature of the courts provides
opportunities to examine how racial and ethnic minority judges interact with their panel
colleagues. Random panel assignments also ensure that racial and ethnic minorities
interact with different colleagues within their circuit. Given this institutional setting,
therefore, this dissertation proposed three main research questions that takes into
consideration African American and Latino judicial behavior across both individual and
panel level settings:
1) Do African American judges come to the bench with a different and more
liberal voice?
2) Can African American and Latino judges influence panel outcomes that favor
claimants who come to defend or appeal their case?
3) Are African American and Latino more likely to write the majority opinion?
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To address these research questions, I relied on two overarching theories:
descriptive representation and small group theory that focuses “panel effects.” While the
theory of descriptive representation was important for explaining how African American
and Latino judges vote across salient policy issues, small group theory provided a
framework for understanding how racial and ethnic minority judges could overcome the
institution of majority rule and influence their panel colleagues. This dissertation also
contributed to our understanding of African Americana and Latino judicial behavior by
focusing on those factors that condition the judicial behavior. While the presence of
salient policy issues provides one condition, this dissertation emphasized the role of
claimant effects or co-racial and co-ethnic cues that can mediate the behavior of African
American and Latino judges. Based on these three arguments, I expected African
American and Latino judges to not only behave differently than their white colleagues,
but I also expected racial and ethnic minority judges to influence panel outcomes and the
decision to assign the majority opinion.
Summary of Results
Overall, the results from this dissertation provide partial support for my
hypotheses. In the context of individual voting behavior, African American judges are
more likely than non-Black judges to vote in favor of the claimant, especially when a
Black claimant is present. Latino judges, on the other hand, have a tendency to rule in the
opposite direction, as they are less likely to rule in favor of co-ethnic claimants and nonLatino claimants alike. These differences in behavior also continue to hold once the
social composition of the panel is taken into account, as African American and Latino
judges vote differently than their white panel colleagues on majority-white panels.
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Interestingly, the results also demonstrate that African American and Latino judges can
influence the voting behavior of their white-panel colleagues. Through mechanisms of
deliberation, specialization, and strategic bargaining, white judges sitting on racially and
ethnically diverse panels are likely to conform to the preferences of their Black and
Latino colleagues. In all, these differences in voting behavior suggest that discrimination,
which is central to understanding voting behavior among minority judges, may work
differently for both African American and Latino judges.
The results with regards to Latino judges should be interpreted with some
caution, however. Due to the under-representation of Latino judges, there was little
opportunity for Latino judges to rule on co-ethnic claimants. First, the results are only
interpretable insofar that they explain the behavior of Latino judges who have
participated in discrimination claims between 2001 and 2009. Of the 14 Latino judges
included in this study, only 5 Latino judges participated in a claim involving another
Latino. Regardless of their party affiliation, though, a clear majority of the decisions were
less than favorable towards other Latinos. Second, the results are largely driven the
presence of an outlier judge. In fact, a single Latino judge, Judge Carlos Lucero of the
Tenth Circuit, was responsible for many of the decisions involving another Latino
claimant. Despite being appointed by President Clinton, a Democratic president, and
having an ideology score of -.408 (liberal), Judge Lucero voted against another Latino
100 percent of the time. Given this more extreme behavior and the tendency to rule
against other Latinos claimants, I also decided to include a separate control variable for
Judge Carlos Lucero in the models focusing on individual voting behavior. However, the
tendency to vote against the claimant for Latino judges continues to hold.
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The results from this analysis also indicate that African American and Latino
judges are not marginalized in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Following small group theory,
which emphasizes social psychology explanations of behavior, the results demonstrate
that the presence of a single African American judge on a panel significantly increases
the probability of a decision that favors the claimant in Title VII discrimination claims.
However, the propensity to rule in favor of the claimant depends on the presence of a coracial claimant. Contrary to expectations, ethnically diverse panels have a tendency to
decrease the probability of a favorable outcome, regardless of having another Latino
claimant present. Taken together, the two findings suggest that claimant effects can have
varying effects on panel outcomes. In terms of co-racial cues, the presence of a Black
claimant can improve the quality of deliberation among African American judges. Since
Black judges tend to sit on majority-white panels, the results also suggest that racially
diverse panels, coupled with the presence of a Black claimant, can crystallize issues of
race among white jurists. The combined presence of a Latino judge and Latino claimant,
however, has a much different effect, as ethnically diverse panel are less likely to rule in
favor of other Latinos. Thus, Latino judges’ tendency to rule against the claimant may
motivate their white colleagues to rule against the claimant more generally.
As judges who come to the bench with different points of view, this dissertation
also tested the hypothesis that stated African American and Latino judges will be more
likely to write the majority opinion in Title VII employment discrimination cases. The
results show that the race and ethnicity of judges can have an important impact on the
decision-making of the presiding judge. In the context of race, the presiding judge is
more likely to assign an African American judge to write the majority opinion, but not
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necessarily Latino judges. Only when non-presiding Latino judges and non-presiding
white jurists are compared against one another, do significant differences between the
two groups emerge. The second major finding also shows that the propensity to write the
majority opinion is not based upon the formal position of the presiding judge. Instead of
using the power of the presiding position to their advantage, the results shows that
African American and Latino judges are as likely as their white colleagues to distribute
the majority opinion to their panel colleagues.
Explaining Latino Judicial Behavior
The results from the analysis demonstrate that African American and Latino
judges are not monolithic in behavior. Several explanations have been offered to explain
why there would be similarities in behavior. However, none fully explain the voting
behavior of Latino judges towards Title VII claims. First, the socialization hypothesis
maintains that minority judges may suppress their most preferred preferences. According
to this view, judges are subject to judicial norms and collegial peer-pressure that would
cause judges to conform to more dominant preferences within the circuit (Carp and
Wheeler 1972; Wasby, 1989). While the socialization hypothesis has been reinforced by
research that focuses on acclimation effects of freshman judges within the U.S. Courts of
Appeals (Martinek and Collins, 2008; Hettinger, Martinek, and Lindquist, 2004), this
argument has also been supported by more recent research that surveys Latinos in the
legal profession. For example, Cruz and Molina (2009) find that “experiences with
discrimination have led Latinas in the law to mask or disavow their identity in order to
assimilate within the dominant culture of their workplaces” (50). Similarly, Chavez
(2011) describes how a Latino lawyer spent his entire career trying to fit into the
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dominant culture by becoming the “white guy” (43). Although the respondent preferred
his carnitas and Budweiser to cheese and crackers, the respondent felt his attempt to fit in
was simply a part of business. After 20 years in of trying to play “the game,” the
respondent had finally decided that he had enough (Chavez, 2011: 43).
Second, Latino judges may simply represent a special cadre within their own
ethnic group (Manning, 2004: 11). According to this view, Latino judges will not rule
differently than white judges because they do not share the same experiences as the rest
of the Latino population. As judges in the federal judiciary, their socio-economic profile
does not mirror the rest of the Latino population. For example, Latinos jurists are highly
educated, hold professional occupations, such as judgeships at the state and local level,
and earn more income prior to being appointed to the bench (Goldman 1997; Slotnick
1983; Goldman and Saronson, 1994-1995). Moreover, Gryski, Zuk, and Barrow (1994)
find that Latino appointments are most strongly influenced by socio-economic status, as
political elites in charge of the appointment process have a tendency to respond to wellto-do communities.
Third, attitudes or ideological considerations may play a greater role than
background characteristics, such as race and ethnicity. Thus, Latino judicial behavior
may simply be a function of the appointment process and the ideological preferences of
the president and home-state senators. Indeed “scholars have noted the increasing
politicization of judicial appointments as interest groups have become more involved in
the judicial selection process, and Presidents increasingly seek and nominate appointees
who loosely reflect the political views of the administration” (Manning, 2004: 3; see also
Caldeira and Wright 1995). To consider this possibility, therefore, I controlled for
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ideology in the post-estimation results. However, the results from this analysis
demonstrate that judges’ ideology does not have any conditional effect on the behavior of
African American and Latino judges.
One alternative explanation that has yet to be fully explored focuses on intragroup relations involving authority-subordinate relationships. Following research that
focuses on gender, group roles, and mentoring in the workplace, Williams and Locke
(1999) hypothesize that female supervisors are more likely to perceive a sense of
mentorship with their female subordinates (see also Euwema and Van de Vliert, 1994).
Contrary to expectations, however, the authors find that female supervisors perceived the
least amount of mentoring behavior towards other female subordinates. To explain this
unintended result, the authors argued that women might treat their subordinates harsher
because they wish to become acclimated to the leadership styles that are favored in maledominated organizations. Facing barriers to upward mobility, this argument suggests that
female managers take on more masculine-oriented behaviors that emphasize
competitiveness, aggression, and independence (Wood, 1997).

As a result, female

managers are likely to become more direct and provoke a negative evaluation with their
subordinates (Wood, 1997). For example, Euwema and Van de Vliert (1994) find that
female managers are more likely to use forceful tactics with other female subordinates
during times of conflict. Ashcrarft and Pacanowsky (1996) also find that females in
female-dominated offices are more likely to distance themselves by claiming to not only
prefer their male coworkers to their female colleagues, but also prefer more masculine
standards.
Given this dissertation’s focus on intra-group relations, the above argument may
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also apply to Latinos jurists ruling on other Latino claimants. In comparison to African
American judges, the appointment of Latino jurists is relatively recent phenomenon.
However, racial and ethnic minorities have a tendency to experience barriers to upward
mobility, as the duration for Senate confirmation takes twice as long for minority
appointees than whites (e.g. Nixon and Goss, 2001). Therefore, Latino judges may very
well experience similar acclimation effects that provoke more negative responses to coethnic claimants. As Justice Thurgood Marshall noted, “members of minority groups
frequently respond to discrimination and prejudice by attempting to disassociate
themselves from the group, even to the point of adopting the majority’s negative attitudes
towards the minority” (Schaerer, 2008: 5). In all, this argument is reinforced by two
studies that focus on Latino judicial behavior. In the U.S. District Courts, Manning
(2004) finds that Latino judges tend to rule against the claimant across criminal and civil
rights and liberty cases. At the state level, Holmes et al. (1993) also find similar results,
as Latino judges are more likely than their white colleagues to rule against Latino and
white defendants. Taken together, the findings in this dissertation suggest that Latino
judicial behavior holds across both federal and state courts.
Explaining Differences in Behavior between Latino and African American Judges
In all, these differences in judicial behavior beg the question: why do African
American judges behave differently than Latinos judges? Perceptions of linked fate may
be the one possible answer to this question. The concept of linked fate refers to the belief
that one’s own life chances are connected to their racial group (Dawson, 1994: 5).
Focusing on the African American experience in the United States, Dawson (1994)
argues that the legacy of slavery and shared experiences with discrimination have led
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Blacks to substitute their individual preferences in exchange for group preferences (see
also Tate, 1993). Also known as the Black Utility Heuristic, this process is triggered by
the presence of racial cues (McClain et al., 2009), including explicit messages across
non-racialized policies (White, 2007). So long as race remains important, Dawson (1994)
suggests, it is efficient for African Americans to believe that their individual fates are tied
to the Black community (61).
While the concept has been used by scholars to explain African Americans’ nearmonolithic support for the Democratic Party and policies supporting the African
American community (Dawson, 1994; Hochschild, 1995; McClain, Johnson Carew,
Walton, and Watts, 2009; Sanchez, 2006b; Tate, 1993), there is good reason to believe
that linked fate may play an important role in the behavior of African American judges.
One of Dawson’s (1994) more notable findings is that perceptions of linked fate
transcend class divisions. From catching a taxi at night to being stopped by the police, the
finding suggest that African American elites are as likely as other Blacks to experience
random acts of racism (Espinoza and Harris, 1997). In 1993, for example, an African
American judge was arrested on suspicion for using a stolen credit card at an upscale
shopping mall in New Jersey. Despite showing his identification and adamantly denying
the charges, the police took him into custody where he was chained to a wall for three
and a half hours (Margolick, 1994). Since middle-class status does not necessarily
decrease the likelihood of encountering discrimination (Ifill, 2000: 437), African
Americans, including African American judges, are likely to continue to view race as
salient.
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Perceptions of discrimination are also apparent among African Americans in the
legal profession. For example, over 90 percent of African American lawyers believe that
racial bias exists in the justice system and that racism in the justice system is the same or
greater than other segments of society (Carter, 1999). These attitudes are also shared
among African American judges. In comparison to 83 percent of White judges, for
example, only 18 percent of Blacks share the belief that black litigants are treated fairly
in the justice system (Lyels, 1997: 237). Perceptions of discrimination, moreover, are
reinforced by two-thirds of lawyers who say they have personally witnessed racial bias in
the legal system over the past three years (Carter, 1999). Since perceptions of linked fate
transcend class divisions and because African Americans in the legal profession continue
to view race as salient, there is reason to believe that African American judges will be
more likely than white judges to support policy issues affecting the African American
community
More recently, scholars of group identity have also applied the concept of linked
fate to pan-ethnic groups, including Latinos (Barreto, Masuoka, and Sanchez, 2008;
Sanchez, 2006ab; Sanchez and Masuoka, 2010; Stokes, 2006; Masuoka, 2006; Miller,
Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk, 1981). In comparison to African Americans, though,
research suggests that the pathways to linked fate are much different for Latinos (Sanchez
and Masuoka, 2010; Masuoka, 2006), as Sanchez and Masuoka (2010) find income to be
negatively correlated with perceptions of linked fate. Different from African Americans,
therefore, wealthier Latinos are less likely to believe their life chances are inherently
linked with other Latinos. These last findings may also apply to Latinos judges,
especially since the background characteristics of Latinos in the federal courts do not
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mirror the rest of the Latino population.
Implications for Substantive Representation
The results from this dissertation have important implications for the relationship
between descriptive and substantive representation. Since the early 1990s, there has been
much debate over the merits of descriptive representation and whether or not diversity in
representative institutions can translate into substantive representation of interests for
racial and ethnic minorities. Most notably, Swain (1993), in her study of congressional
representatives, finds that white Members of Congress can represent Black constituents
as effectively as African American MCs. Although there is value in descriptive
representation, Swain (1993) goes on to reason that it is the goal of re-election that
motivates the behavior of representatives, regardless of their race and ethnicity. Since this
seminal work, however, the research focusing on descriptive representation generally
finds that racial and ethnic minorities, including Latinos and African American
representatives, are more responsive by pursuing policies that promote the interests of
their respective groups at the national (Casellas, 2011; Cannon, 1999; Whitby, 1997; Kerr
and Miller, 1997; Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran, 1996; Tate, 2003; Welch and
Hibbing, 1994; but see Swain, 1993; Hero and Tolbert, 1995); and local levels of
government (Casellas, 2011; Bratton and Haynie, 1999; Bratton, 2006; Kerr and
Mladenka, 1994; but see Mladenka, 1989). Contrary to Swain’s (1993) research,
therefore, this research ultimately suggests that racial and ethnic minorities can do a
better job at representing their respective communities.
This dissertation adds to this larger discussion of descriptive and substantive
representation by focusing on the behavior of African American and Latino judges in the
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lower federal courts. The findings from this dissertation show that some descriptive
representatives (i.e. African American judges) are responsive to their respective
communities in Title VII employment discrimination cases. Over the years, there has
been a substantial increase in the number of employment discrimination claims. For
example, the number of cases exponentially grew from 8,303 in 1991 to 23,772 in 1998,
representing a 286 percent increase. Title VII cases, moreover, constitute the bulk of
employment discrimination cases (Clermont and Schwab, 2009, 2004). In comparison to
other types of claims, such disability and age discrimination, claims based on
employment accounted for 68.38 percent (64,122) of all Title VII claims between 1998
and 2006.
However, the likelihood of winning employment discrimination claims has been
extremely low (Selmi, 2001; Selmi, 2011; Clermont and Schwab, 2009, 2004). Between
1979 and 2006, federal plaintiffs won 15 percent of job discrimination cases while the
win rate for all other civil cases is about 51 percent (Clermont and Schwab, 2009). In
Title VII discrimination claims, the win rate among plaintiffs was 10.88 percent, about 4
percentage points lower than employment discrimination claims combined. Despite these
small successes, however, appellate-court judges typically reverse these pro-plaintiff
decisions, rendering the total number of plaintiff success far lower than those coming out
of the U.S. District Courts. Between 1988 and 2000, for example, the U.S. Courts of
Appeals reversed 42.76 percent of the District Court decisions. By contrast, only 10.12
percent of the decisions were reversed favoring the defendant. (see also Clermont and
Schwab, 2004). This dissertation, moreover, shows that the success rate was about 25%
for Title VII claims filed between 2001 and 2009.
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The declining number of Title VII claims, coupled with the propensity to reverse
decisions in favor of the defendant, has caused some to speculate about why
discrimination claims are so hard to win (Selmi, 2001). In the context of Title VII cases,
Selmi (2000-2001) reasons that negative attitudes towards race have served as a frame for
analyzing evidence, drawing inferences and conclusion based on ambiguous evidence
(Selmi, 2000-2001). Assuming that the role of discrimination has sharply diminished, this
mindset has caused judges to be more hesitant to draw inferences of racial discrimination
based on circumstantial evidence, even though the court has long recognized that race
discrimination is generally more subtle (Selmi, 2000-2001, 2011). 47 Not surprisingly,
employees and their lawyers have become discouraged at their chances of winning, “as
the plaintiff-side’s learning curve has dictated a decline in the filings” (Clermont and
Schwab, 2004, 188). For example, Joe Whatley Jr., an attorney for New York said, “We
will no longer take individual employment-discrimination cases, because there's such a
high likelihood of losing” (Koppel, 2009).

47

For example, Melvin Hicks, an African American male, was working as a supervisor for a correctional

facility. Contrary to common practice, Hicks was disciplined for infractions of his subordinates and was
singled out following a change in management. The management also wanted to reassert control of the
prison facility in response to a report suggesting that having too many African American supervisors might
have had a deleterious effect on inmate discipline. Despite mounting evidence against the correctional
facility, the Supreme Court ruled that the reasons were due to personal rather than racial animus. Justice
Souter, however, dissented from the opinion. He argued that, “a different judge, working through a
different mindset, one where discrimination may be more readily accepted as an explanation, would have
interpreted the evidence differently” (see Selmi, 200-2001).
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Diversity in the courts, however, can help compensate for such difficulties in two
important ways. First, African American judges, can contribute to the development of
Title VII policies by crystallizing issues of race and ethnicity to their panel colleagues.
Assuming that African American judges are on the winning side of the panel decision,
they will have greater opportunities to challenge the content of majority opinions that can
act as possible barriers to more winnable claims in the future. Second, they will have
greater opportunities to write the majority opinion. Indeed, the majority is at is at the core
of the appeals courts’ ability to make policy (Songer and Segal, 1993). Judges can use the
majority opinion to clarify the interpretation of law, not only to help fulfill their error
correction responsibilities, but also to set legal precedent, which serves as important
guidelines for lower federal courts and administrative agencies. The majority opinion
also gives judges in the presiding position the opportunity to set the policy agenda
(Maltzman and Wahlbeck, 2004: 551). This agenda setting-power is reinforced by
internal rules and procedures that give the authoring judge the power to circulate the
initial draft to her panel colleagues for approval. Consequently, judges can determine the
scope of issues that are initially addressed at the onset of conference.
The study also provides an added dimension to the study of descriptive
representation by examining the more direct impact diversity can have on claimants
themselves. In the U.S. Courts of Appeals, Black claimants are over-represented in cases
involving Title VII employment discrimination claims. Between 2001 and 2009, for
example, Black claimants accounted for 63.96 percent of Title VII claims adjudicated in
the intermediary courts. Interestingly, though, the results from this analysis demonstrate
that Black claimants are as likely as other claimants, including white, Asian American,
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and Middle Eastern claimants to win their appeals case. Still, there is cause for concern
since claimants generally lose on appeal. African American judges, therefore, can level
the playing field by being more responsive to other Blacks when they go to appeal or
defend their case. Not only does the presence of an African American judge increase the
probability of a favorable vote, but racially diverse panels can also increases the
probability of a favorable outcome, as African American judges are capable of
influencing their white panel colleagues. The effect, moreover, is quite substantial, as the
racial diversity increase the probability of a favorable panel outcome by 32 percent, more
than 14% increase than panels consisting of all white judges. As Welch, Combs, and
Gruhl (1998) reason, “this level of responsiveness may ultimately ensure that racial and
ethnic minorities do not receive harsher treatment than they deserve” (127). Still, Black
claimants may continue to face an uphill battle since African Americans continue to be
under-represented in the U.S. Courts of Appeals and the lower federal courts more
generally.
In comparison to Black claimants, though, the results suggest that Latinos may
not necessarily be at a disadvantage. In the U.S. Courts of Appeals, for example, Latinos
represent about 12 percent (489) of claims adjudicated between 2001 and 2009. Different
from Black claimants, though, Latino claimants are more likely than non-Latino
claimants to win on appeal. Although Latino judges are less likely to rule in favor of
other Latinos, these decisions only account for 35 observations during the period of
study. This is not to suggest, however, that all Latinos have been treated equally, as some
Latinos in this analysis were racially black and therefore included in the African
American category. Although there were not enough observations to examine how Afro-
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Latinos fare in the appeals courts, research focusing on the relationship between skin
color and discriminations suggests that darker-skinned Latinos will be as likely as other
Black claimants to win their case.
Based on these results, there is good reason to believe that the courts will continue
to be a viable alternative to the other institutions. Over the years, African Americans and
Latinos have relied on a “legal strategy” to pursue their policy agenda and compensate
for the lack of representation in Congress and state legislative institutions. However,
increasing levels of diversity (Rocca and Sanchez, 2011) and significant gains in
committee leadership positions (Rocca, Sanchez, and Morin, 2010), has given racial and
ethnic minorities more opportunities to be successful at passing legislation, if not more
success, in Congress than in previous years. In their analysis of legislative effectiveness,
Rocca and Sanchez (2011) report that “bills sponsored by Black MCs were more likely to
pass each stage of the legislative process during Democratic Congresses than those
sponsored by non-Latino whites” (17). Latinos MCs, on the other hand, where as likely
as non-Latino whites to report bills out of the committee, pass legislation in the House,
and succeed in turning legislation into law. Similar to the courts, therefore, the findings
indicate that minority legislators are not as marginalized in legislative institutions as
previous research demonstrates (see Bratton and Haynie, 1999).
Assuming that the lower federal courts continue to become more racially and
ethnically diverse, racial and ethnic minorities may wish to continue to rely on the legal
strategy to challenge legislation that is salient to racial and ethnic minorities. First, the
ever-increasing workload in the lower federal courts provides more opportunities to
interpret and refine legislation, such as Title VII legislation. Second, minority members
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of Congress tend pass legislation that benefits their concerns of their districts. For
example, Rocca and Sanchez (2011) demonstrate that minority MCs are more effective at
passing non-minor pieces of legislation, such as land and water rights, operation bills on
District of Columbia affairs, and government property management. Still, the success of
passing civil rights and other minority pieces of legislation seem to be somewhat limited
in comparison. This is not surprising, though, especially since civil rights issues represent
polarizing interests that may not find the same kind of support among other members of
Congress (Preuhs, 2006; Hawkewsorth, 2004; Bratton and Haine, 1999; 672).

Limitations of Dissertation and Future Areas of Research
This dissertation prompts further investigation into the study of African American
and Latino judicial behavior. First, a new direction of research is to examine those factors
that explain why Latino and African American judges behave the way they do. Previous
research on the subject has a tendency to assume that all minorities, regardless of their
race and ethnicity, behave differently than their white colleagues. However, this study
finds that African American and Latino judges are not as monolithic in their behavior as
originally theorized. Future research needs to address this new puzzle by developing a
survey instrument that examines the extent to which discrimination plays a motivating
role in Latino and African American judicial behavior. Following previous work on state
representatives (Hardy-Fanta, Sierra, Lien, Pinderhughes, and Davis, 2005), an ideal
survey would include a battery of questions that capture the life experiences of Latino
and African American judges, from early adolescence to their careers in the legal
profession. The survey would also include questions that attempt to identify the
motivations behind going to law school and pursuing a career in law. Finally, it would
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include measures of group consciousness or linked fate to capture judges’ perceptions of
group solidarity. In all, a survey of Latino and African American judges will contribute
significantly to our understanding of judicial behavior, race and ethnicity, and
representation.
From a theoretical standpoint, future research should also consider the national
origin of both Latino judges and claimants. In the U.S. Courts of Appeals, Latino jurists
come from diverse generational and ancestral backgrounds, including Mexico, Puerto
Rico, and Spain. The presence of a Latino appellant may, therefore, generate a weaker
cue for Latino judges. The term “Latino,” is a pan-ethnic term that incorporates
individuals who originate from diverse national origins throughout Latin America and the
Iberian Peninsula (Garcia and Sanchez, 2008). Based on different historical legacies and
immigration experiences, de la Garza et al. (1992) argues that Latinos cannot be expected
to share a sense of commonality. This argument is reinforced by studies that find that
Latinos are more likely to identify with their national origin than pan-ethnic labels, such
as Hispanic or Latinos (de la Garza et al., 1992; Jones Correa and Leal, 1996). Recent
work also suggests that Latinos’ national origin can play a meaningful role in
understanding the relationship between descriptive and symbolic representation. For
example, Sanchez and Morin (2011), find that the presence of co-ethnic mayors can
heighten perceptions of liked fate among their constituents. Therefore, Latinos from
diverse national origins may not necessarily evoke a sense of shared group membership
for Latino judges. In all, the ability to control for the both the judges’ and appellants’
national origin would greatly improve our understanding of Latino judicial behavior
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Finally, this study is only generalizable in so far that it speaks to Title VII
discrimination cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Therefore, one should be cautious in
its generalizability to other policy issues. Still, these findings can provide a platform for
future studies across other policy issues. Previous research, for example, has focused on
criminal cases, such as those surrounding discrimination and crime (Scherer 2004-2005;
Gottschall, 1983). More recent studies have even narrowed their case selection by
focusing more exclusively on search and seizure cases and cases dealing more
specifically with employment discrimination and affirmative action (Scherer 2004-2005;
Farhang and Wawro, 2004; Kastellec, forthcoming).

While certainly fruitful for

examining the effect that diversity can have on behavior, researchers should move
beyond these topics to examine other policy areas, such as immigration policy (but see
Williams, n. d). Over the years, the issue of immigration has become increasingly salient
for Latinos. In 2006, for example, more than 54 percent of Latinos believed that the
debates contributed to an increase in discrimination (Pew Hispanic Center, 2006).
Although Latinos generally share positive attitudes towards immigrants, Latinos are more
likely to believe that the United States should reduce the number of immigrants entering
into the United States (Hood and Morris 1997: Hood III, Morris, and Shirkey 1997; de la
Garza et al. 1992; Burns and Gimpel, 2000; but see Leal 2007). A more recent pole
conducted by Latino Decisions, however, indicates that Latinos, regardless of their
national background, regional location, and socio-economic status, generally support
immigration policies that favor immigrant rights, such as the Dream Act, and believe that
anti-Latino sentiment will be a strong motivating force for choosing who Latinos will
vote for in the upcoming 2012 presidential election.
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The inclusion of immigration policy also provides an additional avenue to
examine Black-Brown relations at the elite level. While Anglos maintain the most
negative views towards the flow of immigrants into the U.S. (Leal, 2007), African
Americans are less likely than Latinos to advocate reducing levels of legal immigration
(Citrin, Greene and Wong 1997; but see Leal 2007). Overall, these attitudes, at least for
African Americans, can be largely attributed to two factors: 1) lack of social contact,
which can foster negative attitudes and stereotypes of immigrants and Latinos more
generally (Bobo and Massagli, 2001; Bobo et al., 1994; Dyer, Vedlitz, and Worchel,
1989; Mindiola, Neimann, and Rodriguez, 2002; Kaufmann, 2005; Oliver and Wong,
2003) and, 2) perception of competition over a number of finite resources, such as jobs,
housing, and other government resources (Alozie and Ramirez, 1999; Johnson and
Oliver, 1989; Oliver and Johnson, 1984; Kaufmann, 2003; Mindiola, Niemann, and
Rodriguez, 2002; but see McClain and Karnig, 1990; McClain, 1993; McClain and
Tauber, 1998, 2001). Consequently, I would expect African American judges to have
more negative attitudes towards immigrants and Latino immigrants in particular.
From a policy perspective, the issue of immigration has become just as
contentious in the federal courts. The Supreme Court and the lower federal courts, more
importantly, have adhered to the “plenary power” doctrine by deferring authority to
Congress and Executive agencies in immigration cases. In Chevron U.S. A., Inc V.
Natrual Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984), the Supreme Court requires the lower
federal courts to defer “reasonable agency interpretation of ambiguous statutes for which
the agency has authority to administer” (Slocum 2008, 370). Accordingly, “the Court’s
decision to defer its power rests on the assumption that administrative law agencies have
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greater expertise and more democratic accountability than courts” (Cox 2007: 1682). In
more recent years, however, federal judges have become more skeptical of the
immigration courts and their rulings (Cox 2007).1 For example Judge Posner has argued
that “the adjudication of [immigration] cases at the administrative level has fallen below
the minimum standards of legal justice” (Cox 2007: 1769). Despite the assumption of
expertise and democratic accountability, moroever, Judge Posner has questioned the
immigration agencies ability to handle both legal and factual questions, labeling past
decisions as “arbitrary, unreasoned, irrational, inconsistent, and uninformed” (Cox 2007,
1680). Consequently, the U.S. Courts of Appeals have taken a larger role in dealing with
those issues surrounding immigration policy
In all, this new role has led to some interesting divisions over the interpretation of
Supreme Court prcedent. As the topic of immigration has been pushed to the forefront of
U.S. politics, U.S. Courts of Appeals has been espcially divided over cases involving the
deportation of immigrants. According to CFR 1003.4, for example, “if a non-citizen
departs the United States while his appeal of a deportation order is pending, his departure
withdraws that appeal” (Ungaro 2009: 467). At the center of the debate is the meaning of
“departure,” and whether an immigrant left the country voluntary or involuntary.
Although the Bureau of Immigration Affairs is charged with determining the legal
meaning of the statute, the court has generally been inconsistent in its interpretation,
endorsing both positions (Ungaro 2009, 475). Not surprisingly, the lack of consistency
has trickled down to the Courts of Appeals. While some courts reason that ambiguity of
the law dictates that voluntary and involuntary departures should treated the same, other
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contend that involuntary departures should not constitute the withdrawal of their appeals
(Ungaro, 2009).
Final Remarks
This dissertation entered into the debate that contests the importance of
descriptive representation in the courts. Focusing on the latter of the two merits of
descriptive representation, this study concludes that descriptive representation can lead to
substantive policy outcomes. However, the results from this dissertation demonstrate only
partial support for my hypotheses. Highlighting the role of claimant effects, this
dissertation demonstrates that African American and Latino judges are not monolithic in
their behavior. While African American judges are more likely rule in favor of Black
claimants, Latino judges demonstrate much different behavior, as they are less likely to
rule in favor of Latino and non-Latino claimants alike. At the panel level, a similar
pattern also emerges, as the presence of an African American and Latino judge can have
different substantive effects on panel outcomes. Not only do African American and
Latino judges demonstrate influence over their panel colleagues, but they are also more
likely write the majority opinion and craft policy.
In the context of the courts, this dissertation calls for further efforts to improve the
racial and ethnic composition of the lower federal courts. Although Latino and African
American judges leads to different substantive outcomes, this dissertation holds that
diversification is a normative good (see Mansbridge, 1999). Although the federal
judiciary is the least understood of the three branches of government, the lack of visibility
does not negate importance of having diverse institutions that “look like America”
(Goldman 1978-1979). First, it can provide a sense of trust. In comparison to whites,
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African Americans and Latinos are more skeptical of the notion they receive equal
treatment, are less trusting of court authorities, and believe courtroom decisions are
influenced by political considerations (Brooks and Jeon-Slaughter, 2001; Rottman, 2000:
6). Second, racial and ethnic minorities can improve these negative perceptions by acting
as role models and compensating for historical and continued injustices (Phillips, 1998, p.
228; see also Mansbridge, 1999). These expectations, moreover, are shared among judges
themselves, as African American judges believe descriptive representation to be
important for building a sense of equal justice and trust towards the judiciary (Smith,
1983). In turn, the presence of a diverse judiciary that “looks like America” is said to
contribute to the perception that the judicial branch is a legitimate institution (Walker and
Barrow, 1985: 597). Finally, diversification of the courts can lead to greater perceptions
of institutional legitimacy (Blank and Scherer, 2010). Given the lack of enforcement
powers within the judiciary, perceptions legitimacy is especially crucial for a judiciary
that is independent.
Given these normative goods, presidents should continue to improve upon the
courts racial and ethnic composition. Since 2008, President Obama has followed in the
footsteps of predecessors by appointing 8 African Americans and 4 Latinos to the U.S.
Courts of Appeals within his first four years as president. Although these appointments
have simply maintained the overall representation of African American and Latinos on
the appeals-court bench, there has been some notable appointment with regards to Latino
jurists. For example, President Obama appointed, Judge Adalberto Jordan, the first Cuban
to the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The president has also contributed to the intermediary
courts’ growing diversity by appointing the second Latina, Mary Helen Murguia, to the
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9th Circuit Courts of Appeals. Finally, President Obama appointed Jimmie Reyena of
Tucumcari, NM, who became the first minority to be confirmed in Federal Circuit Court
history.
However, the appointment of African American and Latino judges should not
only be limited to African American and Latino judges. Although African American and
Latinos represent the two largest minority populations, future presidential administrations
should also make a concerted effort to appoint Asian American and American Indian
judges to the lower federal courts. Currently, the federal courts consist of 1 American
Indian judge and 19 Asian American judges, though only 3 Asian Americans sit on the
U.S. Courts of Appeals. Of these three appointments, President Obama most recently
appointed Jacqueline Hong-Ngoc Nguyen and Denny Chin Denny. Born in Hong Kong
and Vietnam, respectively, the two appointments not only reflect an attempt to make the
courts look more like American electorate, but they also demonstrate the rich diversity
within the Asian American community.
As the lower federal courts become more diverse, researchers will be able to
improve upon their ability to address questions surrounding the behavior of racial and
ethnic minority groups and the conditional role of claimant effects. For example, do
Asian American judges behave differently than their white colleagues and how does their
voting behavior compare to African American and Latino jurists? Also, does the presence
of co-ethnic cues have a positive effect on the voting behavior of Asian American
judges? Do claimant effects also hold across other policy issues, such as immigration?
Finally, teasing out the race and ethnicity of claimants, how do judges behave towards
claimants with different racial and ethnic characteristics? In all, this dissertation provides
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a comprehensive examination of African American and Latino judicial behavior by
focusing on individual voting behavior, panel outcomes, and majority opinion writing.
Moreover, it provides an important first step towards understanding the role of claimant
cues in African American and Latino judicial behavior.
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APPENDIX A: Validity Tests for Individual-Level Analysis
Table A.1: List of Latino and African American Judges who participated in a Title VII Employment
Discrimination Claim between 2001 and 2009.
Latino Judge
African American Judge
Name
Court
Appointing
Appointing
Name
Court
President
President
th
Arthur Alarcon
9
Carter
Algenon L, Marbley
S. D. Ohio
W. Bush
Carlos F Lucero
10th
Clinton
Allyson K. Duncan
4th
W. Bush
th
nd
Carlos T. Bea
6
W. Bush
Amalya L. Kearse
2
Carter
Cecilia Altonoga
S. D. Florida W. Bush
Ann Claire Williams
7th
Clinton
th
Edward C. Prado
5
W. Bush
Brian Stacy Miller
E. D. Arkansas W. Bush
Emilio M. Garza
5th
H. W. Bush Carl E. Stewart
5th
Clinton
th
Fortunato P. Benavides 5
Clinton
Damon Jerome Keith
6th
Carter
nd
Jose A. Carbanes
2
Clinton
Denise Page Hood
E.D. Michigan Clinton
Juan R. Torruella
1st
Reagan
Eric Lee Clay
6th
Clinton
rd
Julio M. Fuentes
3
Clinton
Harry T. Edwards
D.C.
Carter
Kim Wardlaw
9th
Clinton
Janice Rogers Brown
D.C
W. Bush
th
Richard A. Paez
9
Clinton
Jerome Farris
Carter
Rosemary Barkett
11th
Clinton
Jonnie B. Rawlinson
9th
Clinton
nd
Sonia Sotomayor
2
Clinton
Judith W. Rogers
D.C.
Clinton
Lavenski R. Smith
8th
W. Bush
Michael J. Davis
D. Minnesota
Clinton
th
Nathaniel R. Jones
6
Clinton
Ransey Guy Cole, Jr.
6th
Clinton
th
Roger L. Gregory
4
W. Bush
Theodore A. Mckee
3rd
Clinton
th
Theodore A. McMillian 8
Carter
N=14 (5 Republicans; 9 Democrats)
N=21 (6 Republicans; 15 Democrats)
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Table A.2: Logistic Model of Judicial Behavior in the U.S. Court of Appeals (2001-2009)
Model 5 (Constrained Model)
Model 6 (Full Model)
SE
Discrete
Discrete
SE
Variables
Coef.
Robust
Change
Coef.
Change
Robust
(min  max)
(min max)
Background Characteristics
Latino Judge

-1.220***

0.473

-0.1481

---

---

0.334**

0.195

---

---

Female Judge

0.305**

Born in South

Latino Judge*Latino Claimant
African American Judge
African American Judge*Black
Claimant

-0.950***

0.410

-0.1246

---

-1.224*

1.075

-0.1439

0.0615

-0.156

0.300

-0.0257

---

0.688**

0.348

0.1364

0.169

0.0549

0.314**

0.168

0.0566

0.039

0.168

0.0067

0.029

0.168

0.0049

Age of Judge

-0.001

0.009

-0.0067

0.000

0.009

-0.0027

Former Prosecutor

-0.090

0.162

-0.0153

-0.113

0.162

-0.0192

Ivy League Education

-0.201†

0.174

-0.0333

-0.212*

0.172

-0.0351

Designate Judge

-0.117

0.290

-0.0195

-0.120

0.293

-0.0199

-0.411***

0.216

-0.0837

-0.456***

0.211

-0.0932

0.284

0.0874

Attitudes & Strategic Interaction
Judge Ideology

0.474†

Ideology of Panel Median

0.452

0.290

0.0836

Ideology of Circuit Median

-0.628

0.625

-0.0962

-0.636

0.623

-0.0975

Ideology of Supreme Court
Median

0.376

1.046

0.0789

0.429

1.043

0.0903

Lower Court Decision (Favorable
Vote)

2.156***

0.217

0.4826

2.169***

0.219

0.4851
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Table A.2 (cont.): Logistic Model of Judicial Behavior in the U.S. Court of Appeals (2001-2009)
Case Facts
Amicus Curiae Brief
Discrimination Case

0.750**
-0.036

0.265

0.1509

0.138

-0.0061

0.807**
-0.044

0.265

0.164

0.137

-0.0076

Hostile Work Environment Case

0.373†

0.161

0.0688

0.364†

0.161

0.0669

Latino Claimant

0.604*

0.277

0.1162

0.651*

0.289

0.126

Black Claimant

-0.178

0.172

-0.031

-0.252

0.178

-0.044

Asian Claimant

-0.250

0.375

-0.0401

-0.241

0.372

-0.0387

0.135

0.348

0.0239

0.108

0.340

0.019

-2.912***

0.718

-0.2082

-2.729***

0.757

-0.2046

Middle Eastern Claimant
American Indian Claimant
Circuit Norms
1st Circuit

-2.078**

0.609

-0.1962

-2.050**

0.607

-0.1947

nd

-0.282

0.417

-0.0448

-0.214

0.410

-0.0346

rd

-1.091†

0.463

-0.1349

-1.077†

0.452

-0.1336

th

-1.162†

0.494

-0.1439

-1.122†

0.492

-0.1404

th

-0.507

0.559

-0.0765

-0.475

0.551

-0.0722

th

-0.440

0.413

-0.0674

-0.383

0.407

-0.0595

th

-1.831**

0.468

-0.2471

-1.769**

0.459

-0.2402

th

8 Circuit

-0.954†

0.470

-0.1365

-0.917

0.463

-0.132

10th Circuit

-0.171

0.472

-0.0281

-0.129

0.464

-0.0214

11 Circuit

-1.549*

0.592

-0.1728

-1.489*

0.586

-0.1687

D.C. Circuit

-1.251†

0.582

-0.1549

-1.150

0.575

-0.1461

2 Circuit
3 Circuit
4 Circuit
5 Circuit
6 Circuit
7 Circuit

th

Yearly Controls
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Table A.2 (cont.): Logistic Model of Judicial Behavior in the U.S. Court of Appeals (2001-2009)
2002
0.294
0.405
0.0543
0.287
0.404

0.0529

2003

-0.405

0.323

-0.0642

-0.404

0.322

-0.064

2004

-0.077

0.383

-0.013

-0.086

0.381

-0.0146

2005

-0.155

0.521

-0.0256

-0.138

0.525

-0.0229

2006

-0.227

0.257

-0.037

-0.237

0.254

-0.0384

2007

-1.190**

0.302

-0.1527

-1.201***

0.300

-0.1536

2008

-0.511

0.403

-0.0773

-0.503

0.398

-0.0761

2009

-0.238

0.590

-0.0384

-0.269

0.589

-0.043

Constant
0.095
0.806
0.059
0.797
N
3,985
3,985
Log pseudo likelihood
-1919.4224
-1914.0917
% Correctly Predicted
78.17%
78.09%
† p < .10, two-tailed; *p < .05, two-tailed; **p < .01, two-tailed; ***p < .001, two-tailed.
Note: The model serves as a validity check on the individual voting behavior of African American and Latino
judges by clustering around the panel instead of the individual judge. The dependent variable is a vote in favor of
racial and ethnic minorities. Both models cluster around panel (1,329 clusters).
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Table A.3: Logistic Model of Judicial Behavior in the U.S. Court of Appeals (2001-2009)
Model 7 (Cluster Around Judge)
Model 8 (Cluster Around Panel)
Discrete
Discrete
SE
SE
Variables
Coef.
Change
Coef.
Change
Robust
Robust
(min  max)
(min  max)
Background Characteristics
Judge Carlos F. Lucero

-2.542***

0.559

-0.2006

-2.542***

0.559

-0.2006

Latino Judge

-0.723†

0.376

-0.101

-0.723**

0.376

-0.101

African American Judge

0.309

0.193

0.0565

0.309**

0.193

0.0565

Female Judge

0.309†

0.170

0.0554

0.309**

0.170

0.0554

Born in South

0.077

0.168

0.0133

0.077

0.168

0.0133

Age of Judge

0.000

0.009

-0.0027

0.000

0.009

-0.0027

Former Prosecutor

-0.106

0.161

-0.018

-0.106

0.161

-0.018

Ivy League Education

-0.203

0.173

-0.0336

-0.203†

0.173

-0.0336

Designate Judge

-0.096

0.290

-0.0159

-0.096

0.290

-0.0159

-0.492***

0.209

-0.1006

Attitudes & Strategic
Interaction
Judge Ideology
Ideology of Panel Median

-0.492*

0.209

-0.1006

0.501†

0.291

0.0919

0.501

0.291

0.0919

Ideology of Circuit Median

-0.591

0.626

-0.0901

-0.591

0.626

-0.0901

Ideology of Supreme Court
Median

0.481

1.045

0.1016

0.481

1.045

0.1016

Lower Court Decision
(Favorable Vote)

2.139***

0.217

0.4785

2.139***

0.217

0.4785

Amicus Curiae Brief

0.756**

0.267

0.152

0.756**

0.267

0.152
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Table A.3 (cont.): Logistic Model of Judicial Behavior in the U.S. Court of Appeals (2001-2009)
Discrimination Case
-0.044
0.139
-0.0076
-0.044
0.139
-0.0076
Hostile Work Environment
Case

0.370*

0.162

0.068

0.370†

0.162

0.068

Latino Claimant

0.595*

0.283

0.1141

0.595*

0.283

0.1141

Black Claimant

-0.188

0.175

-0.0326

-0.188

0.175

-0.0326

Asian Claimant

-0.258

0.371

-0.0412

-0.258

0.371

-0.0412

0.097

0.333

0.0169

0.097

0.333

0.0169

-2.899***

0.714

-0.2071

-2.899***

0.714

-0.2071

Middle Eastern Claimant
American Indian Claimant
Circuit Norms
1st Circuit

-2.084***

0.601

-0.1956

-2.084**

0.601

-0.1956

nd

-0.253

0.405

-0.0403

-0.253

0.405

-0.0403

rd

-1.116*

0.454

-0.1364

-1.116†

0.454

-0.1364

th

-1.138*

0.487

-0.1414

-1.138†

0.487

-0.1414

th

-0.547

0.551

-0.0815

-0.547

0.551

-0.0815

th

-0.410

0.403

-0.0631

-0.410

0.403

-0.0631

th

-1.787***

0.459

-0.2416

-1.787**

0.459

-0.2416

th

-0.924*

0.461

-0.1326

-0.924

0.461

-0.1326

0.014

0.471

0.0024

0.014

0.471

0.0024

2 Circuit
3 Circuit
4 Circuit
5 Circuit
6 Circuit
7 Circuit
8 Circuit
th

10 Circuit
th

11 Circuit

-1.538**

0.583

-0.1714

-1.538*

0.583

-0.1714

D.C. Circuit

-1.223*

0.578

-0.152

-1.223

0.578

-0.152

0.322

0.406

0.322

0.406

Yearly Controls
2002

0.0597
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0.0597

Table A.3 (cont.): Logistic Model of Judicial Behavior in the U.S. Court of Appeals (2001-2009)
2003
-0.365
0.323
-0.0581
-0.365
0.323
-0.0581
2004

-0.072

0.380

-0.0121

-0.072

0.380

-0.0121

2005

-0.080

0.524

-0.0134

-0.080

0.524

-0.0134

2006

-0.236

0.256

-0.0381

-0.236

0.256

-0.0381

2007

-1.200***

0.302

-0.1531

-1.200**

0.302

-0.1531

2008

-0.532

0.401

-0.0798

-0.532

0.401

-0.0798

2009

-0.286

0.588

-0.0455

-0.286

0.588

-0.0455

Constant
-0.008
0.806
-0.008
0.806
N
3,985
3,985
Log pseudo likelihood
-1911.3541
-1911.3541
% Correctly Predicted
78.42%
† p < .10 two-tailed, *p < .05 two-tailed. **p < .01 two-tailed, ***p < .001 two-tailed.
Note: Model serves as a validity check on the behavior of Latino judges by controlling for Judge Carlos F.
Lucero. The dependent variable is a vote in favor of racial and ethnic minorities. Model 7 cluster around
judge (304 clusters). Model 8 clusters around the pane (1,329)
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APPENDIX B: Logistic Model of Panel Outcomes (Includes Variables that Account for the Partisan Composition of Panels)
Table B.1: Logistic Model of Panel Outcomes in the U.S. Court of Appeals (2001-2009)
Model 3 (Constrained Model)
Model 4 (Full Model)
Robust
Discrete
Discrete
Coef.
Robust
Variables
SE
Change
Coef.
Change
SE
(min  max)
(min  max)
Social Composition of Panel
One Latino Judge on a Panel
One Latino Judge on a
Panel*Latino Claimant
One Black Judge on a Panel
One Black Judge on a Panel*Black
Claimant

-1.807***

0.322

-0.1983

-1.346***

0.333

-0.1622

---

---

---

-2.308**

0.839

-0.1912

0.416*

0.191

0.0739

-0.191

0.346

-0.0306

---

---

---

0.865*

0.388

0.1657

One Female Judge on a Panel

0.246

0.206

0.0423

0.266

0.214

0.0451

Two Female Judges on a Panel

0.844***

0.257

0.1644

0.814**

0.269

0.1561

Average Age of Panel

-0.007

0.015

-0.0385

0.016

-0.0782

-0.014

Partisan Composition of Panel
One Democrat on a Panel

0.349†

0.191

0.0594

0.465*

0.204

0.0788

Two Democrats on a Panel

0.042

0.245

0.0070

0.035

0.255

0.0058

All Democrats on a Panel

0.591†

0.352

0.1134

0.749†

0.395

0.147

-0.187

0.969

-0.0271

0.327

1.025

0.0451

0.872

1.199

0.1875

1.298

1.260

0.2855

Attitudes & Strategic Interaction
Circuit Ideological Median
Supreme Court Ideological Median
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Table B.1 (cont.): Logistic Model of Panel Outcomes in the U.S. Court of Appeals (2001-2009)
Favorable Lower Court Decision
2.285***
0.314
0.5072
2.385***
0.316

0.5261

Case Facts
Discrimination Case

-0.011

0.174

-0.0018

-0.038

0.182

-0.0063

Hostile Work Environment Case

0.318

0.244

0.0568

0.331

0.248

0.0586

Amicus Curiae Brief

0.223

0.299

0.0393

0.284

0.317

0.0503

Black Claimant

0.053

0.208

0.0089

-0.155

0.259

-0.0258

Latino Claimant

0.722*

0.292

0.1387

0.317

0.1949

-0.174

0.432

-0.0277

-0.021

0.445

-0.0035

0.489

0.509

0.0922

0.400

0.507

0.0731

Asian Claimant
Middle Eastern Claimant

0.985**

Circuit Norms
1st Circuit

-2.189*

0.924

-0.1941

-2.279*

0.962

-0.1944

nd

-0.356

0.499

-0.054

0.154

0.512

0.0263

rd

-1.440*

0.672

-0.155

-1.472*

0.665

-0.154

th

4 Circuit

-1.767*

0.712

-0.1787

-1.807*

0.732

-0.1782

5th Circuit

2 Circuit
3 Circuit

-0.582

0.836

-0.0838

-0.680

0.857

-0.0939

th

-0.870

0.624

-0.1156

-0.677

0.635

-0.0932

th

-2.522***

0.707

-0.3069

-2.502***

0.720

-0.3051

th

-1.541*

0.673

-0.1919

-1.480*

0.691

-0.1821

0.099

0.662

0.0169

0.261

0.675

0.0458

6 Circuit
7 Circuit
8 Circuit
th

10 Circuit
11th Circuit

-2.065**

0.786

-0.1941

-2.087**

0.808

-0.1919

D.C. Circuit

-2.029*

0.872

-0.1995

-2.106*

0.913

-0.1996

Yearly Controls
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Table B.1 (cont.): Logistic Model of Panel Outcomes in the U.S. Court of Appeals (2001-2009)
2002
0.181
0.541
0.0317
0.267
0.572

0.0473

2003

-0.519

0.377

-0.0784

-0.336

0.402

-0.0518

2004

-0.042

0.434

-0.0069

-0.041

0.461

-0.0066

2005

0.135

0.504

0.0232

0.210

0.538

0.0363

2006

-0.475

0.363

-0.071

-0.618†

0.363

-0.0878

2007

-1.322***

0.403

-0.1595

-1.413***

0.424

-0.1632

2008

-0.914†

0.475

-0.1211

-0.988*

0.473

-0.1267

2009

-0.535

0.728

-0.0777

-0.891

0.766

-0.1157

0.172

1.281

0.339

1.331

Constant
N
Log Pseudo Likelihood

1274

1274

-614.44487

-577.00744

Correctly Predicted
78.48%
80.14%
†p < .10, two tailed; *p < .05, two-tailed; **p < .01, two-tailed; ***p < .001, two-tailed.
Note: Models serve as a validity check on panel outcomes by controlling for the partisan composition of the
panel. The dependent variable is panel ruling in favor of the claimant. All decisions are clustered around panel
per claim (1,329).
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Appendix C: Logistic Model of Majority Opinion Writing Model (Clusters Observations Around Panel)
Table C.1: Logistic Model of Majority Opinion Writing in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 2001-2009

Black Judge

Model 3 (Constrained)
Discrete
SE
Coef.
Change
Robust
(min  max)
0.512*
0.194
0.1208

Model 4 (Fully Specified)
Discrete
SE
Coef.
Change
Robust
(min  max)
0.480*
0.220
0.1129

Latino Judge

0.420

0.263

0.0989

0.606†

0.340

0.1446

Female Judge

-0.353*

0.168

-0.0760

-0.150

0.214

-0.0331

0.204

0.148

0.0465

0.212

0.152

0.0483

Chief Judge

-0.532*

0.179

-0.1088

0.053

0.310

0.012

Judge Designate

-0.034

0.235

-0.0077

-0.178

0.350

-0.0386

0.567**
0.528**

0.163
0.153

0.1298
0.1205

0.706***
0.529**

0.181
0.152

0.1619
0.1205

0.099

0.258

0.0244

0.097

0.259

0.0237

-0.007
---

0.117
---

-0.0016
---

0.030
-1.217*

0.125
0.389

0.0067
-0.2110

Variables

Ivy League Education

Presiding Judge
Proximate Ideological
Judge
Circuit Ideological
Distance
Multiple Issues
Chief Judge*Multiple
Issues
Designate
Judge*Multiple Issues
Latino Judge*Presiding
Judge

---

---

---

0.358

0.500

0.0839

---

---

---

-0.489

0.459

-0.0997
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Table C.1 (cont.): Logistic Model of Majority Opinion Writing in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 20012009
Black Judge*Presiding
-------0.092
0.481
-0.0203
Judge
Female
-------0.587†
0.323
-0.1186
Judge*Presiding Judge
Constant

-1.086***

0.159

-1.157***

0.164

0.1129

N
1420
1420
Log pseudo likelihood
-895.18409
-889.85468
Correctly Predicted
65.42%
66.20%
Note: This model serves as a validity check on majority opinion assignments by clustering around the
panel decision. The dependent variable is Majority Opinion Writer. This model excludes the 4th circuit,
judges who dissent from the majority opinion, and per curium decisions. It also excludes Asian American
judges to ease the interpretation of the results. Observations are clustered around case. There are 487
clusters. †p < .10, two-tailed; *p <.05, two-tailed; **p <.01, two-tailed; *** p <.001, two-tailed.
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